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Attack Tree Analysis for norman/friendly_id

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to resources or information, or cause denial of service, by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations related to the friendly_id gem.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Gain Unauthorized Access/DoS via friendly_id
                                                      |
                      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      |                                                                               |
              1. Slug Collision/Prediction                                                 3.  Configuration/Implementation Errors
                      |                                                                               |
      ---------------------------------                                                       ---------------------------------
      |               |                                                                       |               |               |
1.1  Brute-Force 1.2  Dictionary                                                           3.1  Use of      3.2  Insecure    3.3 Insufficient
     Slugs        Attack on                                                                    `find`        Slug         Length/
 --HIGH RISK-->   Short Slugs                                                                  directly      Generation     Complexity
      |          --HIGH RISK-->                                                               [CRITICAL]   (e.g.,         Checks
      |                                                                                     (bypassing    predictable  --HIGH RISK-->
      |                                                                                      friendly_id)  sequence)
      |
      |
(If short/
simple slugs)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Slug Collision/Prediction (High-Risk Path)

  • Overall Description: The attacker attempts to guess or create a slug that matches an existing resource's slug, leading to unauthorized access. This is particularly dangerous if the application allows short, simple, or predictable slugs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Brute-Force Slugs (High Risk if short/simple slugs are allowed)

  • Description: The attacker systematically tries many different slug combinations until they find a valid one.
  • Likelihood: High to Very High if short/simple slugs are allowed; Very Low with default friendly_id settings (UUIDs).
  • Impact: Medium to High (Unauthorized access to resources, data leakage).
  • Effort: Low to Medium if short/simple slugs are allowed; Very High with default settings.
  • Skill Level: Low (Basic scripting knowledge).
  • Detection Difficulty: Low without rate limiting (many failed requests); Medium to High with rate limiting.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Dictionary Attack on Short Slugs (High Risk if short/simple, word-based slugs are allowed)

  • Description: The attacker uses a list of common words, phrases, or names to try and guess valid slugs.
  • Likelihood: High if short, simple, word-based slugs are allowed; Very Low with default settings.
  • Impact: Medium to High (Unauthorized access, data leakage).
  • Effort: Low (Readily available wordlists).
  • Skill Level: Very Low (Basic scripting).
  • Detection Difficulty: Low without rate limiting; Medium to High with rate limiting.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Configuration/Implementation Errors (High-Risk Path and Critical Node)

  • Overall Description: Mistakes made by the developer when implementing or configuring friendly_id can create significant vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Use of find directly (bypassing friendly_id) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The developer uses the standard ActiveRecord find method with a numeric ID instead of friendly_id's friendly.find (or equivalent). This completely bypasses the slug lookup and its security benefits.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake, especially for developers new to friendly_id).
  • Impact: Very High (Complete bypass of slug-based access control; direct access to resources via numeric IDs).
  • Effort: Very Low (Just knowing the numeric ID).
  • Skill Level: Very Low.
  • Detection Difficulty: Very High (Appears as completely legitimate traffic; no indication that friendly_id is being bypassed).

Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Insecure Slug Generation (e.g., predictable sequence) (High Risk)

  • Description: The developer overrides the default slug generation with a custom method that produces predictable slugs (e.g., a simple counter or a weak random number generator).
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Requires overriding the default, secure slug generation).
  • Impact: High (Predictable access to resources).
  • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding and implementing a custom slug generation method).
  • Skill Level: Medium (Requires some programming knowledge).
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Difficult to distinguish from legitimate requests).

Attack Tree Path: 3.3 Insufficient Length/Complexity Checks (High Risk)

  • Description: The developer allows very short or simple slugs, making brute-force or dictionary attacks much easier. This directly enables attack vectors 1.1 and 1.2.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Requires overriding default settings or not implementing proper validation).
  • Impact: Medium to High (Makes brute-force and dictionary attacks easier).
  • Effort: Very Low (For the attacker, if the vulnerability exists).
  • Skill Level: Very Low (For the attacker).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Similar to brute-force and dictionary attack detection).