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Threat Model Analysis for jnunemaker/httparty

Threat: URL Injection

  • Description: An attacker manipulates user-controlled input that is directly used to construct the URL in an httparty request. By injecting malicious characters or URLs, the attacker can redirect the request to an unintended destination, potentially an attacker-controlled server or internal resource. This is done by exploiting insufficient input validation before the URL is passed to httparty's request methods (e.g., get, post).
  • Impact:
    • Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers.
    • Unauthorized access to internal network resources (SSRF).
    • Redirection to phishing or malware distribution sites.
  • HTTParty Component Affected: httparty request methods (get, post, put, delete, etc.) and URL construction within the application code using httparty.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user-provided input before incorporating it into URLs.
    • Parameterized Requests/URL Building: Utilize parameterized requests or secure URL building methods provided by Ruby or httparty to construct URLs safely, avoiding direct string concatenation of user input into URLs.
    • Allow-listing: Implement allow-lists of permitted domains or URL paths to restrict request destinations to known and trusted locations.

Threat: Insecure Deserialization of Responses

  • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities arising from the automatic deserialization of HTTP responses by httparty. If the application trusts and processes deserialized data from untrusted sources without validation, attackers can leverage deserialization flaws in the parsing libraries (e.g., JSON or XML parsers) or in the application's logic that handles the deserialized data. This is relevant when httparty is used to interact with external APIs returning formats like JSON or XML, and the application relies on httparty's automatic parsing.
  • Impact:
    • Remote Code Execution (if deserialization vulnerabilities exist in parsing libraries or application logic).
    • Data corruption or manipulation.
    • Denial of Service.
  • HTTParty Component Affected: httparty's automatic response parsing (JSON, XML, etc.) and the underlying parsing libraries used by Ruby.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical if RCE is possible)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Response Validation: Validate the structure and content of responses after deserialization but before processing the data in the application logic.
    • Schema Validation: Implement schema validation for expected response formats (e.g., JSON Schema).
    • Error Handling: Implement robust error handling for deserialization failures and unexpected response formats.
    • Explicit Parsing: Consider disabling automatic deserialization and handling response parsing explicitly to gain more control and validation opportunities.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep JSON and XML parsing libraries used by Ruby and httparty up-to-date to patch known deserialization vulnerabilities.

Threat: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection (If handling XML responses)

  • Description: If the application uses httparty to fetch and parse XML responses, and the XML parser is not securely configured, an attacker can exploit XXE injection vulnerabilities. By crafting malicious XML responses with external entity declarations, the attacker can force the server to access local files, internal network resources, or trigger denial of service. This is relevant when httparty is used to interact with external services returning XML and the application relies on httparty or Ruby's default XML parsing behavior.
  • Impact:
    • Local file disclosure (reading sensitive files on the server).
    • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to internal network or external resources.
    • Denial of Service.
  • HTTParty Component Affected: httparty's XML response parsing and the underlying XML parsing library (e.g., Nokogiri).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable External Entity Processing: Configure the XML parser to disable processing of external entities. In Nokogiri, this is typically done by setting options during parsing.
    • Input Sanitization (XML): Sanitize or validate XML responses before parsing, although disabling external entities is the primary defense.
    • Avoid XML from Untrusted Sources: If possible, avoid processing XML responses from untrusted external sources.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep the XML parsing library (Nokogiri) up-to-date to patch any known XXE vulnerabilities.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in HTTParty or its Dependencies

  • Description: HTTParty itself or its dependencies (e.g., libraries for HTTP handling, parsing, etc.) might contain security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities if they are present in the application's deployed version of httparty or its dependencies. This is a general dependency management risk applicable to any library, including httparty.
  • Impact:
    • Varies widely depending on the specific vulnerability, ranging from Remote Code Execution to Denial of Service or Information Disclosure.
  • HTTParty Component Affected: Entire httparty library and its dependencies.
  • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to Low depending on the vulnerability, considering potential for RCE, we classify as High to Critical overall)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Regularly update httparty and all its dependencies to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Dependency Scanning: Use dependency scanning tools (e.g., Bundler Audit, Gemnasium, Snyk) to automatically identify vulnerable dependencies in your project.
    • Security Monitoring: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases related to Ruby and httparty to stay informed about new threats.

Threat: Insecure TLS/SSL Configuration

  • Description: Misconfiguration of TLS/SSL settings when using httparty can weaken the security of HTTPS connections. For example, disabling certificate verification or using weak cipher suites can make the application vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. This occurs when developers incorrectly configure httparty's SSL options, such as verify: false or specifying insecure ciphers.
  • Impact:
    • Data interception and eavesdropping (man-in-the-middle attacks).
    • Data modification in transit.
    • Credential theft.
  • HTTParty Component Affected: httparty's SSL configuration options (e.g., ssl_ca_cert, ssl_verify, ssl_version, ciphers).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Certificate Verification: Ensure TLS/SSL certificate verification is enabled by default and not explicitly disabled unless absolutely necessary and with strong justification.
    • Use Strong Ciphers and TLS Protocols: Configure httparty to use strong cipher suites and modern TLS protocols (TLS 1.2 or higher). Avoid using weak or deprecated ciphers and protocols.
    • Proper SSL Option Configuration: Carefully review and correctly configure httparty's SSL options based on security best practices.