mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for jnunemaker/httparty

Mitigation Strategy: Explicitly Specify Parser

• Description:

  1. Identify all HTTParty calls: Search the codebase for all instances where HTTParty.get, HTTParty.post, etc., are used.
  2. Specify the format option: For each HTTParty call, explicitly add the :format option, setting it to the expected data format (e.g., :json, :xml). Do not rely on httparty's automatic detection based on the Content-Type header. This forces httparty to use the specified parser, regardless of what the server sends.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Unexpected Data Handling/Parsing Issues (XML/JSON): (Severity: High) - Prevents httparty from automatically choosing a parser based on a potentially malicious Content-Type header, reducing the risk of vulnerabilities in the underlying parsing libraries.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: Medium) - Indirectly helps mitigate DoS by preventing httparty from attempting to parse a large response with an unexpected parser.
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): (Severity: Critical) - Reduces the risk of RCE by ensuring the correct parser is used, minimizing the attack surface.

• Impact:

  • Unexpected Data Handling/Parsing Issues: Risk significantly reduced. httparty will no longer guess the parser.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Risk slightly reduced; provides a small contribution to overall DoS protection.
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Risk significantly reduced, as a potential attack vector is mitigated.

• Currently Implemented:

  • /app/services/api_client.rb: Implemented for JSON parsing.
  • /app/models/data_fetcher.rb: Partially implemented; format is specified in some calls.

• Missing Implementation:

  • /app/models/data_fetcher.rb: format is not consistently specified.
  • /app/controllers/external_data_controller.rb: No parser specification; relies entirely on automatic parsing.

Mitigation Strategy: Strict SSL/TLS Verification (Control via httparty Options)

• Description:

  1. Audit for :verify => false: Thoroughly search the entire codebase for any instances of HTTParty calls that include the :verify => false option.
  2. Remove or conditionalize (with extreme caution): Remove any occurrences of :verify => false found in production code. If it's absolutely necessary for development or testing (and this should be rare and well-justified), use environment variables to control its behavior, ensuring it defaults to true (or is omitted, as true is the default) in production. The best practice is to never use :verify => false.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: (Severity: Critical) - Ensures that httparty verifies the SSL/TLS certificate of the server, preventing attackers from intercepting the connection.

• Impact:

  • Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: Risk eliminated (assuming the system's CA store is not compromised and :verify => false is never used in production).

• Currently Implemented:

  • /config/initializers/httparty.rb: A global default is set to :verify => true, but this could be overridden locally.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Need a thorough code review to ensure no local overrides of the global :verify => true setting exist within individual HTTParty calls.

Mitigation Strategy: Controlled Redirection Following (Using httparty Options)

• Description:

  1. Assess redirection needs: Determine if following redirects is essential for each HTTParty call.
  2. Disable if unnecessary: If redirects are not needed, use :follow_redirects => false within the HTTParty call to disable them completely.
  3. Limit redirects: If redirects are required, use :max_redirects within the HTTParty call to set a low, reasonable limit (e.g., 3). This prevents infinite redirect loops and limits the potential for SSRF.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): (Severity: High) - Limiting redirects reduces the risk of httparty being tricked into accessing internal resources. (Note: This is not a complete SSRF solution; URL validation is still crucial, but that's outside the scope of direct httparty interaction.)
  • Open Redirects: (Severity: Medium) - Limiting redirects reduces the risk, but URL validation is still needed for complete protection.
  • Infinite Redirect Loops: (Severity: Low) - :max_redirects directly prevents infinite loops.

• Impact:

  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Risk reduced, but not eliminated. Further mitigation (URL validation) is required.
  • Open Redirects: Risk reduced, but not eliminated. Further mitigation (URL validation) is required.
  • Infinite Redirect Loops: Risk eliminated.

• Currently Implemented:

  • /app/services/link_checker.rb: :max_redirects is set to 5.

• Missing Implementation:

  • /app/controllers/proxy_controller.rb: This controller blindly follows redirects (no max_redirects or follow_redirects options are used), making it highly vulnerable.
  • Not consistently applied across all HTTParty calls.

Mitigation Strategy: Set Timeouts (Using httparty Options)

• Description:

  1. Analyze response times: Determine reasonable expected response times for each external API.
  2. Set :timeout: For every HTTParty call, set the :timeout option to a value slightly above the expected response time (e.g., 5 seconds, 10 seconds). This prevents httparty from waiting indefinitely.
  3. Set granular timeouts: Set :read_timeout, :connect_timeout and :write_timeout to a value slightly above the expected response time.

• Threats Mitigated:

  • Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: Medium) - Prevents httparty from hanging indefinitely due to slow or unresponsive external services, which could lead to resource exhaustion in your application.

• Impact:

  • Denial of Service (DoS): Risk significantly reduced. httparty will no longer wait indefinitely for responses.

• Currently Implemented:

  • /app/services/api_client.rb: A global timeout of 10 seconds is set, but it's not applied to all individual HTTParty calls.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Many individual HTTParty calls do not have specific :timeout, :read_timeout, :connect_timeout or :write_timeout options set.
  • Granular timeouts are not implemented.