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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for lostisland/faraday

Attack Surface: Insecure TLS/SSL Configuration

  • Description: Weak or misconfigured TLS/SSL settings can allow attackers to intercept and decrypt communication between the application and external services (MITM attacks).
  • How Faraday Contributes: Faraday's configuration options for TLS/SSL (ssl: {}) and the choice of adapter directly influence the security of HTTPS connections. Incorrectly configuring these settings weakens TLS/SSL protection.
  • Example: Disabling certificate verification in production using ssl: { verify: false } in Faraday configuration. This allows any server to impersonate the intended target without certificate validation, making MITM attacks trivial.
  • Impact: Confidential data transmitted over HTTPS can be exposed to attackers. Integrity of data cannot be guaranteed.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always enable certificate verification in production: Remove or comment out any ssl: { verify: false } configurations.
    • Use strong TLS protocols: Ensure the adapter and server support and negotiate strong TLS versions (TLS 1.2 or higher). Configure Faraday and the adapter to prefer strong protocols if possible.
    • Properly configure certificate paths/stores: Ensure the system's certificate store is up-to-date and correctly configured. If using custom certificates, configure Faraday to use the correct paths via ssl: { ca_file: 'path/to/ca_cert.pem', ca_path: 'path/to/ca_certs_dir' }.
    • Regularly update adapter and OpenSSL/LibreSSL: Keep the underlying adapter library and the system's TLS/SSL libraries updated to patch known vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Proxy Credential Exposure

  • Description: Storing proxy credentials (username/password) insecurely can lead to unauthorized access to the proxy and potentially the application's outbound traffic.
  • How Faraday Contributes: Faraday allows specifying proxy URLs including credentials directly in the connection configuration. This direct configuration method, if misused, can lead to credential exposure.
  • Example: Hardcoding proxy credentials in the Faraday connection URL like proxy: 'http://user:[email protected]:8080' within the application code or configuration files. These credentials can be easily exposed in version control, logs, or configuration dumps.
  • Impact: Attackers gaining access to proxy credentials can monitor, intercept, or modify outbound traffic. They might also be able to use the proxy for other malicious activities, potentially pivoting into internal networks if the proxy provides such access.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid embedding credentials directly in code or configuration files: Use environment variables or secure secrets management systems (like HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) to store and retrieve proxy credentials.
    • Retrieve credentials at runtime: Fetch proxy credentials from secure storage only when needed, avoiding persistent storage in easily accessible locations.
    • Restrict access to configuration files and environment variables: Implement proper access controls to limit who can view or modify configurations containing proxy credentials.
    • Consider using credential-less proxy authentication methods: Explore if the proxy supports authentication methods that don't require storing passwords directly (e.g., IP-based authentication, API keys, or mutual TLS).

Attack Surface: Header Injection through Middleware

  • Description: Middleware that manipulates HTTP headers without proper sanitization can introduce header injection vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to control or inject arbitrary headers.

  • How Faraday Contributes: Faraday's middleware architecture allows developers to intercept and modify requests and responses, including headers. Custom or poorly written request middleware that handles headers unsafely directly introduces this attack surface within the Faraday request pipeline.

  • Example: Custom middleware that sets a header using unsanitized user input:

    class CustomHeaderMiddleware < Faraday::Middleware
  def call(env)
    env[:request_headers]['X-Custom-Header'] = options[:user_input] # options[:user_input] is from user input
    @app.call(env)
  end
end

conn.request :custom_header_middleware, user_input: params[:user_header]

    If params[:user_header] contains newline characters (\n), it can inject arbitrary headers into the HTTP request.

  • Impact: Header injection can lead to various attacks, including HTTP response splitting (though less common in modern browsers), session fixation, and in some scenarios, cross-site scripting (if headers are reflected in responses). It can also be used to bypass security controls that rely on header parsing.

  • Risk Severity: High

  • Mitigation Strategies:

    • Sanitize and validate all user-provided input before using it in headers within middleware: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to ensure that any data used to construct headers is properly escaped and validated to prevent injection attacks. Specifically, remove or encode newline characters and other control characters.
    • Avoid directly incorporating user input into headers if possible: Re-evaluate the need to use user input directly in headers. If feasible, use predefined header values or safer methods to achieve the desired functionality.
    • Carefully review and test custom middleware: Thoroughly audit and perform security testing on any custom middleware that manipulates headers to ensure it's secure and doesn't introduce injection vulnerabilities. Pay close attention to how user-provided data is handled.
    • Use Faraday's built-in header manipulation methods: When possible, use Faraday's built-in methods for setting headers, and ensure you understand how they handle special characters. However, even these methods require careful input handling in middleware.