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Attack Tree Analysis for lewagon/setup

Objective: Compromise Application via lewagon/setup

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Attack Goal: Compromise Application via lewagon/setup [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Compromise during Setup Execution [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack on Download [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.1.1. Intercept HTTP Download (if fallback to HTTP) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.2. Compromised lewagon/setup Repository [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 1.2.1. Direct Repository Compromise (GitHub Account/Repo) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      1. Compromise Post-Setup via Introduced Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 2.1. Vulnerable Tool Versions Installed [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.1.1. Outdated Software with Known Vulnerabilities (e.g., Ruby, Node.js, PostgreSQL) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 2.2. Malicious Configuration Introduced [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.2.1. Backdoor in Dotfiles (.bashrc, .zshrc, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise during Setup Execution [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Targeting the setup script during the download and execution phase. This is a critical point of vulnerability because the script is often executed with elevated privileges and can make significant changes to the system.

  • Breakdown:

    • Impact: Critical - Successful compromise at this stage can lead to full control of the developer's machine.

    • Likelihood: Varies depending on the specific sub-path, but overall, the initial download and execution is a vulnerable point.

    • Effort: Can range from low to high depending on the specific attack (MITM lower, Repo compromise higher).

    • Skill Level: Can range from medium to expert depending on the specific attack.

    • Detection Difficulty: Can be high, especially for MITM attacks and subtle repository compromises.

    • Mitigation Focus:

      • Secure Download: Enforce HTTPS for script download.
      • Script Inspection: Mandate and facilitate script inspection before execution.
      • Source Verification: Strictly use and verify the official repository.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack on Download [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Intercepting the network traffic during the download of setup.sh to inject a malicious script.
  • Breakdown:

    • Impact: Critical - Execution of a malicious script with user privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise.

    • Likelihood: Low-Medium - Depends on network environment. Less likely on secure networks, more likely on public Wi-Fi or compromised networks.

    • Effort: Low-Medium - Tools for MITM attacks are readily available. Requires network proximity or control.

    • Skill Level: Medium - Requires basic networking knowledge and ability to use MITM tools.

    • Detection Difficulty: High - Difficult for average users to detect in real-time without network monitoring tools.

    • Mitigation Focus:

      • HTTPS Enforcement: Strictly enforce HTTPS for download to prevent interception.
      • VPN Usage: Encourage developers to use VPNs, especially on untrusted networks.

    • **1.1.1. Intercept HTTP Download (if fallback to HTTP) [HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Specific Vector: Exploiting a fallback to HTTP download, if it exists, making interception trivial.
      • Increased Risk: HTTP download is unencrypted and easily intercepted.
      • Mitigation: Eliminate any possibility of HTTP fallback. Ensure HTTPS is mandatory and enforced.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Compromised lewagon/setup Repository [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Compromising the official lewagon/setup GitHub repository to inject malicious code directly into the source script.
  • Breakdown:

    • Impact: Critical - Wide-scale compromise affecting all users who download the script after the repository is compromised.

    • Likelihood: Low - GitHub has security measures, but account compromise or repository vulnerabilities are always a potential risk.

    • Effort: High - Requires sophisticated attacks like social engineering, phishing, or exploiting GitHub platform vulnerabilities.

    • Skill Level: High-Expert - Requires expertise in social engineering, platform-specific exploits, or potentially insider access.

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium-High - Difficult to detect immediately. Relies on GitHub security monitoring, community reporting, and code review processes.

    • Mitigation Focus:

      • Repository Security: Implement strong security practices for the repository and maintainer accounts (MFA, strong passwords, access control).
      • Code Review: Rigorous code review process for all changes to setup.sh.
      • Security Audits: Regular security audits of the repository and infrastructure.
      • Incident Response Plan: Have a plan in place to quickly respond to and mitigate a repository compromise.

    • **1.2.1. Direct Repository Compromise (GitHub Account/Repo) [HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Specific Vector: Directly gaining control of maintainer accounts or exploiting vulnerabilities in the GitHub platform to modify the repository.
      • Increased Risk: Direct compromise of the official source is highly impactful and undermines trust.
      • Mitigation: Focus on robust account security, platform security monitoring, and proactive vulnerability management for the repository.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Compromise Post-Setup via Introduced Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities introduced into the developer's environment by the setup.sh script after the initial setup is complete.
  • Breakdown:

    • Impact: Medium to High - Can lead to application compromise, data breaches, or unauthorized access depending on the nature of the vulnerability.

    • Likelihood: Medium - If the setup script installs outdated software or insecure configurations, the likelihood of exploitation increases over time.

    • Effort: Low - Exploits for known vulnerabilities and default configurations are often readily available and easy to use.

    • Skill Level: Low to Medium - Exploiting known vulnerabilities and default configurations requires relatively low skill.

    • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium - Vulnerability scanners and security audits can detect many of these issues.

    • Mitigation Focus:

      • Tool Version Management: Use up-to-date and secure versions of tools. Implement a process for regular updates.
      • Secure Defaults: Configure tools with secure default settings. Avoid weak passwords or overly permissive access controls.
      • Configuration Hardening: Harden system and tool configurations to minimize the attack surface.

    • **2.1. Vulnerable Tool Versions Installed [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Specific Vector: Installing outdated versions of software (Ruby, Node.js, PostgreSQL, etc.) that contain known security vulnerabilities.

      • Increased Risk: Known vulnerabilities are actively targeted by attackers and exploits are often publicly available.

      • Mitigation:

        • Version Pinning and Updates: Pin tool versions to stable and reasonably up-to-date releases. Provide clear instructions and mechanisms for users to update these versions easily.
        • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the installed tool versions for known vulnerabilities.

      • **2.1.1. Outdated Software with Known Vulnerabilities (e.g., Ruby, Node.js, PostgreSQL) [HIGH RISK PATH]

        • Specific Vector: Directly exploiting known vulnerabilities in outdated software versions installed by the setup script.
        • Increased Risk: Exploits are readily available, making this a low-effort attack.
        • Mitigation: Prioritize updating software versions to patch known vulnerabilities.

    • **2.2. Malicious Configuration Introduced [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Specific Vector: The setup script intentionally or unintentionally introduces malicious configurations, such as backdoors in dotfiles.

      • Increased Risk: Malicious configurations can be persistent and stealthy, providing long-term access for attackers.

      • Mitigation:

        • Script Review: Thoroughly review the setup script for any configuration changes, especially to dotfiles and system settings.
        • Principle of Least Privilege: Avoid making unnecessary configuration changes. Only modify settings that are essential for the intended development environment.
        • Configuration Monitoring: Implement mechanisms to monitor and detect unauthorized changes to system configurations and dotfiles.

      • **2.2.1. Backdoor in Dotfiles (.bashrc, .zshrc, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

        • Specific Vector: Injecting malicious code into dotfiles that executes every time a new shell is opened, creating a persistent backdoor.
        • Increased Risk: Backdoors in dotfiles are very stealthy and can provide long-term, persistent access. Detection is difficult without careful inspection.
        • Mitigation:
          • Dotfile Integrity: Ensure the setup script does not modify dotfiles in unexpected or suspicious ways.
          • User Awareness: Educate users to inspect their dotfiles after running setup scripts from untrusted sources.
          • Security Tools: Use security tools that can detect suspicious modifications to dotfiles.