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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for puppetlabs/puppet

Attack Surface: Malicious Puppet Modules from Untrusted Sources

  • Description: Using Puppet modules from sources that are not thoroughly vetted or trusted, such as the public Puppet Forge without due diligence, can introduce malicious code into your infrastructure.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet relies on modules to define configurations. If a module is compromised, it can be used to execute arbitrary code on Puppet Master and Agents. Puppet Forge, while convenient, can be a source of untrusted modules if not carefully managed.
  • Example: A developer downloads a popular-sounding module from Puppet Forge without verifying the author or reviewing the code. This module contains a backdoor that allows the attacker to gain remote access to all nodes managed by Puppet.
  • Impact: Full compromise of managed infrastructure, data breaches, system instability, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Module Vetting: Thoroughly review module code before use, especially from public sources.
    • Trusted Sources: Prioritize modules from trusted sources, official Puppet modules, or internally developed and reviewed modules.
    • Private Forge/Repository: Host modules in a private, controlled repository instead of relying solely on the public Forge.
    • Code Scanning: Implement automated code scanning and static analysis tools to detect potential vulnerabilities in modules.
    • Dependency Management: Carefully manage module dependencies and ensure they are also from trusted sources.

Attack Surface: Insecure Puppet Master API Access

  • Description: Weak or missing authentication and authorization on the Puppet Master API allows unauthorized access to critical Puppet functionalities.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet Master API is the central control point. Unsecured API access allows attackers to manipulate configurations, extract sensitive data, and disrupt operations.
  • Example: The Puppet Master API is exposed without client certificate authentication and uses weak password-based authentication. An attacker gains access using brute-force or credential stuffing and modifies critical configurations, leading to system outages.
  • Impact: Unauthorized configuration changes, data breaches (sensitive data in catalogs), denial of service, remote code execution on Puppet Master.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • HTTPS Enforcement: Always use HTTPS for all Puppet Master API communication.
    • Client Certificate Authentication: Implement client certificate authentication for Puppet Agents and administrative access to the API.
    • Strong RBAC: Implement and enforce robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to limit API access based on roles and permissions.
    • API Firewalling: Restrict API access to only authorized networks and IP addresses using firewalls.
    • Regular Security Audits: Periodically audit API access controls and configurations.

Attack Surface: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks on Agent-Master Communication

  • Description: If communication between Puppet Agents and the Puppet Master is not properly secured, attackers can intercept and manipulate data in transit.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet Agents rely on communication with the Master to receive configurations. Insecure communication allows attackers to inject malicious catalogs or steal sensitive data exchanged between Agent and Master.
  • Example: An organization uses HTTP instead of HTTPS for Puppet communication. An attacker on the network performs a MitM attack, intercepts a catalog, injects malicious code into it, and forces the Puppet Agent to execute it, compromising the managed node.
  • Impact: Agent compromise, node compromise, data breaches, unauthorized configuration changes, remote code execution on agents.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • HTTPS Enforcement: Enforce HTTPS for all communication between Puppet Agents and the Puppet Master.
    • Certificate Validation: Ensure Puppet Agents properly validate the Puppet Master's certificate to prevent rogue master attacks.
    • Secure Network Infrastructure: Secure the network infrastructure between Agents and Master to minimize the risk of MitM attacks.
    • Mutual TLS (mTLS): Consider implementing mutual TLS for enhanced authentication and encryption.

Attack Surface: Exposure of Sensitive Data in Puppet Catalogs

  • Description: Puppet catalogs can inadvertently contain sensitive information like passwords, API keys, and other secrets if not handled carefully.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet catalogs are generated by the Master and contain the desired state for managed nodes. If secrets are included in manifests or modules and end up in catalogs, they can be exposed if catalogs are compromised.
  • Example: A developer hardcodes a database password in a Puppet manifest. This password is included in the generated catalog and could be exposed if an attacker gains access to the catalog through API vulnerabilities or MitM attacks.
  • Impact: Data breaches, credential compromise, unauthorized access to systems and services.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • External Secrets Management: Use external secrets management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Puppet Secrets, Hiera backends) to store and retrieve secrets securely instead of hardcoding them in Puppet code.
    • Catalog Encryption (If Supported): Explore options for encrypting Puppet catalogs during transmission and storage.
    • Regular Code Reviews: Conduct regular code reviews to identify and remove any hardcoded secrets in Puppet manifests and modules.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Avoid including unnecessary sensitive data in catalogs.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in Custom Puppet Code (Functions, Types, Providers)

  • Description: Custom Ruby code within Puppet modules (functions, types, providers) can introduce vulnerabilities if not developed securely.
  • Puppet Contribution: Puppet allows for custom Ruby code to extend its functionality. Insecure custom code can be exploited during catalog compilation or agent execution, leading to various attacks.
  • Example: A custom Puppet function is written with a command injection vulnerability. An attacker crafts malicious input that is passed to this function, leading to arbitrary command execution on the Puppet Master during catalog compilation.
  • Impact: Remote code execution on Puppet Master or Agents, privilege escalation, data breaches, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding practices when developing custom Ruby code for Puppet.
    • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation and sanitization in custom functions and providers to prevent injection vulnerabilities.
    • Code Reviews: Conduct thorough code reviews of custom Ruby code to identify potential vulnerabilities.
    • Static Analysis Tools: Use static analysis tools to scan custom Ruby code for security flaws.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Limit the privileges of custom code and avoid running with unnecessary elevated permissions.