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Attack Tree Analysis for simplecov-ruby/simplecov

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting insecure access to SimpleCov coverage reports due to misconfiguration.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via SimpleCov [ROOT GOAL - CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.0] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of SimpleCov [CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.1] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Insecure Report Storage or Access [CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.1.1] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Access Publicly Accessible Coverage Reports [CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.1.1.1] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Discover Publicly Accessible Report Path [CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.1.1.2] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Access and Analyze Coverage Reports [CRITICAL NODE] └───[2.1.1.2.1] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Extract Sensitive Information from Coverage Reports [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: [2.0] Exploit Misconfiguration or Misuse of SimpleCov

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from how SimpleCov is set up and used within the application, specifically focusing on insecure configurations rather than library vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Misconfigurations are a common occurrence in web application deployments due to human error, rushed deployments, or lack of security awareness.
  • Impact: Medium - Information Disclosure primarily. While not direct code execution, leaked information can significantly aid further, more impactful attacks.
  • Effort: Low - Exploiting misconfigurations often requires minimal effort, relying on standard web reconnaissance techniques.
  • Skill Level: Low - Basic understanding of web requests and common web paths is sufficient.
  • Detection Difficulty: Low - Standard web traffic, might be missed without specific monitoring for coverage report access attempts.

Attack Tree Path: [2.1] Exploit Insecure Report Storage or Access

  • Attack Vector: Targeting vulnerabilities related to how coverage reports are stored and accessed, focusing on scenarios where access controls are insufficient or misconfigured.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Developers might overlook the security implications of coverage reports, especially in internal or staging environments, leading to insecure storage or access configurations.
  • Impact: Medium - Information Disclosure. Access to reports reveals internal application details, code structure, and potentially uncovered code areas.
  • Effort: Low - Exploiting insecure storage often involves standard web requests or basic file system access if system access is gained through other means.
  • Skill Level: Low to Medium - Basic web request skills or system access knowledge if file system permissions are targeted.
  • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium - Depends on the specific misconfiguration. Publicly accessible web reports are easier to detect in logs, while file system permission issues might be harder to spot without specific monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: [2.1.1] Access Publicly Accessible Coverage Reports

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting the scenario where coverage reports are unintentionally made accessible to the public via the web server.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Accidental public exposure can happen due to incorrect web server configuration, default settings, or developers forgetting to restrict access before deployment.
  • Impact: Medium - Information Disclosure. Publicly accessible reports are easily discoverable and provide immediate access to sensitive application information.
  • Effort: Low - Requires only standard web browsing or automated tools to discover and access publicly available resources.
  • Skill Level: Low - No specialized skills are needed.
  • Detection Difficulty: Low - Standard web traffic, might be missed unless specifically monitoring for access to known coverage report paths.

Attack Tree Path: [2.1.1.1] Discover Publicly Accessible Report Path

  • Attack Vector: Identifying the URL or file path where coverage reports are located when they are unintentionally exposed publicly.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Common paths like /coverage, /reports, /simplecov are often tried by attackers. robots.txt or directory listing misconfigurations can also inadvertently reveal paths.
  • Impact: Low - Path discovery itself is a preliminary step, but confirms the potential for information disclosure.
  • Effort: Low - Simple tools like web browsers, curl, or directory brute-forcers can be used.
  • Skill Level: Low - Basic web reconnaissance skills.
  • Detection Difficulty: Low - Standard web traffic, path discovery attempts might be mixed with normal browsing or automated scans.

Attack Tree Path: [2.1.1.2] Access and Analyze Coverage Reports

  • Attack Vector: Once the report path is discovered, accessing the reports using standard web requests (e.g., HTTP GET) and then analyzing the content of the reports.
  • Likelihood: High - If the path is discovered to be publicly accessible, accessing the reports is usually straightforward.
  • Impact: Medium - Information Disclosure. Access to reports allows for detailed analysis of code structure, internal paths, and potentially uncovered code areas.
  • Effort: Low - Requires a web browser or simple scripting to download and view the reports.
  • Skill Level: Low - Basic web browsing and file handling skills.
  • Detection Difficulty: Low - Standard web traffic, accessing static files might not be flagged as suspicious unless specific monitoring is in place.

Attack Tree Path: [2.1.1.2.1] Extract Sensitive Information from Coverage Reports

  • Attack Vector: Analyzing the content of the accessed coverage reports to extract sensitive information that can be used for further attacks or understanding the application's internals.
  • Likelihood: High - If reports are accessible, extracting information is a logical next step and relatively easy.
  • Impact: Medium - Information Disclosure. Extracted information (internal paths, code structure, uncovered areas) significantly aids in reconnaissance and planning subsequent attacks.
  • Effort: Low - Manual review of reports or simple scripts to parse and extract specific data.
  • Skill Level: Low - Basic understanding of code and file formats.
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Low - Analyzing the content of downloaded files is an off-system activity and not directly detectable by the application.