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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for puppetlabs/puppet

Attack Surface: Agent API Exposure (Unauthenticated Access)

  • Description: If the Puppet Agent API is enabled and not properly secured with authentication, attackers can directly interact with the agent.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet Agent provides an API that, if enabled, allows interaction with the agent's functionality. Default configurations might not enforce authentication.
  • Example: An attacker on the same network as a Puppet Agent can send API requests to /puppet/v3/status/summary without authentication and retrieve system information, or even trigger actions like running Puppet agent manually via /puppet/v3/run/.
  • Impact: Node compromise, information disclosure, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable the Agent API if not required.
    • Enable and enforce strong authentication for the Agent API.
    • Restrict network access to the Agent API to authorized networks/IPs only (e.g., via firewall rules).

Attack Surface: Catalog Tampering (Man-in-the-Middle)

  • Description: Attackers intercept and modify Puppet catalogs in transit between the Puppet Server and Agent.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet Agents retrieve catalogs from the Puppet Server. If communication is not encrypted or certificate validation is weak, it's vulnerable to MITM.
  • Example: An attacker performs a MITM attack on the network between a Puppet Agent and Server. They intercept the catalog and inject malicious resources (e.g., create a backdoor user, disable security services) before forwarding it to the Agent. The Agent applies the tampered catalog, compromising the node.
  • Impact: Node compromise, widespread configuration drift, security breaches across managed infrastructure.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce HTTPS for all communication between Puppet Agent and Server.
    • Implement robust certificate validation on both Puppet Agent and Server.
    • Use trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) for certificate signing.
    • Regularly audit and rotate certificates.

Attack Surface: Puppet Server Application Vulnerabilities (Java/Web Framework)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Puppet Server application itself, including the underlying Java runtime environment or web application framework.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet Server is a complex Java application built on JRuby on Rails, inheriting vulnerabilities common to these technologies.
  • Example: A known deserialization vulnerability exists in a Java library used by Puppet Server. An attacker crafts a malicious serialized object and sends it to the Puppet Server through a vulnerable endpoint, achieving remote code execution on the server.
  • Impact: Puppet Server compromise, control over managed infrastructure, data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly patch Puppet Server and its dependencies (Java, JRuby, Rails, libraries).
    • Implement a vulnerability management program to track and remediate known vulnerabilities.
    • Harden the Puppet Server operating system and environment.
    • Follow security best practices for Java and web application deployments.

Attack Surface: Puppet Language Code Injection

  • Description: Injecting malicious code into Puppet catalogs through unsafe handling of external data or template processing.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet language allows integration with external data sources (facts, Hiera, ENCs) and template rendering. Improper sanitization can lead to injection.
  • Example: A Puppet module uses a fact value directly in an exec resource without proper sanitization. An attacker compromises the fact source and injects shell commands into the fact value. When the Puppet Agent retrieves the catalog, the malicious commands are executed on the managed node.
  • Impact: Node compromise, arbitrary code execution on managed nodes and potentially the Puppet Server during catalog compilation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Sanitize and validate all external data inputs used in Puppet code.
    • Avoid using external data directly in sensitive resources like exec or file without careful validation.
    • Use parameterized classes and functions to encapsulate logic and reduce injection risks.
    • Employ secure coding practices in Puppet modules.
    • Regularly audit Puppet code for potential injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Malicious or Vulnerable Puppet Modules

  • Description: Using Puppet modules from untrusted sources or modules containing vulnerabilities.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet relies heavily on modules for extending functionality. The Puppet Forge and other sources can host modules of varying quality and security.
  • Example: A user downloads a Puppet module from an unofficial source that appears to provide a useful function. However, the module contains malicious code that creates a backdoor user on all nodes where the module is applied.
  • Impact: Widespread node compromise, introduction of backdoors, configuration drift, supply chain attack.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Only use Puppet modules from trusted and reputable sources (e.g., Puppet Forge, official vendors).
    • Thoroughly vet and audit modules before using them in production.
    • Implement module signing and verification mechanisms if available.
    • Keep modules updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Consider using private module repositories for better control and security.