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Attack Tree Analysis for lewagon/setup

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to, or control over, a system or application configured using the lewagon/setup repository, leveraging vulnerabilities or misconfigurations introduced by the setup process itself. This includes gaining shell access, reading/modifying sensitive data, or disrupting service, specifically through easily exploitable and high-impact vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Compromise Application using lewagon/setup
                                                |
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                                                       |
  1. Misconfigured Services/Permissions 1. Exploit Default/Weak Credentials | | | ------|------ | | | | 1.2 Hardcoded Credentials | in Configuration Files | (e.g., database.yml, | secrets.yml) [CRITICAL] | ------|------ | | 3.1 Overly 3.2 Exposed Permissive Sensitive File/Dir Configuration Permissions Files (e.g., .env, config/) Accessible via Web [CRITICAL] | ----------|---------- | | 3.1.1 SSH with -> HIGH RISK -> 3.2.1 Database Password Credentials Authentication in .env [CRITICAL] Enabled [CRITICAL] Exposed via Web Server Misconfiguration [CRITICAL] | ----------|---------- | | 3.1.2 Weak SSH -> HIGH RISK -> 3.2.2 Rails Secret Key Strength Key Base in .env [CRITICAL] Exposed via Web Server Misconfiguration [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Default/Weak Credentials

  • 1.2 Hardcoded Credentials in Configuration Files (e.g., database.yml, secrets.yml) [CRITICAL]
    • Description: The setup process might leave default or example credentials (e.g., for the database or Rails secret key) in configuration files. An attacker who gains access to these files can immediately use these credentials.
    • Likelihood: Low (if setup script forces credential changes); High (if it doesn't).
    • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise, database access, session hijacking).
    • Effort: Very Low (Read the configuration file).
    • Skill Level: Very Low.
    • Detection Difficulty: High (Unless file integrity monitoring is in place).

Attack Tree Path: 3. Misconfigured Services/Permissions

  • 3.1 Overly Permissive File/Dir Permissions:

    • Description: Files or directories are set with overly broad permissions (e.g., world-writable), allowing unauthorized users on the system to modify or access them. While not directly a high-risk path on its own in this specific context (because the exposure via the web server is the more critical issue), it's a contributing factor.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake).
    • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on the specific files/directories).
    • Effort: Very Low (List file permissions).
    • Skill Level: Very Low.
    • Detection Difficulty: High (Without regular audits or file integrity monitoring).

  • 3.1.1 SSH with Password Authentication Enabled [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: If SSH is enabled during setup, and password authentication is not disabled, attackers can attempt brute-force or dictionary attacks to guess user passwords and gain remote shell access.
    • Likelihood: Low (if setup script disables it); High (if it doesn't).
    • Impact: Very High (Remote root access, complete system control).
    • Effort: Low (Automated brute-force tools are readily available).
    • Skill Level: Low.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts can be logged, but might be noisy).

  • 3.1.2 Weak SSH Key Strength:

    • Description: Even if key-based authentication is used, weak SSH keys (e.g., short RSA keys) can be cracked, allowing attackers to gain remote shell access.
    • Likelihood: Low (if setup script enforces strong keys); Medium (if it doesn't).
    • Impact: Very High (Remote root access).
    • Effort: High (Requires significant computational resources).
    • Skill Level: High.
    • Detection Difficulty: Very High (Key cracking is typically done offline).

  • 3.2 Exposed Sensitive Configuration Files (e.g., .env, config/) Accessible via Web [CRITICAL]:

    • Description: This is the core of the high-risk paths. A misconfigured web server (Nginx, Apache) allows direct access to sensitive files via HTTP requests. This is a catastrophic security failure.

    • Likelihood: Medium (Common web server misconfiguration).

    • Impact: Very High (Exposure of credentials, API keys, etc.).

    • Effort: Very Low (Try accessing the file via a web browser).

    • Skill Level: Very Low.

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web server logs might show access attempts, but might be missed).

    • -> HIGH RISK -> 3.2.1 Database Credentials in .env Exposed via Web Server Misconfiguration [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: The .env file, containing database credentials, is accessible via a web browser due to the web server misconfiguration. An attacker can simply download the file and gain full access to the application's database.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Driven by the likelihood of 3.2).
      • Impact: Very High (Complete database compromise – read, write, delete data).
      • Effort: Very Low.
      • Skill Level: Very Low.
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium.

    • -> HIGH RISK -> 3.2.2 Rails Secret Key Base in .env Exposed via Web Server Misconfiguration [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: The .env file, containing the Rails secret_key_base, is accessible via a web browser. The secret_key_base is used to sign cookies and other sensitive data. If exposed, an attacker can forge sessions, potentially leading to remote code execution.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Driven by the likelihood of 3.2).
      • Impact: Very High (Session hijacking, potential for remote code execution).
      • Effort: Very Low.
      • Skill Level: Low to Medium (Requires some understanding of Rails session management).
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium.