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Attack Tree Analysis for thoughtbot/bourbon

Objective: Compromise Application via Bourbon [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Visualization

    1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Development Workflow Using Bourbon [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • 2.1. Compromised Development Environment [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Code during Sass Compilation Process [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.1.1.1. Modify Sass files to include malicious CSS (Directly or indirectly via Bourbon usage) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • 2.2. Supply Chain Attack on Bourbon Itself [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Bourbon [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker is to successfully compromise the application that utilizes the Bourbon library. This could involve various forms of compromise, such as data breaches, defacement, denial of service, or gaining unauthorized access and control.
  • Why Critical: This is the root goal of the entire attack tree. Success at any of the leaf nodes in the High-Risk Paths can contribute to achieving this goal.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Development Workflow Using Bourbon [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This attack vector targets weaknesses in the software development lifecycle, specifically focusing on how Bourbon is integrated and used within the development process. It bypasses direct attacks on the Bourbon library itself and instead exploits vulnerabilities in the environment and processes surrounding its use.
  • Why High Risk: Development workflows are often less rigorously secured than production environments. Compromising this stage can have significant and cascading impacts, potentially affecting all deployments of the application.
  • Why Critical Node: Success here opens up multiple avenues for injecting malicious code into the application during the build process, making it a pivotal point in the attack.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromised Development Environment [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This attack vector focuses on compromising the local development environment of a developer working on the application. This could be a developer's workstation, virtual machine, or any system used for writing and compiling code, including Sass and Bourbon.
  • Why High Risk: Developer workstations are often targets due to potentially weaker security controls compared to production servers and the access they provide to source code and build processes.
  • Why Critical Node: A compromised development environment allows the attacker to directly manipulate the codebase and build artifacts before they even reach testing or production, making it a highly effective point of attack.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Inject Malicious Code during Sass Compilation Process [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This attack vector involves inserting malicious code into the application's CSS stylesheets during the Sass compilation stage. Since Bourbon is a Sass library, this process is directly relevant. The attacker aims to inject malicious CSS that will be included in the final application build and executed by users' browsers.
  • Why High Risk: CSS injection, while not directly XSS in the traditional sense, can be used for various malicious purposes, including data exfiltration, website defacement, and potentially as a stepping stone for more complex attacks.
  • Attack Methods:
    • Modifying Sass files directly.
    • Compromising the Sass compiler itself.
    • Compromising build tools involved in the Sass compilation process.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Modify Sass files to include malicious CSS (Directly or indirectly via Bourbon usage) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: This is the most direct and impactful action within the "Compromised Development Environment" path. The attacker, having gained access to a developer's machine, directly modifies Sass files (which may or may not use Bourbon mixins) to inject malicious CSS code. This malicious CSS is then compiled into the application's stylesheets and deployed.
  • Why High Risk: Direct modification of source code is a highly effective way to inject malicious functionality. The injected CSS becomes a persistent part of the application.
  • Why Critical Node: This is the point where malicious code is actually injected into the application's CSS. Success here directly leads to the deployment of compromised CSS.
  • Attack Scenarios:
    • Directly editing .scss files: The attacker opens Sass files and adds malicious CSS rules.
    • Indirectly via Bourbon usage: The attacker might modify Sass files that use Bourbon mixins in a way that, when compiled, generates malicious CSS. This could be through subtle changes that are harder to detect than blatant CSS injection.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Supply Chain Attack on Bourbon Itself [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This attack vector targets the Bourbon library itself. An attacker attempts to compromise the Bourbon repository, distribution channels, or the development infrastructure of the Bourbon project to inject malicious code directly into the library.
  • Why Critical Node: While of Very Low Likelihood for a well-maintained project like Bourbon, the impact is potentially Critical. If successful, malicious code would be distributed to a vast number of applications using Bourbon, leading to widespread compromise.
  • Attack Scenarios:
    • Compromising the Bourbon GitHub repository and injecting malicious code into the source.
    • Compromising package distribution channels (if Bourbon were distributed via a package manager in a way that could be compromised).
    • Compromising the development infrastructure of the Bourbon maintainers to inject malicious code during the release process.