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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for lewagon/setup

Attack Surface: Outdated Dependencies

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Ruby gems, Node.js packages, or system-level libraries defined within the setup files.
  • How setup Contributes: The Gemfile, Gemfile.lock, package.json, yarn.lock, and Dockerfile (if present) directly define the project's initial dependencies. lewagon/setup may include older versions or not enforce strict version pinning at the time of project creation.
  • Example: An outdated version of the rack gem (used by Rails) with a known denial-of-service vulnerability is specified in the Gemfile generated by setup.
  • Impact: Code execution, data breach, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High (depending on the specific vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately after using lewagon/setup, run bundle update, npm update, or yarn upgrade to update dependencies to the latest compatible versions.
    • Use dependency vulnerability scanners (e.g., bundler-audit, npm audit, yarn audit, Snyk, Dependabot) and address reported issues promptly.
    • Consider pinning dependencies to specific, known-safe versions, especially for critical libraries.
    • If using Docker, update the base image specified in the Dockerfile to a recent, secure version.
    • Remove unnecessary development dependencies before deploying to production.

Attack Surface: Exposed Development Tools

  • Description: Development-only tools (debuggers, test frameworks) are included in the project's dependency lists without proper separation.
  • How setup Contributes: lewagon/setup might include these tools by default in the project's Gemfile or package.json without clearly distinguishing between development and production dependencies within the generated files.
  • Example: The pry-byebug gem (a Ruby debugger) is listed in the main section of the Gemfile (not within a group :development block), making it likely to be included in production.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, code execution, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately after using lewagon/setup, manually edit the Gemfile and package.json to move development-only tools into appropriate group :development blocks (Ruby) or devDependencies sections (Node.js).
    • Use environment variables (e.g., RAILS_ENV, NODE_ENV) to conditionally load dependencies.
    • Review the production build process to ensure development tools are excluded.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configurations

  • Description: Template configuration files provided by the setup contain weak defaults.
  • How setup Contributes: lewagon/setup directly provides template configuration files (e.g., config/database.yml, .env.example) that may contain insecure default values or comments suggesting insecure practices.
  • Example: The config/database.yml file generated by setup uses the default PostgreSQL username (postgres) and suggests a blank or easily guessable password in comments. The .env.example file might contain placeholder API keys that are not strong or unique.
  • Impact: Database compromise, data breach, unauthorized access.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately after using lewagon/setup, manually review and modify all generated configuration files.
    • Never use default passwords or API keys. Generate strong, unique credentials.
    • Remove any comments suggesting insecure practices.
    • Use environment variables to manage sensitive configuration settings, and do not commit the .env file.
    • Follow the principle of least privilege.

Attack Surface: Rails Secret Key Base (Initial Generation)

  • Description: The initial secret_key_base generated by the setup process might be weak or predictable if the setup script itself has flaws. (This is less likely with a well-maintained project like lewagon/setup, but still a theoretical direct contribution).
  • How setup Contributes: lewagon/setup is directly responsible for generating the initial secret_key_base for the Rails application.
  • Example: (Hypothetical) If the setup script used a weak random number generator, the generated secret_key_base could be predictable.
  • Impact: Session hijacking, unauthorized access, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately after using lewagon/setup, regenerate the secret_key_base using a strong, cryptographically secure random number generator (e.g., rails secret).
    • Never commit the secret_key_base to the Git repository.
    • Store it securely in environment variables.
    • Regularly rotate the key.

Attack Surface: Docker Image Vulnerabilities (If Dockerfile is Provided)

  • Description: The Dockerfile provided by the setup specifies a vulnerable base image or insecure build steps.
  • How setup Contributes: If lewagon/setup includes a Dockerfile, it directly defines the base image and the commands used to build the application's container.
  • Example: The Dockerfile uses an outdated version of ruby:2.7-slim as its base image, which contains known vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Code execution, container escape, host system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical to High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Immediately after using lewagon/setup, manually update the FROM instruction in the Dockerfile to use a recent, secure version of the base image.
    • Review all commands in the Dockerfile to ensure they follow security best practices (e.g., avoid installing unnecessary packages, run as a non-root user).
    • Use a Docker image vulnerability scanner (Trivy, Clair, Docker Scan) before deploying the image.