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Attack Tree Analysis for sj26/mailcatcher

Objective: Compromise WebApp via MailCatcher [CRITICAL NODE - Overall Goal]

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise WebApp via MailCatcher [CRITICAL NODE - Overall Goal] ├───[1.1.2.a] HTML Injection leading to XSS in MailCatcher UI (Indirect WebApp impact) [HIGH-RISK PATH - XSS in UI] │ └───[2.1.1] Stored XSS via Email Content [CRITICAL NODE - Stored XSS] │ └───[2.1.1.a] Malicious email content (HTML/JavaScript) stored and executed in user's browser when viewing in MailCatcher UI ├───[2.0] Exploit MailCatcher's Web UI [HIGH-RISK PATH - Web UI Exploitation] │ ├───[2.1] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH - XSS] │ │ └───[2.1.1] Stored XSS via Email Content [CRITICAL NODE - Stored XSS] (Repeated for clarity) │ │ └───[2.1.1.a] Malicious email content (HTML/JavaScript) stored and executed in user's browser when viewing in MailCatcher UI (Repeated for clarity) │ ├───[2.3] Information Disclosure via Web UI (Design Weakness) [HIGH-RISK PATH - Information Disclosure] [CRITICAL NODE - Information Disclosure] │ │ └───[2.3.1] Unauthorized Access to Captured Emails [CRITICAL NODE - Unauthorized Access] │ │ └───[2.3.1.a] MailCatcher by default has NO authentication. Anyone with network access to port 1080 can view ALL captured emails. ├───[3.0] Abuse of MailCatcher's Design & Intended Use (Misconfiguration/Exposure) [HIGH-RISK PATH - Misconfiguration/Exposure] │ └───[3.1] MailCatcher Exposed to Public Network [CRITICAL NODE - Public Exposure] │ └───[3.1.1] Accidental or intentional exposure of MailCatcher's web UI and SMTP ports to the internet. [HIGH-RISK PATH - Public Network Exposure] │ └───[3.1.1.a] Leads to all vulnerabilities under [1.0] and [2.0] being exploitable by anyone on the internet.

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE - Overall Goal]: Compromise WebApp via MailCatcher

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting any vulnerability or misconfiguration within MailCatcher to gain unauthorized access to the WebApp or its data, indirectly through the development/testing environment.
  • Impact: Compromise of the WebApp's development/testing environment, potential data breach if sensitive information is exposed through MailCatcher, and potential disruption of development workflows.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [HIGH-RISK PATH - XSS in UI] -> [CRITICAL NODE - Stored XSS] -> [2.1.1.a] Malicious email content (HTML/JavaScript) stored and executed in user's browser when viewing in MailCatcher UI

  • Attack Vector:
    • Attacker crafts a malicious email containing HTML and JavaScript.
    • WebApp sends this email through MailCatcher's SMTP service.
    • MailCatcher stores the email and its content.
    • When a user (developer, tester) views this email in MailCatcher's web UI, the malicious JavaScript is executed in their browser because MailCatcher fails to properly sanitize the HTML content.
  • Impact:
    • Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.
    • Attacker can potentially:
      • Steal session cookies of the user viewing MailCatcher.
      • Redirect the user to a malicious website.
      • Perform actions on behalf of the user within the MailCatcher UI or other web applications they are logged into in the same browser session (indirectly impacting WebApp if the user is also accessing WebApp).
  • Mitigation:
    • MailCatcher developers should implement robust HTML sanitization for email content displayed in the web UI.
    • Users should be cautious when viewing emails in MailCatcher, especially from untrusted sources.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [HIGH-RISK PATH - Web UI Exploitation] -> [HIGH-RISK PATH - XSS] -> [CRITICAL NODE - Stored XSS] (Repeated for clarity) -> [2.1.1.a] Malicious email content (HTML/JavaScript) stored and executed in user's browser when viewing in MailCatcher UI (Repeated for clarity)

  • Attack Vector: This path reiterates the XSS vulnerability described above, emphasizing that exploiting the Web UI is a high-risk approach, and XSS is a primary concern within the Web UI.
  • Impact & Mitigation: Same as described in point 2.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [HIGH-RISK PATH - Information Disclosure] -> [CRITICAL NODE - Information Disclosure] -> [CRITICAL NODE - Unauthorized Access] -> [2.3.1.a] MailCatcher by default has NO authentication. Anyone with network access to port 1080 can view ALL captured emails.

  • Attack Vector:
    • MailCatcher's web UI (port 1080) is accessible on a network (potentially beyond localhost).
    • Due to the lack of authentication, anyone who can reach port 1080 can access the MailCatcher web UI.
    • Through the UI, they can view all captured emails, including potentially sensitive information sent by the WebApp.
  • Impact:
    • Information Disclosure vulnerability.
    • Exposure of potentially sensitive data contained within emails captured by MailCatcher. This can include:
      • Password reset links
      • API keys
      • User registration details
      • Internal system notifications
      • Debug information
      • Potentially sensitive user data.
  • Mitigation:
    • Network Isolation is paramount. Ensure MailCatcher's web UI (port 1080) is NOT accessible from untrusted networks or the public internet.
    • Restrict access to localhost or a tightly controlled development/staging network using firewalls and network segmentation.
    • Consider using a VPN for remote access to development environments.
    • Avoid sending real sensitive data through MailCatcher, even in development environments if possible.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [HIGH-RISK PATH - Misconfiguration/Exposure] -> [CRITICAL NODE - Public Exposure] -> [HIGH-RISK PATH - Public Network Exposure] -> [3.1.1.a] Leads to all vulnerabilities under [1.0] and [2.0] being exploitable by anyone on the internet.

  • Attack Vector:
    • MailCatcher's web UI (port 1080) and/or SMTP port (1025) are accidentally or intentionally exposed to the public internet or a less trusted network.
    • This misconfiguration makes all vulnerabilities identified in the attack tree (especially information disclosure and XSS) easily exploitable by a wide range of attackers.
  • Impact:
    • Significant increase in risk for all vulnerabilities.
    • High likelihood of Information Disclosure due to unauthorized access to the web UI.
    • Increased risk of XSS exploitation if malicious emails are sent and viewed by users accessing the publicly exposed MailCatcher.
    • Potential for DoS attacks against the SMTP service.
  • Mitigation:
    • Strictly control network access to MailCatcher.
    • Regularly audit network configurations to ensure MailCatcher is not unintentionally exposed.
    • Use firewalls and network segmentation to enforce access restrictions.
    • Employ monitoring and alerting to detect any unauthorized access attempts to MailCatcher's ports if exposed to wider networks (though ideally, it should not be exposed).