Attack Surface: Malicious Source Code Injection (via fpm's Source Handling)
Description: An attacker compromises a source that fpm is configured to use (Git repository, package repository, local files), injecting malicious code that fpm then packages.
How fpm Contributes: fpm's core function is to package code from specified sources. It is the direct mechanism by which the malicious code is incorporated into the package. fpm does not inherently validate the integrity of these sources beyond what the underlying package managers (if any) might do.
Example: An attacker compromises a private Git repository that fpm is configured to pull from. fpm then packages the malicious code. Or, fpm is configured to use a compromised version of a package from PyPI.
Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker gains arbitrary code execution on any system where the compromised package is installed.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Source Verification: Rigorously verify the integrity and authenticity of all sources before providing them to fpm. Use checksums, digital signatures (if available via underlying package managers), and GPG-signed commits for Git.
* Version Pinning: Pin all dependency and source versions within the configuration provided to fpm. Use a Gemfile.lock, requirements.txt (with hashes), or equivalent, and ensure fpm respects these.
* Dependency Auditing: Regularly audit all dependencies for known vulnerabilities. This includes dependencies of the software being packaged and dependencies of fpm itself.
* Private Repository Security: Implement strong access controls and multi-factor authentication for any private repositories used as sources by fpm.
Attack Surface: Command Injection via fpm Arguments
Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that is used to construct fpm's command-line arguments, leading to the execution of arbitrary commands on the system where fpm is run.
How fpm Contributes: fpm's command-line interface is the primary interaction point. If arguments are built from untrusted input without proper sanitization, fpm becomes the direct vector for command injection.
Example: A web application uses user-provided input to specify the package type to build with fpm. The user enters deb; rm -rf /. If the application doesn't sanitize, fpm might execute the rm -rf / command.
Impact: Potentially complete system compromise, data loss, or denial of service on the system running fpm (not necessarily the target system for the package).
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Input Sanitization: Never directly use unsanitized user input in fpm commands. Implement strict input validation and escaping.
* Parameterized API (if available): If fpm offers a programmatic API (and you are using it programmatically), use that API to avoid manual string construction.
* Principle of Least Privilege: Run fpm itself with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid running it as root.
* Whitelisting: Use a whitelist of allowed characters or patterns for any input that will be used in fpm arguments.
Description: An attacker injects malicious code into pre-install or post-install scripts that fpm is configured to include in the package.
How fpm Contributes: fpm provides the mechanism to define and include these scripts within the package. It is the direct means by which these scripts are delivered and executed during installation.
Example: An attacker modifies the source code to include a malicious post-install script that downloads and executes a remote payload. fpm packages this script.
Impact: Complete system compromise on the system where the package is installed, as the scripts typically run with installer privileges (often root).
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Script Review: Thoroughly review all pre-install and post-install scripts for any suspicious code before providing them to fpm for packaging.
* Minimize Script Complexity: Keep pre/post-install scripts as simple as possible. Avoid complex logic or external dependencies within the scripts that fpm will include.
* Principle of Least Privilege: If possible, install packages (created by fpm) with the minimum necessary privileges. Avoid installing as root unless absolutely necessary. This mitigates the impact of a compromised script, even though it doesn't directly address fpm's role.