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Attack Tree Analysis for ruby-concurrency/concurrent-ruby

Objective: To cause a denial-of-service (DoS) or achieve arbitrary code execution (ACE) in a Ruby application by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations related to the concurrent-ruby library.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application (DoS or ACE)
    |
    |--- Exploit Misconfiguration/Misuse (Likelihood: M, Impact: H)
    |       |
    |       |--- Resource Exhaustion (L: H, I: H, E: L, S: I, DD: M) (CRITICAL)
    |       |       |
    |       |       |--- ThreadPool - Unbounded Queue (L: H, I: VH, E: L, S: N, DD: M) (CRITICAL)
    |       |       |
    |       |       |--- ThreadPool - Excessive Threads (L: M, I: VH, E: L, S: N, DD: M) (CRITICAL)
    |       |       |
    |       |       |--- Resource Exhaustion - General (L: H, I: H, E: L, S: I, DD: M) (CRITICAL)
    |       |
    |    |--- Future/Promise (L: M, I: H)
    |           |
    |           |--- Long-Running Operations Blocking Threads (L: H, I: H, E: L, S: I, DD: M) (CRITICAL)

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfiguration/Misuse

  • Description: This branch represents the most common attack surface. Developers often misuse concurrency features due to a lack of understanding or oversight, leading to vulnerabilities. This is not a flaw in concurrent-ruby itself, but rather in how it's used.
  • Mitigation:
    • Thorough code reviews focusing on concurrency aspects.
    • Training developers on safe concurrency practices.
    • Use of static analysis tools to detect potential issues.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion (CRITICAL)

  • Description: This is a broad category encompassing various ways an attacker can consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, file handles, network connections), leading to a denial-of-service. It's a critical node because it's a common consequence of many concurrency-related misconfigurations.
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement robust input validation and rate limiting to prevent resource flooding.
    • Use bounded resources (e.g., limited-size thread pools, connection pools).
    • Monitor resource usage and set alerts for unusual activity.
    • Implement timeouts for operations to prevent indefinite blocking.

Attack Tree Path: ThreadPool - Unbounded Queue (CRITICAL)

  • Description: An attacker sends a large number of tasks to a thread pool configured with an unbounded queue. The queue grows indefinitely, consuming all available memory and leading to an application crash.
  • Mitigation:
    • Always use a bounded queue. Set a reasonable max_queue size for ThreadPoolExecutor and similar constructs.
    • Monitor queue length and trigger alerts if it grows beyond a threshold.
    • Consider using a thread pool that automatically rejects tasks when the queue is full (e.g., using a RejectedExecutionHandler).

Attack Tree Path: ThreadPool - Excessive Threads (CRITICAL)

  • Description: The application is configured to create a very large number of threads, either statically or dynamically. This overwhelms the system's resources (CPU, memory), leading to slowdowns or a crash.
  • Mitigation:
    • Carefully tune the max_threads parameter of thread pools. Consider the number of CPU cores and the nature of the tasks.
    • Use a thread pool that dynamically adjusts the number of threads based on load, if available.
    • Monitor the number of active threads and system resource usage.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion - General (CRITICAL)

  • Description: This is a catch-all for other ways an attacker might exhaust resources, such as creating many Future objects that never complete, or leaking resources within threads.
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement comprehensive resource management. Ensure that all acquired resources (files, sockets, database connections, etc.) are properly released, even in error conditions.
    • Use ensure blocks or similar mechanisms to guarantee resource cleanup.
    • Profile the application to identify resource leaks and bottlenecks.

Attack Tree Path: Future/Promise - Long-Running Operations Blocking Threads (CRITICAL)

  • Description: A developer uses a Future or Promise to execute a long-running or blocking operation (e.g., a large file read, a slow network request) without using a dedicated thread pool or asynchronous I/O. This blocks a thread from the main thread pool, reducing the application's capacity to handle other requests, leading to a denial of service.
    • Mitigation:
      • Use asynchronous I/O operations whenever possible within Future and Promise blocks.
      • If blocking operations are unavoidable, offload them to a separate, dedicated thread pool with appropriate size limits.
      • Implement timeouts to prevent a single long-running operation from blocking a thread indefinitely.
      • Use non-blocking alternatives where available (e.g., non-blocking I/O libraries).