Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code on Server via Brakeman
Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code on Server via Brakeman
├── 1. Exploit Brakeman's Reporting Mechanism *** │ ├── 1.1 Manipulate Brakeman Output to Inject Malicious Code *** │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Craft Input to Trigger Vulnerable Output Formatting (e.g., HTML injection in report) *** │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1 Identify vulnerable output format (HTML, JSON, CSV, etc.) !!! │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2 Craft malicious input that exploits the chosen format. !!! │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.3 Trigger Brakeman scan with the malicious input. │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.4 Exploit the generated report (e.g., XSS if viewed in browser, command injection if parsed by another tool). !!! │ │ └── 1.1.2 Tamper with Report Storage (if reports are stored) │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1 Gain write access to report storage location (e.g., file system, database). !!! │ ├── 1.2 Exploit Report Parsing/Processing Logic │ │ ├── 1.2.1 If Brakeman output is piped to another tool, exploit vulnerabilities in that tool. │ │ │ ├── 1.2.1.2 Research vulnerabilities in that tool related to input parsing. !!! │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.3 Craft Brakeman output (potentially malicious) to trigger the vulnerability in the downstream tool. !!! │ │ └── 1.2.2 If a custom script processes Brakeman output, exploit vulnerabilities in the custom script. │ │ ├── 1.2.2.2 Identify vulnerabilities in the script (e.g., command injection, insecure file handling). !!! │ │ └── 1.2.2.3 Craft Brakeman output to trigger the vulnerability in the custom script. !!! ├── 2. Exploit Brakeman's Internal Logic (Less Likely, but Higher Impact) │ ├── 2.1 Find and Exploit a Vulnerability in Brakeman's Code Itself │ │ ├── 2.1.2 Identify potential vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection, path traversal, insecure deserialization). !!! │ │ ├── 2.1.3 Craft input that triggers the identified vulnerability. !!! │ │ └── 2.1.4 Exploit the vulnerability to gain code execution. !!! │ ├── 2.2 Supply Chain Attack │ │ ├── 2.2.1 Compromise a Brakeman dependency. │ │ │ ├── 2.2.1.2 Find or create a vulnerability in a dependency. !!! │ │ │ └── 2.2.1.3 Publish the malicious dependency. !!! │ │ └── 2.2.2 Compromise the Brakeman distribution channel (e.g., RubyGems). │ │ ├── 2.2.2.1 Gain control of the Brakeman package on RubyGems. !!! └── 3. Misuse of Brakeman Leading to Indirect Vulnerabilities !!! ├── 3.1 False Sense of Security !!! │ ├── 3.1.1 Relying solely on Brakeman and neglecting other security practices. !!! │ └── 3.1.2 Misinterpreting Brakeman's results. !!! ├── 3.2 Incorrect Configuration !!! ├── 3.2.1 Using outdated Brakeman version. !!!
Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Brakeman's Reporting Mechanism
Description: The attacker crafts malicious input to the application being scanned by Brakeman. This input is designed to trigger a vulnerability in how Brakeman formats its output (e.g., HTML, JSON, CSV). The goal is to inject malicious code into the report itself.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Manipulate Brakeman Output to Inject Malicious Code
Description: The attacker crafts malicious input to the application being scanned by Brakeman. This input is designed to trigger a vulnerability in how Brakeman formats its output (e.g., HTML, JSON, CSV). The goal is to inject malicious code into the report itself.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1 Identify vulnerable output format
Description: The attacker examines Brakeman's output options and how they are handled by any report viewers or processors. They look for formats that might be susceptible to injection attacks (e.g., HTML susceptible to XSS, CSV susceptible to formula injection).
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2 Craft malicious input that exploits the chosen format
Description: The attacker creates specially crafted input for the application that, when processed by Brakeman, will result in the malicious code being embedded in the report. This requires understanding the specific vulnerabilities of the chosen output format.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.3 Trigger Brakeman scan with the malicious input
Description: The attacker triggers a Brakeman scan, ensuring the malicious input is processed.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.4 Exploit the generated report
Description: The attacker exploits the vulnerability in the report viewer or processor. For example, if the report is viewed in a browser, an XSS vulnerability could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript. If the report is parsed by another tool, a command injection vulnerability could be exploited.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1 Gain write access to report storage location
Description: If Brakeman reports are stored (e.g., on the file system or in a database), the attacker needs to gain write access to that location. This usually requires exploiting a separate vulnerability, such as a file upload vulnerability, weak file permissions, or a database injection vulnerability.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Exploit Report Parsing/Processing Logic
Description: This attack targets how Brakeman's output is used after the scan. If the output is piped to another tool or processed by a custom script, vulnerabilities in those components can be exploited.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2 Research vulnerabilities in that tool related to input parsing
Description: If Brakeman output is sent to another tool, the attacker researches known vulnerabilities in that tool, particularly those related to how it parses input.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.3 Craft Brakeman output (potentially malicious) to trigger the vulnerability in the downstream tool
Description: The attacker crafts Brakeman output (which may or may not require malicious application input) that will trigger the vulnerability in the downstream tool.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2.2 Identify vulnerabilities in the script (e.g., command injection, insecure file handling)
Description: If a custom script processes Brakeman output, the attacker reviews the script's code for vulnerabilities, such as command injection, path traversal, or insecure file handling.
Description: The attacker crafts Brakeman output that will exploit the identified vulnerability in the custom script.
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2 Identify potential vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection, path traversal, insecure deserialization)
Description: The attacker performs a deep code review of Brakeman's source code, looking for vulnerabilities that could lead to code execution. This requires expert-level knowledge of Ruby and secure coding practices.
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3 Craft input that triggers the identified vulnerability
Description: If a vulnerability is found in Brakeman itself, the attacker crafts input that will trigger the vulnerability when Brakeman processes it.
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.4 Exploit the vulnerability to gain code execution
Description: The attacker exploits the vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the server running Brakeman.
Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.2 Find or create a vulnerability in a dependency
Description: The attacker targets one of Brakeman's dependencies, either finding an existing vulnerability or creating a new one.
Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.3 Publish the malicious dependency
Description: The attacker publishes the compromised dependency to a package repository (e.g., RubyGems), hoping that Brakeman users will unknowingly install it.
Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2.1 Gain control of the Brakeman package on RubyGems
Description: The attacker attempts to gain control of the official Brakeman package on RubyGems, potentially through social engineering, password cracking, or exploiting vulnerabilities in RubyGems itself.
Attack Tree Path: 3.1 False Sense of Security
Description: This is a meta-vulnerability. It's not a direct attack on Brakeman, but rather a dangerous mindset that can lead to other vulnerabilities being overlooked.
Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1 Relying solely on Brakeman and neglecting other security practices
Description: The development team mistakenly believes that running Brakeman is sufficient for security and neglects other essential practices like manual code review, penetration testing, and using other security tools.
Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2 Misinterpreting Brakeman's results
Description: The team ignores warnings, misunderstands their severity, or fails to properly remediate the identified issues.
Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Incorrect Configuration
Description: Brakeman is misconfigured, leading to incomplete or inaccurate scans.
Attack Tree Path: 3.2.1 Using outdated Brakeman version
Description: The team fails to update Brakeman regularly, leaving known vulnerabilities in Brakeman itself unpatched. This is a critical and easily preventable issue.