Objective: Achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) on the Server
Goal: Achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) on the Server
└── 1. Exploit Quine Relay's Code Generation/Execution
├── 1.1. Inject Malicious Code into the Initial Ruby Script [HIGH RISK]
│ ├── 1.1.1. Input Validation Bypass (If any input is used to seed the relay) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
│ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Craft input that bypasses length restrictions.
│ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Craft input that bypasses character filtering.
│ │ └── 1.1.1.3. Craft input that bypasses any sanitization logic.
│ └── 1.1.2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in the Initial Script's Logic
│ └── 1.1.2.2. Identify areas where external data (e.g., environment variables, file contents) influences code generation. [CRITICAL]
├── 1.2. Inject Malicious Code During a Language Transition [HIGH RISK]
│ ├── 1.2.1. Target a Specific Language Transition (e.g., Ruby -> Python) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
│ │ ├── 1.2.1.1. Identify weaknesses in the code responsible for generating the next language's source. [CRITICAL]
│ │ ├── 1.2.1.2. Exploit differences in language syntax/semantics to inject code. (e.g., comment injection, string interpolation flaws)
│ │ └── 1.2.1.3. Leverage language-specific vulnerabilities in the generated code (e.g., Python's eval
, JavaScript's eval
).
│ └── 1.2.2. Target the "Glue Code" Between Languages
│ ├── 1.2.2.1. If there's any intermediary code handling the transition, exploit vulnerabilities there. [CRITICAL]
│ └── 1.2.2.2. Manipulate file paths or environment variables used during the transition.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Inject Malicious Code into the Initial Ruby Script [HIGH RISK]
- Description: This is the most direct attack path. The attacker aims to modify the initial Ruby script that starts the Quine Relay. Success here grants immediate control over the entire code generation process.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Input Validation Bypass (If any input is used to seed the relay) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
- Description: If the application allows any form of user input to influence the initial Ruby script (even indirectly), this is the primary attack vector. The attacker will attempt to bypass any input validation or sanitization mechanisms to inject malicious code.
- Attack Vectors:
- 1.1.1.1. Craft input that bypasses length restrictions: The attacker might try to provide excessively long input strings to cause buffer overflows or bypass length checks designed to prevent code injection.
- 1.1.1.2. Craft input that bypasses character filtering: The attacker might use special characters or encoding techniques to circumvent filters that attempt to block malicious code (e.g., using URL encoding, Unicode characters, or other obfuscation methods).
- 1.1.1.3. Craft input that bypasses any sanitization logic: The attacker will try to find flaws in the sanitization routines that allow them to inject code that appears safe but is actually malicious (e.g., exploiting regular expression vulnerabilities, using double encoding, or finding edge cases not handled by the sanitization).
- Attack Vectors:
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in the Initial Script's Logic
- 1.1.2.2. Identify areas where external data (e.g., environment variables, file contents) influences code generation. [CRITICAL]
- Description: Even without direct user input, if the initial script reads data from external sources (environment variables, files, etc.), and this data influences the generated code, an attacker could manipulate these external sources to inject code.
- Attack Vectors:
- Environment Variable Manipulation: The attacker might try to modify environment variables read by the script to inject malicious code or alter the script's behavior.
- File Content Manipulation: If the script reads data from files, the attacker might try to modify those files to inject malicious code. This could involve exploiting file upload vulnerabilities or gaining access to the file system through other means.
- Data Source Poisoning: If the script reads data from a database or other external data source, the attacker might try to poison that data source with malicious content.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Inject Malicious Code During a Language Transition [HIGH RISK]
- Description: This attack path targets the code responsible for generating the source code of the next language in the Quine Relay sequence. It exploits the complexity of translating code between different programming languages.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Target a Specific Language Transition (e.g., Ruby -> Python) [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
- Description: The attacker focuses on a specific transition point (e.g., from Ruby to Python, Python to C, etc.) and attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in the code that performs this translation.
- Attack Vectors:
- 1.2.1.1. Identify weaknesses in the code responsible for generating the next language's source. [CRITICAL]
- Description: This is the core of the attack. The attacker analyzes the code that generates the next language's source code, looking for any flaws that could allow them to inject malicious code. This might involve finding bugs in string formatting, concatenation, or other code manipulation operations.
- 1.2.1.2. Exploit differences in language syntax/semantics to inject code (e.g., comment injection, string interpolation flaws):
- Description: Different programming languages have different rules for comments, strings, and other syntactic elements. The attacker might exploit these differences to inject code that is valid in one language but has a different (malicious) meaning in another. For example, they might inject a comment that closes a string in one language, allowing them to inject arbitrary code after the comment. Or they might exploit differences in how string interpolation is handled.
- 1.2.1.3. Leverage language-specific vulnerabilities in the generated code (e.g., Python's
eval
, JavaScript'seval
):- Description: The attacker might try to inject code that uses inherently dangerous functions or features of a specific language. For example, they might try to inject
eval()
calls in Python or JavaScript, which can execute arbitrary code.
- Description: The attacker might try to inject code that uses inherently dangerous functions or features of a specific language. For example, they might try to inject
- 1.2.1.1. Identify weaknesses in the code responsible for generating the next language's source. [CRITICAL]
- Attack Vectors:
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2. Target the "Glue Code" Between Languages
- Description: This attack targets any code that is used to manage the execution of the different languages in the Quine Relay (e.g., shell scripts, system calls).
- Attack Vectors:
- 1.2.2.1. If there's any intermediary code handling the transition, exploit vulnerabilities there. [CRITICAL]
- Description: If there are any scripts or programs that orchestrate the execution of the different languages, the attacker will try to find vulnerabilities in those scripts (e.g., command injection, path traversal).
- 1.2.2.2. Manipulate file paths or environment variables used during the transition:
- Description: The attacker might try to manipulate file paths or environment variables used by the "glue code" to redirect execution to malicious code or to alter the behavior of the Quine Relay.
- 1.2.2.1. If there's any intermediary code handling the transition, exploit vulnerabilities there. [CRITICAL]
- Attack Vectors: