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Threat Model Analysis for jnunemaker/httparty

Threat: SSL/TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

  • Threat: SSL/TLS Certificate Validation Bypass

    • Description: An attacker performs a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, intercepting the HTTPS connection. They present a forged certificate. If httparty is misconfigured to ignore validation errors (e.g., verify: false), the application accepts the fake certificate, allowing the attacker to decrypt and modify traffic.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of confidentiality and integrity. Attacker can steal credentials, API keys, user data, and inject malicious data.
    • Affected HTTParty Component: The HTTParty.get, HTTParty.post (and other request methods), specifically the :verify option within the options hash. This directly controls httparty's behavior regarding certificate verification.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Never disable SSL verification (verify: false) in production. Ensure verify: true (the default) is always used.
      • Use code review and static analysis to detect verify: false.
      • Educate developers on the importance of SSL/TLS validation.
      • Consider certificate pinning (requires custom SSL context).

Threat: Request Parameter Tampering (via Injection)

  • Threat: Request Parameter Tampering (via Injection)

    • Description: An attacker manipulates user-supplied data used to construct httparty requests. Without proper sanitization/encoding, the attacker injects malicious values into URL parameters, headers, or the body. This alters the request's behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data manipulation on the target server. While httparty does some encoding, it's not a complete defense against injection.
    • Impact: Depends on the target API. Could range from minor data corruption to significant breaches or remote code execution on the target server.
    • Affected HTTParty Component: HTTParty.get, HTTParty.post (and others), specifically how :query, :body, and :headers are constructed. httparty's automatic parameter serialization is a factor, as it can be misused if input isn't validated.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always validate and sanitize all user-supplied data before using it in any part of an httparty request.
      • Use httparty's features for setting parameters (:query, :body, :headers) rather than manual string concatenation.
      • Understand the expected data types/formats for the target API.
      • Use a robust input validation library.

Threat: Unsafe Response Parsing

  • Threat: Unsafe Response Parsing

    • Description: httparty automatically parses responses (JSON, XML) based on Content-Type or the format option. An attacker crafts a malicious response to exploit vulnerabilities in the parsing library (e.g., a vulnerable JSON parser).
    • Impact: Could lead to denial of service, arbitrary code execution, or information disclosure, depending on the parsing library vulnerability.
    • Affected HTTParty Component: The response parsing logic within httparty, relying on external libraries like MultiJson (and its underlying parsers). The format option and automatic format detection are relevant.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep MultiJson and its underlying parsing libraries up-to-date.
      • Explicitly specify the expected response format (e.g., format: :json).
      • Validate the structure and content of the parsed response after httparty parses it. Don't assume safety. Use a schema validator if available.

Threat: Sensitive Data Leakage (in Requests)

  • Threat: Sensitive Data Leakage (in Requests)

    • Description: Sensitive information (API keys, tokens, etc.) is accidentally included in httparty requests, either hardcoded or inadvertently logged. This is a direct threat because httparty is the mechanism by which the data is transmitted.
    • Impact: Exposure of credentials, leading to unauthorized access.
    • Affected HTTParty Component: Any httparty request method (get, post, etc.) where sensitive data might be in the URL, headers, or body.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Never hardcode sensitive information.
      • Use environment variables or a secure configuration system.
      • Implement logging that redacts or omits sensitive data. Be careful with request bodies/headers.
      • Use code review and static analysis.

Threat: Timeout Misconfiguration

  • Threat: Timeout Misconfiguration

    • Description: httparty requests are made without appropriate timeouts, or with timeouts that are too high. A slow server can cause the application to hang, leading to resource exhaustion.
    • Impact: Application hangs or becomes unresponsive (denial of service for the application).
    • Affected HTTParty Component: The timeout option in HTTParty.get, HTTParty.post (and others). This is a direct configuration option within httparty.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always set appropriate timeouts using the :timeout option.
      • Choose reasonable timeouts for the expected response time.
      • Consider separate timeouts for connection and overall request.
      • Test under simulated network latency.