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Threat Model Analysis for jordansissel/fpm

Threat: Compromised fpm Binary

  • Threat: Compromised fpm Binary
    • Description: An attacker replaces the legitimate fpm binary with a malicious one. This could happen through supply chain attacks or compromised download sources. When developers use this compromised fpm to package their application, the malicious binary injects malware into the resulting package.
    • Impact: Distribution of malware to application users, leading to system compromise, data theft, or other malicious activities on user machines.
    • Affected fpm Component: fpm executable itself, core functionality.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Download fpm from official and trusted sources (e.g., GitHub releases, official package repositories).
      • Verify the integrity of the downloaded fpm binary using checksums (SHA256, etc.) provided by the official source.
      • Use package managers (like apt, yum, brew) to install fpm when possible, as they often provide integrity checks and updates from trusted repositories.
      • Consider using a containerized or isolated build environment to limit the impact of a compromised tool.

Threat: Malicious fpm Dependencies

  • Threat: Malicious fpm Dependencies
    • Description: An attacker compromises a dependency of fpm. fpm relies on Ruby and potentially other gems. If a malicious version of a gem is introduced into the Ruby ecosystem or the build environment, fpm might use it during package creation, leading to malicious code injection into the packaged application.
    • Impact: Similar to compromised binary, this can lead to distribution of malware to application users and compromise of their systems.
    • Affected fpm Component: Dependency resolution and loading within fpm (Ruby gems).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use a dependency lock file (e.g., Gemfile.lock in Ruby) to ensure consistent dependency versions and prevent unexpected updates to potentially malicious versions.
      • Regularly audit and update fpm dependencies.
      • Use vulnerability scanning tools to check fpm dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
      • Source dependencies from trusted repositories and consider using private gem mirrors or repositories for better control.

Threat: Command Injection via fpm Arguments

  • Threat: Command Injection via fpm Arguments
    • Description: An attacker exploits insufficient input sanitization when constructing fpm commands. If parts of the fpm command (e.g., filenames, package metadata) are built dynamically from untrusted input, an attacker can inject malicious commands. For example, by crafting a filename that includes shell commands, they could execute arbitrary code on the build server during package creation.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the build server, potentially leading to build process compromise, data breaches, or malicious modification of the application package.
    • Affected fpm Component: Command-line argument parsing and processing within fpm.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid constructing fpm commands dynamically from untrusted input.
      • If dynamic input is necessary, rigorously sanitize and validate all input before using it in fpm commands. Use parameterized commands or escaping mechanisms provided by the scripting language used to invoke fpm.
      • Apply the principle of least privilege to the build process user, limiting the impact of command injection.

Threat: Accidental Inclusion of Secrets (via fpm packaging)

  • Threat: Accidental Inclusion of Secrets (via fpm packaging)
    • Description: Developers unintentionally include sensitive information like API keys, passwords, or database credentials within the files packaged by fpm. While not directly a vulnerability in fpm itself, fpm's file inclusion mechanism becomes the vector for this issue. Misconfiguration or oversight in what files are provided to fpm for packaging leads to secrets being included in the final application package.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access to systems, data breaches, or account compromise.
    • Affected fpm Component: fpm's file inclusion mechanism, and developer practices in managing secrets during the packaging process.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement robust secret management practices specifically during the build and packaging process. Do not store secrets directly in the codebase or configuration files that are packaged.
      • Use environment variables, dedicated secret management tools, or configuration management systems to manage secrets and ensure they are not inadvertently packaged.
      • Regularly scan the application codebase and build artifacts for accidentally committed secrets.
      • Thoroughly review the list of files and directories provided to fpm for packaging before release to ensure no sensitive information is included.