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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for rails-api/active_model_serializers

Objective: Compromise Application via Active Model Serializers

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Active Model Serializers ├───[AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Gain Unauthorized Data Access [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Over-serialization of Sensitive Data │ │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Attributes │ │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Incorrect Association Serialization │ │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Default Serializer Misuse │ │ ├─── Bypass Authorization Checks in Serializers │ │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Lack of Authorization Logic in Custom Serializers │ ├───[OR] Abuse Custom Serializer Logic │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Custom Attributes/Methods ├───[AND] Gain Unauthorized Data Manipulation (Less Direct via AMS, but possible consequence) │ ├───[OR] [CRITICAL NODE] Indirect Manipulation via Data Exposure [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exposed Sensitive Data Leads to Account Takeover

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via Active Model Serializers

  • This is the root goal and represents the overall objective of the attacker.
  • It is critical because success means full or partial compromise of the application.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Gain Unauthorized Data Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • This is a critical node because unauthorized data access is a primary goal for many attackers and a significant security breach.
  • It is a high-risk path because misconfigurations and insecure custom logic in serializers are common and easily exploitable.
  • Attack Vectors within this path:
    • Exploit Misconfiguration
    • Exploit Vulnerabilities in AMS Library Itself (Lower Risk, not in sub-tree)
    • Abuse Custom Serializer Logic

Attack Tree Path: 3. [OR] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • This is a critical node because misconfigurations are the most likely and easily exploitable vulnerabilities in AMS usage.
  • It is a high-risk path due to the high likelihood and relatively low effort required to exploit misconfigurations.
  • Attack Vectors within this path:
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Over-serialization of Sensitive Data
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Attributes
        • Attack Vector: Developers unintentionally include sensitive attributes in serializers by failing to explicitly exclude them.
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: High (Sensitive Data Exposure)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Incorrect Association Serialization
        • Attack Vector: Serializing related models without proper filtering, leading to exposure of unintended data, especially through deeply nested associations.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium-High (Potentially Sensitive Data Exposure, more complex data)
        • Effort: Low-Medium
        • Skill Level: Low-Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Default Serializer Misuse
        • Attack Vector: Relying on default serializers that expose more data than intended, instead of explicitly defining serializers.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium (Potentially Sensitive Data Exposure)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Bypass Authorization Checks in Serializers
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Lack of Authorization Logic in Custom Serializers
        • Attack Vector: Custom serializers fail to implement proper authorization checks for attributes or associations, leading to unauthorized data access.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium-High (Unauthorized Access to Data)
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
    • Information Leakage via Debugging/Error Messages (Lower Risk, not in sub-tree)

Attack Tree Path: 4. [OR] Abuse Custom Serializer Logic

  • This is a higher-level node representing vulnerabilities introduced through custom serializer implementations.
  • Attack Vectors within this path:
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Custom Attributes/Methods
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Custom attributes fetch data without proper authorization.
        • Attack Vector: Custom attributes in serializers directly access data without proper authorization checks, bypassing application-level security.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium-High (Unauthorized Access to Data, potential for manipulation if logic is complex)
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Custom methods in serializers bypass application-level authorization.
        • Attack Vector: Custom methods in serializers bypass application-level authorization mechanisms, leading to unauthorized data access.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium-High (Unauthorized Access to Data, potential for manipulation if logic is complex)
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard
    • Logic flaws in custom attribute/method implementation (Lower Risk, not in sub-tree)
    • Injection Vulnerabilities in Custom Logic (Very Low Risk, not in sub-tree)

Attack Tree Path: 5. [AND] Gain Unauthorized Data Manipulation (Less Direct via AMS, but possible consequence)

  • This node represents the potential for data manipulation as a consequence of data exposure through AMS.
  • It is linked with "Gain Unauthorized Data Access" because data manipulation is often a secondary goal after gaining unauthorized access.
  • Attack Vectors within this path:
    • [OR] [CRITICAL NODE] Indirect Manipulation via Data Exposure [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exposed Sensitive Data Leads to Account Takeover
        • Attack Vector: Leaked credentials or personal information via AMS misconfigurations are used for account takeover.
        • Likelihood: Medium (If sensitive data is exposed via misconfiguration)
        • Impact: High (Account Takeover, data breach)
        • Effort: Low-Medium
        • Skill Level: Low-Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Exposed Business Logic Leads to Exploitation (Lower Risk, not in sub-tree)
    • Direct Manipulation via AMS Vulnerabilities (Very Very Low Risk, not in sub-tree)