Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
88 lines (68 loc) · 8.41 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

88 lines (68 loc) · 8.41 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for jordansissel/fpm

Objective: Compromise application using FPM by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within FPM itself or its usage (focusing on high-risk areas).

Attack Tree Visualization

└── [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using FPM ├── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Manipulation Vulnerabilities in FPM │ ├── AND Provide Malicious Input Files │ │ ├── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Code into Source Files │ │ │ └── [CRITICAL NODE] Inject Web Shell/Backdoor in Application Code │ │ ├── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Path Traversal Vulnerabilities │ │ │ └── OR Path Traversal in Source Paths │ │ │ └── Access Sensitive Files Outside Intended Scope │ ├── AND [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities in FPM's Dependencies │ │ └── OR Vulnerable Ruby Gems or Libraries │ │ └── [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Dependencies ├── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of FPM │ ├── AND [HIGH-RISK PATH] Run FPM with Elevated Privileges Unnecessarily │ │ └── OR FPM Running as Root │ │ └── [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerability in FPM to Escalate Privileges │ └── AND [HIGH-RISK PATH] Use Outdated or Unpatched Version of FPM │ └── OR Known Vulnerabilities in Older FPM Versions │ └── [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities └── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Package Installation Vulnerabilities (Downstream from FPM, but relevant) ├── AND [HIGH-RISK PATH] Malicious Package Created by FPM │ └── OR [HIGH-RISK PATH] Package Contains Malicious Payload │ └── [CRITICAL NODE] Execute Malicious Code During Package Installation

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using FPM (Root Node):

  • This is the ultimate attacker goal. Success means gaining unauthorized access, control, or causing damage to the application that utilizes FPM for packaging and deployment.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Manipulation Vulnerabilities in FPM:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers target vulnerabilities arising from how FPM handles input data, specifically source files, paths, and potentially configuration.

  • Why High-Risk: Input manipulation is a common and often easily exploitable vulnerability class. Attackers can control the input to FPM, making it a direct and accessible attack surface.

    • Provide Malicious Input Files:

      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject Malicious Code into Source Files:

        • [CRITICAL NODE] Inject Web Shell/Backdoor in Application Code:
          • Attack Vector: An attacker modifies source code files that are input to FPM to include malicious code, such as a web shell or backdoor. When FPM packages this code and the application is deployed, the malicious code becomes active, allowing the attacker to gain remote access and control.
          • Why Critical: Direct code injection leads to immediate and significant compromise. Web shells and backdoors provide persistent access and control.

      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Path Traversal Vulnerabilities:

        • Path Traversal in Source Paths:
          • Access Sensitive Files Outside Intended Scope:
            • Attack Vector: An attacker uses path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) in the source file paths provided to FPM. If FPM doesn't properly sanitize these paths, it might include sensitive files from outside the intended application directory into the package.
            • Why High-Risk: Path traversal is a well-known vulnerability. Exposing sensitive files can lead to information disclosure and further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities in FPM's Dependencies:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in the Ruby gems or libraries that FPM depends on.

  • Why High-Risk: Dependency vulnerabilities are prevalent in software supply chains. FPM, like many applications, relies on external libraries, and vulnerabilities in these libraries can directly impact FPM's security.

    • Vulnerable Ruby Gems or Libraries:
      • [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Dependencies:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers identify and exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in FPM's dependencies. This could involve using existing exploits or adapting them to the specific context of FPM.
        • Why Critical: Exploiting known vulnerabilities is often straightforward if patches are not applied. Dependency vulnerabilities can lead to various impacts, including code execution, denial of service, or information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of FPM:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers leverage insecure configurations or improper usage patterns of FPM in the deployment environment.

  • Why High-Risk: Misconfigurations are common in real-world deployments and can significantly weaken security, making other vulnerabilities easier to exploit.

    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Run FPM with Elevated Privileges Unnecessarily:

      • FPM Running as Root:
        • [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerability in FPM to Escalate Privileges:
          • Attack Vector: If FPM is run with root or administrator privileges (which is often unnecessary), any vulnerability within FPM (even a minor one) can be exploited to escalate privileges to the root level.
          • Why Critical: Running with elevated privileges drastically increases the impact of any vulnerability. Privilege escalation to root grants complete control over the system.

    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Use Outdated or Unpatched Version of FPM:

      • Known Vulnerabilities in Older FPM Versions:
        • [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities:
          • Attack Vector: Using an outdated version of FPM exposes the application to publicly known vulnerabilities that have been patched in newer versions. Attackers can easily find and exploit these vulnerabilities using readily available information and tools.
          • Why Critical: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in outdated software is a very common and effective attack method. It's a low-effort, high-reward scenario for attackers.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Package Installation Vulnerabilities (Downstream from FPM, but relevant):

  • Attack Vector: Attackers target vulnerabilities that arise during the package installation process, which is a downstream consequence of using FPM to create packages.

  • Why High-Risk: Even if FPM itself is secure, vulnerabilities in the package installation process or the resulting malicious package can still compromise the application.

    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Malicious Package Created by FPM:
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Package Contains Malicious Payload:
        • [CRITICAL NODE] Execute Malicious Code During Package Installation:
          • Attack Vector: If an attacker successfully injects malicious code into the input to FPM (as described in "Input Manipulation"), the resulting package created by FPM will contain this malicious payload. When this package is installed on the target system, the malicious code is executed, compromising the application and potentially the system.
          • Why Critical: Code execution during package installation is a powerful attack vector. It allows attackers to gain initial access and establish persistence on the target system.