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Attack Tree Analysis for mislav/will_paginate

Objective: To cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or leak sensitive information by manipulating pagination parameters provided to will_paginate.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  Compromise Application using will_paginate
                                                /                      \
                                               /                        \
                              Denial of Service (DoS)          Information Disclosure (Data Leak)
                                     /                 \                      |
                                    /                   \                     |
                  Excessive Page Number [HIGH RISK]   Excessive Per-Page [HIGH RISK]   Unexpected Data Exposure
                                                                                through Parameter Manipulation [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • 1.a. Excessive Page Number [HIGH RISK]

    • Description: The attacker provides an extremely large page number as a URL parameter (e.g., ?page=999999999). This can cause the application to attempt to calculate a very large offset, potentially leading to performance issues or even crashes.
    • Likelihood: Medium. Attackers commonly test for vulnerabilities by providing extreme values.
    • Impact: Medium to High. Can range from slow response times to complete application unavailability.
    • Effort: Very Low. Requires only modifying a URL parameter.
    • Skill Level: Very Low. No specialized knowledge is needed.
    • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium. Unusually high page numbers might be logged, but could be overlooked without specific monitoring. Performance monitoring would likely detect the slowdown.
    • Mitigation:
      • Strictly validate the page parameter to be a positive integer.
      • Enforce a reasonable maximum value for the page parameter.
      • Implement rate limiting to prevent rapid submission of requests with different page numbers.

  • 1.b. Excessive Per-Page [HIGH RISK]

    • Description: The attacker provides a very large per_page value (e.g., ?per_page=9999999). This forces the database to attempt to retrieve a massive number of records, potentially leading to database overload and a denial of service.
    • Likelihood: Medium. Similar to excessive page numbers, this is a common attack technique.
    • Impact: High. Can easily overwhelm the database and cause a DoS.
    • Effort: Very Low. Modifying a URL parameter.
    • Skill Level: Very Low.
    • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium. Similar to excessive page numbers, it would likely be visible in logs and performance monitoring.
    • Mitigation:
      • Strictly validate the per_page parameter.
      • Enforce a reasonable maximum value for per_page (e.g., 100, 500).
      • Consider offering a predefined set of allowed per_page values.
      • Implement rate limiting.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Information Disclosure (Data Leak)

  • 2.a. Unexpected Data Exposure through Parameter Manipulation [CRITICAL]

    • Description: The attacker manipulates pagination parameters (page, per_page) in combination with other application logic flaws to bypass access controls. This is not a direct will_paginate vulnerability, but a vulnerability in how the application uses the pagination parameters to determine which data to display. For example, if the application uses the page parameter to incorrectly determine user group access, an attacker might access data from other groups.
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium. Depends entirely on the presence of flaws in the application's access control logic.
    • Impact: High to Very High. Could lead to the exposure of sensitive data, including personally identifiable information (PII), financial data, or other confidential information.
    • Effort: Medium to High. Requires understanding the application's internal logic and identifying vulnerabilities in how it handles pagination.
    • Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires knowledge of web application security principles and potentially some reverse engineering.
    • Detection Difficulty: High. Might appear as legitimate user activity unless detailed access logs and intrusion detection systems are in place.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement robust access control logic that does not rely solely on pagination parameters.
      • Verify user permissions before retrieving any data, regardless of the requested page or per-page value.
      • Use secure session management and authentication mechanisms to determine what data a user is authorized to access.
      • Input validation (as always) is important, but it's not sufficient on its own to prevent this type of attack. The core issue is flawed access control logic.