threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for railsadminteam/rails_admin

Threat: Authentication Bypass

• Description: An attacker gains access to the rails_admin dashboard without valid credentials. This could be achieved by exploiting weaknesses in the authentication integration (e.g., misconfigured Devise, weak default passwords, session hijacking), or by directly accessing rails_admin routes if they are not properly protected by the authentication system. The core issue here is that rails_admin relies on an external authentication system, and if that system is flawed, rails_admin is vulnerable.
  • Impact: Complete control over the application's data and potentially the server itself, depending on the application's configuration and the attacker's capabilities.
  • Affected Component: rails_admin's main engine and routing (RailsAdmin::Engine, routing configuration), integration with authentication gems (e.g., Devise). The vulnerability is in how rails_admin uses the authentication system, not necessarily in rails_admin itself, but the impact is directly on rails_admin access.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement a robust authentication system (e.g., Devise) with strong password policies and multi-factor authentication.
    • Ensure rails_admin is correctly mounted and protected by the authentication system. Verify that all rails_admin routes require authentication. This is a crucial rails_admin-specific configuration step.
    • Use secure session management practices (secure cookies, HTTP-only flags, short session timeouts).
    • Consider IP whitelisting or VPN access for the rails_admin interface. This significantly reduces the attack surface for rails_admin.

Threat: Unauthorized Data Modification (Tampering)

• Description: An attacker with limited rails_admin access (or through a bypassed authorization check within rails_admin) modifies data they should not be able to. This could involve changing critical data, bypassing business logic, or injecting malicious content. The attacker might exploit weak rails_admin authorization configurations or vulnerabilities in rails_admin custom actions.
  • Impact: Data corruption, integrity violations, potential for further attacks (e.g., XSS through injected content), business logic disruption.
  • Affected Component: rails_admin's model configuration (config.model), field configurations (fields), custom actions (RailsAdmin::Config::Actions), and potentially the underlying ActiveRecord models if validations are insufficient and rails_admin's authorization fails.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement strong authorization using gems like CanCanCan or Pundit, defining granular permissions for each model and action within the rails_admin context. This is a key rails_admin-specific mitigation.
    • Use read_only configurations within rails_admin for fields that should never be modified through the interface.
    • Maintain robust model-level validations in your Rails application (this is a general defense, but it interacts with rails_admin).
    • Audit all changes made through rails_admin using gems like paper_trail or audited.
    • Validate all input received through rails_admin custom actions, even if it appears to be from a trusted source.

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure (Information Disclosure)

• Description: An attacker gains access to sensitive information displayed within the rails_admin interface. This could include API keys, user credentials, internal IDs, or other confidential data that is inadvertently exposed through poorly configured rails_admin field visibility or rails_admin custom actions.
  • Impact: Compromise of user accounts, API access, potential for further attacks, privacy violations.
  • Affected Component: rails_admin's model configuration (config.model), field configurations (fields), list views, show views, custom actions. The vulnerability lies in how rails_admin presents data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully configure which fields are visible for each model within rails_admin using the fields option. Explicitly list only the necessary fields. This is a primary rails_admin configuration task.
    • Avoid displaying sensitive information in rails_admin list views or show views.
    • Implement data masking or redaction for sensitive fields if they must be displayed within rails_admin.
    • Review and secure any rails_admin custom actions that might expose sensitive data.
    • Ensure proper error handling to prevent information leakage in error messages (this is a general defense, but applies to rails_admin's error output).

Threat: Privilege Escalation via rails_admin Vulnerability

• Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in rails_admin itself (or a misconfiguration of rails_admin) to gain higher privileges than they should have. This could involve bypassing rails_admin's authorization checks or gaining access to restricted rails_admin models or actions.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, ability to modify data beyond authorized limits, potential for complete system compromise.
  • Affected Component: Potentially any part of rails_admin, depending on the specific vulnerability. This could include rails_admin's authorization logic (RailsAdmin::Config.authorize_with), rails_admin custom actions, or core rails_admin components.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep rails_admin updated to the latest version to address any known security vulnerabilities in the gem itself.
    • Follow the principle of least privilege, granting users only the minimum necessary permissions within rails_admin.
    • Regularly review rails_admin's configuration and any custom code added to rails_admin for potential vulnerabilities.
    • Conduct security audits of the application, specifically including the rails_admin integration.

Threat: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) within Rails Admin

• Description: An attacker manipulates IDs or other parameters in rails_admin URLs or requests to access or modify objects they should not have access to. This is often due to insufficient authorization checks within the context of rails_admin.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to or modification of data belonging to other users or the system.
  • Affected Component: rails_admin's controllers and actions that handle object retrieval and modification based on IDs (RailsAdmin::MainController#show, #edit, #update, #delete), rails_admin custom actions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust authorization checks (e.g., CanCanCan, Pundit) specifically configured for use with rails_admin to ensure that users can only access objects they are permitted to. Do not rely solely on authentication.
    • Avoid exposing internal IDs directly in rails_admin URLs or forms. Consider using UUIDs or other non-sequential identifiers.
    • Validate all parameters used to retrieve or modify objects within rails_admin to ensure they are within the allowed scope for the current user.