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Attack Tree Analysis for teamcapybara/capybara

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Data

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 [Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Data]
                                                |
                                 -------------------------------------------------
                                 |                                               |
                  [Exploit Capybara's Driver Interaction]       [Exploit Capybara's Configuration/Usage]
                                 |                                               |
                  ---------------------------------               -------------------------------------------------
                  |                                               |

[Manipulate Driver to ] [Insecure Test Setup] [Execute Arbitrary Code] | | ------------------------------------------------- | | | [[Driver-Specific Vuln]] [[Overly Permissive]] [[Leaked ]] (e.g., Selenium, [Test Environment] [[Secrets]] Poltergeist, etc.) [[in Tests]]
[[RCE via]] [[Use Default/Weak]]
[[Driver]] [[Credentials]] 
                  |                                   |
                  |===>                               |===>

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Capybara's Driver Interaction ===> Manipulate Driver to Execute Arbitrary Code ===> [[Driver-Specific Vuln (RCE via Driver)]]

  • Attack Vector: Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Driver Vulnerability
  • Description:
    • The attacker identifies a vulnerability in the specific Capybara driver being used (e.g., Selenium WebDriver, Cuprite, Poltergeist, etc.) or one of its dependencies (like the browser binary itself).
    • This vulnerability allows the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code on the machine running the tests (the test runner). In some cases, this could extend to the application server if the test runner has direct access.
    • The vulnerability could be a known, unpatched vulnerability (CVE) or a zero-day vulnerability.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends heavily on driver and version. Zero-days are rare, but known vulnerabilities in unpatched drivers are common.)
  • Impact: High (RCE allows complete control of the test runner or potentially the application server.)
  • Effort: Medium to High (Exploiting a known vulnerability might be easy; discovering a zero-day is very hard.)
  • Skill Level: Medium to High (Exploiting known vulnerabilities requires some skill; discovering zero-days requires advanced skills.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) might detect known exploits; zero-days are very hard to detect.)
  • Mitigation:
    • Keep Drivers Updated: Crucially, keep all drivers (and their dependencies, like browser binaries) up-to-date. Regularly audit driver versions and apply security patches immediately. Use a dependency management system.
    • Sandboxing: Run tests in a sandboxed environment (e.g., Docker container, virtual machine) to limit the impact of a successful RCE.
    • Least Privilege: Run the test runner with the least privileges necessary. Avoid running tests as root or administrator.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the test environment for known vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Capybara's Configuration/Usage ===> Insecure Test Setup ===> [[Leaked Secrets in Tests]] / [[Use Default/Weak Credentials]] / [[Overly Permissive Test Environment]]

  • Attack Vector 1: Leaked Secrets in Tests

    • Description:
      • Sensitive information (API keys, database credentials, cloud service keys, etc.) is hardcoded directly into the test files or committed to the version control system.
      • An attacker gains access to the test code repository (e.g., through a compromised developer account, social engineering, or a misconfigured repository).
      • The attacker uses the leaked secrets to access the application or other resources.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake, especially in poorly managed projects.)
    • Impact: High (Direct access to sensitive resources.)
    • Effort: Low (Requires access to the test code repository.)
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Low (If code is reviewed; otherwise, High.)
    • Mitigation:
      • Environment Variables: Use environment variables to store secrets.
      • Secrets Management Solution: Use a dedicated secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault).
      • Pre-Commit Hooks: Use pre-commit hooks (e.g., git-secrets) to prevent accidental commits of secrets.
      • Code Reviews: Enforce mandatory code reviews to catch hardcoded secrets.

  • Attack Vector 2: Use Default/Weak Credentials

    • Description:
      • Test accounts in the application or test environment are configured with default passwords (e.g., "admin/admin") or easily guessable passwords.
      • An attacker uses brute-force or dictionary attacks to guess the credentials.
      • The attacker gains access to the application or test environment using the compromised credentials.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common in test environments.)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Depends on the privileges of the compromised account.)
    • Effort: Low (Brute-force or dictionary attacks.)
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts might be logged.)
    • Mitigation:
      • Strong Passwords: Enforce strong, unique passwords for all test accounts.
      • Password Manager: Use a password manager to generate and store strong passwords.
      • Account Lockout: Implement account lockout policies to prevent brute-force attacks.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): If possible, enable MFA for test accounts, especially those with elevated privileges.

  • Attack Vector 3: Overly Permissive Test Environment

    • Description:
      • The test environment is configured with overly permissive settings, such as:
        • Disabled security features (e.g., authentication, authorization).
        • Weak firewall rules.
        • Unnecessary services running.
        • Direct access to sensitive resources (e.g., databases) from the test runner.
      • An attacker exploits these weaknesses to gain access to the application or test environment.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common practice, unfortunately.)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Increases the attack surface.)
    • Effort: Low (No specific attack effort; attacker benefits from existing misconfiguration.)
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Low (If the environment is audited; otherwise, High.)
    • Mitigation:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Configure the test environment with the least privileges necessary.
      • Mirror Production Security: The test environment should mirror the security settings of the production environment as closely as possible (while using test data and credentials).
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the test environment from other networks.
      • Regular Audits: Regularly audit the test environment's configuration for security vulnerabilities.
      • Infrastructure as Code (IaC): Use IaC to manage the test environment's configuration, ensuring consistency and repeatability.