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Attack Tree Analysis for ruby-concurrency/concurrent-ruby

Objective: Compromise Application Using concurrent-ruby by exploiting concurrency-related weaknesses.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Root: Compromise Application Using concurrent-ruby [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit Concurrency Primitives Misuse [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.1. Promise/Future Manipulation
        • 1.1.1. Unhandled Promise Rejection/Error [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.1.1.a. Information Leakage via Error Details [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          • 1.1.1.b. Denial of Service via Unhandled Exception Cascade [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 1.2. Executor/ThreadPool Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 1.2.1. Task Flooding [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.2.1.a. Denial of Service by Saturating Thread Pool [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.2.1.b. Performance Degradation impacting other users [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 1.3. Atomicity and Data Races [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 1.3.1. Race Conditions on Shared Mutable State [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.3.1.a. Data Corruption leading to application malfunction [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.3.1.b. Logic Bypass due to inconsistent state reads [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit Application Logic Vulnerabilities Exposed by Concurrency [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 2.1. Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) in Asynchronous Operations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 2.1.1. Data Modification between Check and Action [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 2.1.1.a. Authorization Bypass due to state change [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 2.1.1.b. Data Integrity Violation due to inconsistent state [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 2.2. State Management Issues in Concurrent Contexts [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 2.2.2. Inconsistent State due to Race Conditions in Application Logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 2.2.2.a. Business logic errors leading to incorrect outcomes [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          • 2.2.2.b. Security vulnerabilities due to flawed logic execution [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Unhandled Promise Rejection/Error Path

Leads to Information Leakage or Denial of Service due to common developer errors in asynchronous error handling.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Executor/ThreadPool Exhaustion Path

Directly results in Denial of Service through task flooding, a relatively easy attack to execute.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3. Atomicity and Data Races Path

Leads to Data Corruption or Logic Bypasses due to fundamental concurrency issues, often hard to detect and debug.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) in Asynchronous Operations Path

Exploits timing windows in asynchronous operations to bypass security checks or violate data integrity.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2. Inconsistent State due to Race Conditions in Application Logic Path

Results in Security vulnerabilities due to flawed logic execution caused by race conditions in application-level code.