Objective: Compromise application by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within Puppet (Focus on High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes).
Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Puppet
├───[AND]─ Compromise Puppet Infrastructure [CRITICAL NODE]
│ ├───[OR]─ Compromise Puppet Master Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Puppet Master Software Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Puppet Server [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Identify and exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in Puppet Server version [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├───[OR]─ Compromise Puppet Master Access Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Credential Stuffing Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Use compromised credentials from other breaches to access Puppet Master [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Phishing/Social Engineering for Admin Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Trick administrators into revealing their Puppet Master credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Exploit Web UI Vulnerabilities (if exposed) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Exploit vulnerabilities like XSS, CSRF, or SQL Injection in Puppet Master's web interface [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├───[OR]─ Infrastructure Vulnerabilities around Puppet Master [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Exploit OS Vulnerabilities on Puppet Master Server [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system running Puppet Master [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Network Vulnerabilities around Puppet Master [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Exploit network misconfigurations or vulnerabilities to access Puppet Master (e.g., exposed ports, weak firewall rules) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ └───[OR]─ Insider Threat/Malicious Administrator [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ └─── Malicious administrator intentionally compromises Puppet Master [CRITICAL NODE]
│ ├───[OR]─ Compromise Puppet Agent
│ │ ├───[OR]─ Exploit Puppet Agent Software Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ │ │ └─── Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Puppet Agent [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Identify and exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in Puppet Agent version on target node [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├───[OR]─ Local Agent Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ │ │ ├─── Exploit Vulnerabilities in Applications Managed by Puppet [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Leverage vulnerabilities in the application Puppet is managing to gain local access and then manipulate the agent [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Exploit OS Vulnerabilities on Agent Node [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system where Puppet Agent is running [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ ├─── Compromise User Account with Agent Privileges [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ │ └─── Compromise a user account that has sufficient privileges to interact with the Puppet Agent process [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─ Exploit Puppet Code/Configuration (Manifests, Modules) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│ ├───[OR]─ Manifest Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├─── Unvalidated Input in Manifests [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Inject malicious code or commands through unvalidated inputs used in Puppet manifests (e.g., Hiera data, external data sources) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├─── Dynamic Code Execution in Manifests [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Exploit insecure use of dynamic code execution features in Puppet manifests (e.g., `exec`, `shell` with untrusted input) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ ├───[OR]─ Backdoor in Puppet Manifests/Modules [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ ├─── Malicious Module Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ │ │ └─── Deploy a module containing intentionally malicious code or configurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│ ├───[OR]─ Insider Threat/Malicious Developer [CRITICAL NODE]
│ │ └─── Malicious developer intentionally introduces backdoors or vulnerabilities in Puppet code [CRITICAL NODE]
└───[AND]─ Application is Vulnerable to Puppet-Induced Changes
└─── Application relies on configurations managed by Puppet
└─── Application behavior is directly affected by Puppet-deployed configurations and resources
Attack Tree Path: Compromise Puppet Infrastructure
Description: This is the overarching critical node. Success here means the attacker has control over some part of the Puppet ecosystem, allowing them to manipulate configurations and potentially compromise managed applications. Why Critical: Puppet is the central configuration management tool. Compromise here has widespread impact across all managed systems and applications. Mitigation Focus: Implement robust security across the entire Puppet infrastructure, including Master, Agents, and code repositories.
Attack Tree Path: Compromise Puppet Master Server
Description: The Puppet Master is the brain of the operation. Compromising it grants the attacker the ability to control configurations pushed to all agents. Why Critical: Full control over configuration management. Can lead to immediate and widespread application compromise, data breaches, and service disruption. Mitigation Focus: Hardening Puppet Master server, patching, strong access controls, network segmentation, intrusion detection, and insider threat prevention.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Puppet Code/Configuration (Manifests, Modules)
Description: Malicious or vulnerable code within Puppet manifests and modules is directly executed on managed nodes. Why Critical: Direct path to application compromise. Malicious code can be deployed at scale, affecting many systems simultaneously. Mitigation Focus: Secure coding practices, code review, input validation in manifests, module security and trust, secrets management, version control, and static analysis.
Attack Tree Path: Insider Threat/Malicious Administrator
Description: A malicious administrator with access to the Puppet Master can intentionally compromise the system. Why Critical: Bypasses many security controls. Insider knowledge allows for stealthy and impactful attacks. Mitigation Focus: Strong vetting processes, principle of least privilege, separation of duties, audit trails, behavioral monitoring, and incident response planning for insider threats.
Attack Tree Path: Insider Threat/Malicious Developer
Description: A malicious developer with access to Puppet code repositories can introduce backdoors or vulnerabilities into manifests and modules. Why Critical: Malicious code can be deployed at scale through normal Puppet workflows. Difficult to detect through standard security measures. Mitigation Focus: Secure code development lifecycle, code review, access controls to code repositories, module integrity checks, and behavioral analysis of Puppet deployments.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Puppet Server
Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in unpatched Puppet Server software. Why High-Risk: Known vulnerabilities are readily exploitable. Patching delays create windows of opportunity for attackers. Likelihood: Medium (depends on patching cadence). Impact: Critical (full Puppet Master compromise). Effort: Medium (exploits may be public). Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (IDS/IPS, logs). Mitigation: Rigorous and timely patching of Puppet Server. Vulnerability scanning and management.
