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Attack Tree Analysis for jnunemaker/httparty

Objective: To execute arbitrary code, exfiltrate sensitive data, or manipulate application behavior by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations within the httparty library or its usage within the target application.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Compromise Application via HTTParty
                                                  |
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                               |                               
  1.  Data Exfiltration/Manipulation             2.  Code Execution/Injection          
        |                                               |                               
  =======|====================                 =======|====================             
  |      |                   |                 |      |                   |             
1.1   1.2                 1.3               2.1    2.2                 2.3           
Sniff  Manipulate      Leak via              RCE    RCE via             SSRF via      
Resp.  Request         Debugging/            via    Unsafe              Follow        
(MITM) (MITM)          Logging               YAML   XML Parsing         Redirects     
[CRIT] [CRIT]          [CRITICAL]            [CRIT] (XXE)                [CRITICAL]    
                                             Load   [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Exfiltration/Manipulation

  • 1.1 Sniff Response (MITM) [CRITICAL]

    • Description: If the application using httparty doesn't properly validate SSL/TLS certificates (e.g., uses verify: false or a misconfigured CA bundle), an attacker can perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack. They can intercept and potentially modify the responses received by httparty.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Requires network access and misconfiguration, but misconfigurations are common.)
    • Impact: High (Complete compromise of data confidentiality and integrity.)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires setting up a MITM position, but tools are readily available.)
    • Skill Level: Medium (Requires understanding of network protocols and MITM techniques.)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Can be detected with network monitoring and intrusion detection systems, but may be missed if not configured properly.)
    • Actionable Insight:
      • Enforce strict SSL/TLS certificate validation. Ensure verify: true (the default) is used.
      • Use a correctly configured and regularly updated CA bundle.
      • Consider certificate pinning for high-security scenarios.
      • Code Review: Search for verify: false or insecure ssl_context configurations.
      • Testing: Use tools like mitmproxy to test certificate validation.

  • 1.2 Manipulate Request (MITM) [CRITICAL]

    • Description: Similar to 1.1, a MITM attacker can modify the requests sent by httparty if SSL/TLS is not properly enforced.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Same conditions as 1.1)
    • Impact: High (Can lead to unauthorized actions, data modification, or bypassing security controls.)
    • Effort: Medium (Same as 1.1)
    • Skill Level: Medium (Same as 1.1)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Same as 1.1)
    • Actionable Insight: Same as 1.1.

  • 1.3 Leak via Debugging/Logging [CRITICAL]

    • Description: httparty can log request/response details. If sensitive information is included and logs are insecure, an attacker can gain access.
    • Likelihood: High (Very common misconfiguration.)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on the leaked data.)
    • Effort: Low (Requires access to log files.)
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of file systems.)
    • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium (Easy if logs are monitored, but often overlooked.)
    • Actionable Insight:
      • Review Logging Configuration: Avoid logging sensitive data. Use redaction.
      • Secure Log Storage: Ensure logs are stored securely with access controls and encryption.
      • Log Rotation and Retention: Implement rotation and a limited retention policy.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Code Execution/Injection

  • 2.1 RCE via YAML Load [CRITICAL]

    • Description: If the application fetches data from an untrusted source and uses YAML.load, an attacker can inject malicious YAML for RCE.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Requires untrusted source and YAML.load.)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise.)
    • Effort: Medium (Crafting a malicious YAML payload.)
    • Skill Level: Medium to High (YAML vulnerabilities and exploit development.)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Code analysis, intrusion detection, but obfuscation is possible.)
    • Actionable Insight:
      • Use YAML.safe_load: Always use YAML.safe_load with untrusted sources. Never YAML.load.
      • Input Validation: Validate content type and structure before parsing.
      • CSP: Restrict data sources.

  • 2.2 RCE via Unsafe XML Parsing (XXE) [CRITICAL]

    • Description: Similar to 2.1, fetching XML from untrusted sources and using a vulnerable parser can lead to XXE attacks (file disclosure, SSRF, RCE).
    • Likelihood: Medium (Untrusted source and vulnerable parser.)
    • Impact: High to Very High (File disclosure to system compromise.)
    • Effort: Medium (Crafting a malicious XML payload.)
    • Skill Level: Medium to High (XML vulnerabilities and exploit development.)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Code analysis, intrusion detection, WAFs, but obfuscation is possible.)
    • Actionable Insight:
      • Disable External Entities: Configure the XML parser to disable external entities and DTDs.
      • Input Validation: Validate content type and structure before parsing.
      • Use a Safe XML Parser: Choose a secure parser or configuration.

  • 2.3 SSRF via Follow Redirects [CRITICAL]

    • Description: httparty follows redirects by default. An attacker controlling the initial URL can redirect to internal resources (SSRF).
    • Likelihood: Medium (Requires control of initial URL and a vulnerable internal service.)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on accessible internal resources.)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Finding a vulnerable endpoint and crafting a redirect URL.)
    • Skill Level: Medium (Understanding of SSRF and network reconnaissance.)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Network monitoring, intrusion detection, but can be hard to distinguish.)
    • Actionable Insight:
      • Limit Redirects: Use the :limit option.
      • Whitelist Allowed Hosts: Reject redirects to unknown hosts.
      • Validate Redirect URLs: Check against allowed patterns or a whitelist.
      • Disable Redirects: Use follow_redirects: false if possible.