1. Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure via Default Attribute Inclusion
- Description: An attacker sends a standard request to an API endpoint. The serializer, due to implicit attribute inclusion (not explicitly defining
attributes
), returns all model attributes, including sensitive ones likepassword_digest
,api_key
,is_admin
, internal IDs, or other private data not intended for public consumption. - Impact:
- Data Breach: Leakage of sensitive user data, potentially leading to identity theft, financial fraud, or account compromise.
- Privilege Escalation: Exposure of
is_admin
or similar flags could allow an attacker to identify administrative accounts. - Loss of Confidentiality: Exposure of internal business logic or proprietary data.
- Affected Component: The core serialization process when
attributes
are not explicitly defined in the serializer class. This affects theActiveModel::Serializer
base class and any subclasses that inherit this behavior. Specifically, the implicit attribute selection mechanism. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Explicit
attributes
Declaration: Always explicitly list the attributes to be serialized usingattributes :id, :name, :public_field, ...
. Never rely on the default behavior. - Code Reviews: Mandate code reviews that specifically check serializers for explicit attribute definitions.
- Automated Testing: Include tests that verify the JSON output of serializers, ensuring only expected attributes are present.
- Security Linters: Use security-focused linters that can detect implicit attribute inclusion in serializers.
- Explicit
Threat: Over-Exposure of Associated Data
2. Threat: Over-Exposure of Associated Data
- Description: An attacker requests a resource, and the serializer includes deeply nested associations (e.g.,
User
includesPosts
, which includesComments
, which includesCommenters
). The attacker receives a large JSON payload containing sensitive data from related models that they should not have access to. - Impact:
- Data Breach: Leakage of sensitive data from associated records.
- Performance Degradation/DoS: Excessive data retrieval can slow down the API or even lead to a denial-of-service.
- Information Disclosure: Exposure of the relationship graph, revealing connections between users or data that should be private.
- Affected Component: The association handling within serializers (
has_many
,belongs_to
,has_one
). The way these associations are included and how their own serializers are configured. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Selective Association Inclusion: Only include associations that are absolutely necessary for the specific API endpoint and user role.
- Separate Serializers: Create different serializers for different contexts (e.g.,
PublicPostSerializer
vs.AdminPostSerializer
). - Pagination: Always paginate associated records to limit the amount of data returned.
include
Option Control: Carefully manage theinclude
option in controllers to prevent overriding serializer settings and causing unintended data exposure.- Depth Limiting: Consider implementing a mechanism to limit the depth of nested associations.
3. Threat: Denial of Service via Deeply Nested Associations
- Description: An attacker crafts a request that triggers the serialization of deeply nested associations. This causes a large number of database queries (N+1 problem), potentially overwhelming the database server and leading to a denial-of-service.
- Impact:
- Service Unavailability: The API becomes unresponsive, affecting legitimate users.
- Resource Exhaustion: Database server resources (CPU, memory, connections) are exhausted.
- Affected Component: The association handling within serializers (
has_many
,belongs_to
,has_one
), particularly when nested deeply and without proper eager loading or pagination. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Limit Association Depth: Avoid deeply nested associations in serializers.
- Eager Loading: Use
includes
,preload
, oreager_load
in controllers to efficiently load associated data. - Pagination: Paginate associated records to limit the amount of data retrieved.
- Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on API endpoints to prevent abuse.
- Performance Monitoring: Monitor database query performance and identify potential bottlenecks.