Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
103 lines (80 loc) · 5.38 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

103 lines (80 loc) · 5.38 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for ryanb/cancan

Objective: Unauthorized Access/Action via CanCan

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  [Attacker's Goal: Unauthorized Access/Action via CanCan]
                                                  |
                                  -------------------------------------------------
                                  |                                               |
                  [[Misconfigured Ability Definitions]]                [[Bypassing Ability Checks]]
                                  |***                                            |***
                  ---------------------------------                ---------------------------------
                  |***                              |                |***                              |
    [[Overly Permissive Rules]]                     |                [[Missing Ability Checks]]       |
                  |***                              |                |***                              |
    -------------------------                        |       -------------------------               |
    |***                                             |       |***                                      |

[[Using Wildcards Incorrectly]] | [[Controller Bypass]] | |*** | |*** | [[e.g., can :manage, :all]] | [[No load_and_authorize]] | | [[Skipping authorize!]] |

Attack Tree Path: Misconfigured Ability Definitions

  • Description: Errors in the Ability class, which defines user permissions, are the root cause of many CanCan vulnerabilities. This is a critical node because it's the foundation of the authorization system.
  • Likelihood: High/Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium/High

Attack Tree Path: Overly Permissive Rules

  • Description: Rules that grant broader access than intended, often due to a misunderstanding of CanCan's syntax or a lack of careful consideration.
  • Example: can :manage, :all grants complete control over all resources.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Review and replace can :manage, :all with specific permissions.
    • Adhere to the Principle of Least Privilege.
    • Conduct regular code reviews of the Ability class.

Attack Tree Path: Using Wildcards Incorrectly

  • Description: Misunderstanding or misusing wildcards like :all, :read, etc., leading to unintended access grants.
  • Example: can :read, :all grants read access to every resource, potentially exposing sensitive data.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Define permissions explicitly for each resource.
    • Avoid relying heavily on broad wildcards.
    • Document the intended behavior of each rule.

Attack Tree Path: Bypassing Ability Checks

  • Description: Even with correctly defined abilities, failing to enforce them renders the authorization system useless. This is a critical node.
  • Likelihood: High/Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Missing Ability Checks

  • Description: The most common bypass: forgetting to use load_and_authorize_resource (or authorize!) in controllers, leaving actions completely unprotected. * Likelihood: High * Impact: High * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Actionable Insights: * Enforce the use of load_and_authorize_resource in all controllers. * Use linters or code analysis tools to detect missing checks. * Apply load_and_authorize_resource at the controller level.

Attack Tree Path: No load_and_authorize_resource

Attack Tree Path: Controller Bypass

  • Description: Intentionally or accidentally disabling authorization checks for specific actions using skip_before_action :authorize! or skip_authorize_resource. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: High * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Low * Detection Difficulty: Medium * Actionable Insights: * Minimize and strictly review any use of skip_before_action :authorize! and skip_authorize_resource. * Require code review approval for any skipping of authorization.

Attack Tree Path: Skipping authorize!