attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for jnunemaker/httparty

Attack Surface: Unsafe URL Construction

• Description: Vulnerabilities from building URLs by directly embedding user-controlled data without proper sanitization, leading to URL injection.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty's get, post, etc., methods accept URL strings, making it straightforward to construct URLs by directly interpolating user input, which can be dangerous if not handled carefully.
• Example:
  • Code: HTTParty.get("https://api.example.com/resources/#{params[:resource]}") where params[:resource] comes directly from user input.
  • Malicious Input: params[:resource] = "../../../sensitive-data"
  • Resulting URL: https://api.example.com/resources/../../../sensitive-data - potentially accessing unintended resources if the server is vulnerable to path traversal.
• Impact: Unauthorized resource access, redirection to malicious sites, bypassing security controls.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation: Validate and sanitize user input before using it in URLs. Use whitelists or regular expressions to ensure input conforms to expected formats.
  • URL Encoding: Properly URL-encode user-provided data before embedding it in URLs using methods like URI.encode_www_form_component in Ruby.
  • Parameterized Queries: Utilize HTTParty's query: option for dynamic data in URLs: HTTParty.get("https://api.example.com/resources", query: { resource: params[:resource] }).

Attack Surface: Header Injection

• Description: Injecting malicious HTTP headers by directly using user-controlled data in header values, leading to various header-based attacks.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty's headers: option in request methods allows setting custom headers, making it possible to use user input to define header values, which can be exploited for injection.
• Example:
  • Code: HTTParty.get("https://api.example.com", headers: { "User-Agent": params[:user_agent] })
  • Malicious Input: params[:user_agent] = "MyAgent\r\nX-Evil-Header: malicious-value"
  • Resulting Headers: Potentially injecting X-Evil-Header, leading to response splitting or other header manipulation attacks.
• Impact: HTTP Response Splitting, Session Fixation, Cache Poisoning, information disclosure.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Header Validation: Strictly validate user-provided data intended for headers. Whitelist allowed characters and formats.
  • Avoid User-Controlled Headers: Minimize or eliminate the use of user-provided data to set HTTP headers. If necessary, use predefined header values or map user choices to safe, predefined options.
  • Context-Aware Output Encoding: If dynamic headers are unavoidable, ensure proper encoding based on the header context to prevent injection.

Attack Surface: Body Parameter Manipulation

• Description: Injecting malicious data into request bodies when using user-controlled data to construct request bodies, potentially leading to server-side vulnerabilities.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty's body: and query: options allow setting request bodies and query parameters, making it easy to use user input in these parts of the request, which can be exploited if the server-side application is vulnerable.
• Example:
  • Code: HTTParty.post("https://api.example.com/submit", body: { data: params[:payload] })
  • Malicious Input: params[:payload] = "{\"key\": \"value\", \"__proto__\": {\"polluted\": true}}" (Example of prototype pollution if server-side uses vulnerable JavaScript parsing).
  • Resulting Body: The request body contains potentially malicious data that could exploit server-side vulnerabilities depending on how the body is processed.
• Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, Prototype Pollution, or other server-side vulnerabilities depending on server-side processing.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on server-side processing)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize user input before including it in request bodies. Encode data according to the expected content type (e.g., JSON encoding for JSON bodies).
  • Context-Aware Output Encoding: If the server reflects the body content in responses, ensure proper output encoding to prevent XSS.
  • Secure Server-Side Processing: Implement robust server-side input validation and secure coding practices to handle request bodies safely and prevent injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Insecure Deserialization (Automatic Parsing)

• Description: Vulnerabilities from automatically deserializing responses, especially if a malicious server can control the Content-Type and send crafted malicious data.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty automatically parses responses based on the Content-Type header, potentially using libraries vulnerable to insecure deserialization, making it a vector if communicating with untrusted services.
• Example:
  • Scenario: Communicating with a potentially compromised external API.
  • Malicious Response: Server sends a response with Content-Type: application/json but the body contains malicious JSON data designed to exploit a vulnerability in the JSON parsing library used by HTTParty.
  • HTTParty Action: HTTParty automatically attempts to parse the JSON response, potentially triggering the deserialization vulnerability.
• Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), data corruption, depending on the deserialization vulnerability.
• Risk Severity: Critical to High (depending on the vulnerability)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Explicit Parsing: Disable automatic parsing and explicitly parse responses using a secure and well-maintained parsing library, carefully controlling the parsing process. Configure HTTParty to not automatically parse responses and handle parsing manually.
  • Content-Type Validation: Validate the Content-Type header of responses to ensure it matches expectations and is from a trusted source before parsing.
  • Dependency Updates: Keep HTTParty and its dependencies (including parsing libraries) up to date to patch known deserialization vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection (XML Parsing)

• Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in XML parsing libraries to access local files, perform SSRF, or cause DoS through malicious XML responses.
• How HTTParty contributes: If used to parse XML responses (automatically or explicitly), and the underlying XML parser is not secured, HTTParty can become a vector for XXE attacks when processing XML from untrusted sources.
• Example:
  • Scenario: Parsing XML responses from an untrusted external service using HTTParty.
  • Malicious XML Response: Response contains an XML payload with an external entity definition like: <!DOCTYPE root [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]> <root>&xxe;</root>
  • HTTParty Action: HTTParty's XML parsing (if enabled) might process the external entity, potentially exposing the contents of /etc/passwd.
• Impact: Local file disclosure, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Denial of Service (DoS).
• Risk Severity: High to Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Disable External Entity Processing: Configure the XML parsing library used by HTTParty to disable external entity processing. This is often the most effective mitigation. Ensure your XML parsing configuration in your application disables external entities.
  • Use Safe XML Parsing Libraries: Ensure the underlying XML parsing library is secure and up-to-date.
  • Input Validation (Content-Type): Validate the Content-Type header and only parse XML if expected and from a trusted source.

Attack Surface: Insecure SSL/TLS Configuration

• Description: Weakening or disabling SSL/TLS security, making HTTPS connections vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty provides the verify: false option to disable SSL certificate verification and other SSL/TLS configuration options that, if misused, can weaken security.
• Example:
  • Code: HTTParty.get("https://api.example.com", verify: false)
  • Configuration: Setting verify: false disables SSL certificate verification in HTTParty.
  • Attack Scenario: Man-in-the-middle attacker can intercept and modify communication without being detected because certificate verification is disabled by HTTParty's configuration.
• Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, data interception, data manipulation, credential theft.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Enable SSL/TLS Verification: Always enable SSL/TLS certificate verification (verify: true or omit the verify option for default secure behavior) in production environments when using HTTParty. Never set verify: false in production.
  • Use Strong SSL/TLS Protocols: Ensure that strong and up-to-date SSL/TLS protocols are used by the underlying Ruby environment and HTTParty.
  • Certificate Pinning (Advanced): For highly sensitive applications, consider certificate pinning to further enhance security by only trusting specific certificates or certificate authorities.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities (Transitive & HTTParty Itself)

• Description: Vulnerabilities in HTTParty's dependencies or in HTTParty itself due to outdated versions, potentially leading to various security issues.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty relies on other gems, and vulnerabilities in these dependencies or in HTTParty itself can indirectly affect applications using it. Using outdated versions of HTTParty or its dependencies exposes the application to known flaws.
• Example:
  • Transitive Dependency: A critical vulnerability discovered in a gem used by HTTParty for HTTP parsing, which could be exploited through HTTParty.
  • Outdated HTTParty: Using an old version of HTTParty that has a known Remote Code Execution vulnerability that has been patched in newer versions.
• Impact: Wide range of impacts depending on the specific vulnerability, including Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), information disclosure, etc.
• Risk Severity: Varies, can be Critical to High depending on the vulnerability.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Dependency Auditing: Regularly audit project dependencies, including HTTParty and its transitive dependencies, for known vulnerabilities using tools like bundler-audit or brakeman.
  • Dependency Updates: Keep HTTParty and all dependencies up to date with the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities. Use dependency management tools to automate updates.
  • Vulnerability Monitoring: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases to stay informed about new vulnerabilities affecting HTTParty and its dependencies.

Attack Surface: Exposure of Sensitive Information in Logs/Debugging

• Description: Accidentally logging sensitive data (API keys, tokens, user data) in logs or debugging output, potentially exposing credentials or confidential information.
• How HTTParty contributes: HTTParty's debug_output option and general logging practices in applications using HTTParty can lead to sensitive data exposure if request/response data is logged without proper sanitization.
• Example:
  • Code: HTTParty.get("https://api.example.com/sensitive-endpoint", debug_output: $stdout) (enabling debug output to standard output, which might be logged).
  • Logging: Logging full request and response bodies by default in application logs when using HTTParty, without considering sensitive data.
  • Result: Sensitive data included in requests or responses (e.g., API keys in headers, user passwords in request bodies) might be written to logs, making them accessible to unauthorized parties.
• Impact: Confidentiality breach, exposure of credentials, potential account compromise.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Disable Debugging in Production: Disable HTTParty's debug_output option in production environments.
  • Log Sanitization: Sanitize logs to remove or mask sensitive data before logging request and response information. Implement whitelists or blacklists for headers and body parameters to be logged.
  • Secure Logging Practices: Store logs securely, restrict access to logs, and consider using dedicated logging systems with security features. Avoid logging sensitive data if possible.