Attack Tree Path: Credential Stuffing Attack on Puppet Master Access Credentials
Attack Vector: Using compromised credentials from other breaches to attempt login to the Puppet Master admin interface. Why High-Risk: Password reuse is common. Breached credential lists are readily available. Likelihood: Medium (depends on password reuse). Impact: Critical (full Puppet Master compromise). Effort: Low. Skill Level: Low. Detection Difficulty: Medium (login monitoring, anomaly detection). Mitigation: Enforce strong, unique passwords. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA). Monitor for suspicious login attempts.
Attack Tree Path: Phishing/Social Engineering for Puppet Master Admin Credentials
Attack Vector: Tricking administrators into revealing their Puppet Master credentials through phishing emails or social engineering tactics. Why High-Risk: Social engineering can be effective against even technically skilled individuals. Likelihood: Medium (depends on security awareness training effectiveness). Impact: Critical (full Puppet Master compromise). Effort: Low to Medium. Skill Level: Low to Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (user reporting, email security). Mitigation: Security awareness training, phishing simulations, email security solutions, and strong password policies.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Web UI Vulnerabilities of Puppet Master
Attack Vector: Exploiting web application vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF, SQL Injection) in the Puppet Master's web interface (if exposed). Why High-Risk: Web UI vulnerabilities are common. Can lead to session hijacking, privilege escalation, or direct system compromise. Likelihood: Medium (depends on web UI security testing). Impact: Critical (potentially full Puppet Master compromise). Effort: Low to Medium. Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (WAF, web server logs). Mitigation: Secure coding practices for web UI, regular security testing (DAST, SAST), Web Application Firewall (WAF), and input validation.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit OS Vulnerabilities on Puppet Master Server
Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the operating system running the Puppet Master server. Why High-Risk: OS vulnerabilities are common. Compromising the OS directly compromises the Puppet Master. Likelihood: Medium (depends on OS patching cadence). Impact: Critical (full Puppet Master compromise). Effort: Medium (exploits may be public). Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (IDS/IPS, logs). Mitigation: Rigorous OS patching, system hardening, vulnerability scanning, and intrusion detection.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Network Vulnerabilities around Puppet Master
Attack Vector: Exploiting network misconfigurations or vulnerabilities (exposed ports, weak firewall rules) to gain unauthorized access to the Puppet Master. Why High-Risk: Network misconfigurations are common. Direct network access can bypass other security layers. Likelihood: Medium (depends on network security practices). Impact: Critical (access to Puppet Master, potential full compromise). Effort: Low to Medium. Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (network monitoring, firewall logs). Mitigation: Network segmentation, strict firewall rules, regular network security audits, and intrusion detection.
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) in Puppet Agent
Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in unpatched Puppet Agent software on managed nodes. Why High-Risk: Similar to Puppet Master CVEs, but affects individual agent nodes. Can be used for lateral movement. Likelihood: Medium (depends on agent patching cadence). Impact: High (compromise of agent node). Effort: Medium (exploits may be public). Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (endpoint security, logs). Mitigation: Rigorous and timely patching of Puppet Agents on all managed nodes. Endpoint security solutions.
Attack Tree Path: Local Agent Exploitation via Application/OS Vulnerabilities or Compromised User Account
Attack Vector: First compromising an application or OS on a managed node, or a user account on that node, and then leveraging that access to manipulate the local Puppet Agent. Why High-Risk: Common attack path - initial access to a node, then privilege escalation or lateral movement via Puppet Agent. Likelihood: Medium (application and OS vulnerabilities are common). Impact: High (compromise of agent node, potential lateral movement). Effort: Low to Medium. Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (application/OS security monitoring, endpoint security). Mitigation: Application security hardening, OS patching, strong user account security, principle of least privilege, and endpoint security solutions.
Attack Vector: Injecting malicious code or commands into Puppet manifests through unvalidated inputs (Hiera, external data) or insecure use of dynamic code execution features. Why High-Risk: Direct code execution on managed nodes via Puppet. Can be widespread if manifests are deployed broadly. Likelihood: Medium (depends on manifest development practices). Impact: High (compromise of agent nodes applying the manifest). Effort: Medium. Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (code review, static analysis, runtime monitoring). Mitigation: Input validation in manifests, avoid dynamic code execution with untrusted input, secure coding practices, code review, and static analysis.
Attack Tree Path: Backdoor in Puppet Manifests/Modules (Malicious Module Deployment)
Attack Vector: Deploying a Puppet module that contains intentionally malicious code or configurations. Why High-Risk: Stealthy and scalable. Malicious modules can be deployed through normal Puppet workflows. Likelihood: Low to Medium (depends on module review process). Impact: High (widespread compromise of managed nodes). Effort: Medium. Skill Level: Medium. Detection Difficulty: Medium (code review, module integrity checks, behavioral analysis). Mitigation: Module review process, code review, module integrity checks (checksums, signatures), access controls to module deployment, and behavioral analysis of Puppet runs.