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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for teamcapybara/capybara

Attack Surface: Driver Exploitation

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the underlying browser drivers (e.g., Selenium WebDriver, cuprite) used by Capybara can be exploited directly, leading to compromise of the testing environment.
  • How Capybara Contributes: Capybara requires and directly interfaces with these drivers. The driver is an integral part of Capybara's operation, not just a tool used by it.
  • Example: An outdated version of ChromeDriver with a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability is used. An attacker, able to influence the test environment (e.g., by controlling a CI/CD pipeline configuration), triggers the RCE through the driver, even without interacting with the application being tested.
  • Impact: Remote code execution on the testing machine, potential compromise of the entire testing environment, access to source code, credentials, and potentially the ability to influence the application's deployment.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Automated Updates: Implement automated updates for all browser drivers (ChromeDriver, geckodriver, etc.) and related libraries (Selenium WebDriver, cuprite).
    • Driver Hardening: Use the most secure and minimal configuration options for the chosen driver. Disable unnecessary features and capabilities.
    • Sandboxing: Run tests in an isolated environment (e.g., Docker containers, virtual machines) to limit the impact of a driver compromise. This is crucial.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan driver dependencies for known vulnerabilities using software composition analysis (SCA) tools.

Attack Surface: Selector Injection

  • Description: Untrusted input used to construct Capybara selectors (CSS, XPath) can lead to unintended element interactions, potentially triggering actions within the application that were not intended by the test.
  • How Capybara Contributes: Capybara's core mechanism for interacting with web pages relies on selectors. The library provides the methods that use these selectors, making the injection directly tied to Capybara's functionality.
  • Example: A test uses input from a configuration file to build a selector: find(:css, ".user-#{config['user_type']}"). If an attacker can modify the config file and set user_type to admin'] .delete-button, it could select and click a delete button intended only for administrators.
  • Impact: Unintended actions within the application (e.g., deleting data, modifying settings, submitting forms with unexpected values), potentially leading to data loss or corruption. The impact depends on the actions triggered.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Dynamic Selectors: Prioritize static, pre-defined selectors whenever feasible. Hardcode selectors in the test code.
    • Parameterized Selectors: If dynamic selectors are absolutely necessary, use Capybara's built-in methods for escaping and parameterizing selectors. For example, use find(:css, ".user", text: config['user_type']) instead of string concatenation.
    • Input Validation: If external input must be used, rigorously validate and sanitize it to ensure it conforms to a very strict, limited set of allowed characters and patterns. Reject any input that doesn't match.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that the test suite does not have excessive privileges within the application.

Attack Surface: JavaScript Execution (XSS-Indirect, but Capybara-Enabled)

  • Description: Untrusted input used within Capybara's execute_script or evaluate_script methods can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) within the testing context. While technically "indirect" (the vulnerability is in how the input is used, not Capybara itself), Capybara provides the direct mechanism for this execution.
  • How Capybara Contributes: Capybara provides the execute_script and evaluate_script methods, which are the direct means of executing arbitrary JavaScript within the browser. This is a core Capybara feature.
  • Example: A test takes input from an environment variable and injects it into a JavaScript snippet: execute_script("document.getElementById('notification').innerText = '#{ENV['MESSAGE']}'"). If an attacker can control the MESSAGE environment variable and set it to <script>alert('XSS')</script>, the script will execute within the browser controlled by Capybara.
  • Impact: Execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context controlled by Capybara. This could lead to exfiltration of data from the testing environment (e.g., cookies, local storage, environment variables exposed to the browser), manipulation of the browser's state, or potentially influencing subsequent test steps.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Untrusted Input: Never use untrusted input directly within execute_script or evaluate_script. This is the most important mitigation.
    • Strict Sanitization: If dynamic JavaScript is absolutely unavoidable, use a robust, well-vetted JavaScript sanitization library or a templating engine that automatically escapes output specifically designed for JavaScript contexts.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strict CSP within the testing environment to restrict the execution of inline scripts and limit the sources of external scripts. This provides a defense-in-depth layer.
    • Minimize JavaScript Execution: Use Capybara's built-in methods for interacting with the page (e.g., click_button, fill_in) whenever possible, rather than resorting to custom JavaScript. This reduces the attack surface.