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Attack Tree Analysis for thoughtbot/factory_bot

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to FactoryBot usage, focusing on high-risk attack paths.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via FactoryBot Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND]─► Exploit Insecure Test Data Generation [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─► 1.1. Leak Sensitive Data from Test Environment [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[OR]─► 1.1.1. Expose Test Database Backups [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └───► 1.1.1.1. Access Unsecured Backup Storage [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[OR]─► 1.1.2. Log Sensitive Data in Test Logs [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └───► 1.1.2.1. Access Unsecured Test Logs [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └───[OR]─► 1.1.4. Expose Test Data via Error Messages/Debug Pages [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │           └───► 1.1.4.1. Access Debug/Error Pages in Non-Test Environment [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │           └───► 1.1.4.2. Error Handling Reveals Factory-Generated Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   └───[OR]─► 1.2. Generate Insecure Data in Factories [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├───[OR]─► 1.2.1. Create Weak/Predictable Passwords [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └───► 1.2.1.1. Factories Use Static or Simple Password Generation [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └───► 1.2.1.2. Factories Use Predictable Password Patterns [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       ├───[OR]─► 1.2.2. Generate Predictable Usernames/Identifiers [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └───► 1.2.2.1. Factories Use Sequential or Simple Username Generation [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └───► 1.2.2.2. Factories Use Publicly Known Patterns [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       ├───[OR]─► 1.2.3. Include Sensitive Data Directly in Factories [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └───► 1.2.3.1. Hardcode Real Credentials in Factories (e.g., API keys) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │       └───► 1.2.3.2. Embed PII in Factory Attributes Unnecessarily [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─► 2.1.2. Factories Create Data that Bypasses Security Checks [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └───► 2.1.2.1. Factories Set Attributes that Disable Security Features (e.g., admin flags) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │       └───► 2.1.2.2. Factories Create Data in States that are Not Properly Validated [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   └───[OR]─► 2.2. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to FactoryBot usage)
│       └───[OR]─► 2.2.1. Vulnerabilities in FactoryBot Dependencies
│           └───[OR]─► 2.2.1.1. Outdated or Vulnerable Gems Used by FactoryBot [HIGH RISK PATH]
│           └───[OR]─► 2.2.1.2. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting FactoryBot Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───[OR]─► 2.2.2. Vulnerabilities in Gems Used in Factories [HIGH RISK PATH]
│               └───[OR]─► 2.2.2.1. Factories Use Vulnerable Gems for Data Generation (e.g., Faker) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│               └───[OR]─► 2.2.2.2. Factories Use Vulnerable Gems for Complex Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
└───[AND]─► Exploit Misuse of FactoryBot in Non-Test Environments [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├───[OR]─► 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───[OR]─► 3.1.1. Direct Factory Creation in Production Controllers/Services [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │       └───► 3.1.1.1. Developer Mistake in Copying/Pasting Code [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │       └───► 3.1.1.2. Misunderstanding of FactoryBot Scope [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├───[OR]─► 3.1.2. Factories Used in Seed Data or Migrations [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │       └───► 3.1.2.1. Factories Used to Generate Initial Data in Production [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │       └───► 3.1.2.2. Migrations Accidentally Include Factory Calls [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   └───[OR]─► 3.1.3. Factories Exposed via API Endpoints (Debug/Admin) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │           └───► 3.1.3.1. Debug Endpoints Allow Factory Creation [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │           └───► 3.1.3.2. Admin Panels Unintentionally Use Factories [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └───[OR]─► 3.2. Factories Used in Staging/Pre-Production with Production Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├───[OR]─► 3.2.1. Factories Interact with Production-Like Staging Database [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │       └───► 3.2.1.1. Factories Modify or Corrupt Staging Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │       └───► 3.2.1.2. Factories Create Backdoors in Staging Environment [HIGH RISK PATH]
        └───[OR]─► 3.2.2. Staging Environment Exposed with Factory-Generated Data [HIGH RISK PATH]
                └───► 3.2.2.1. Staging Environment Less Secure than Production [HIGH RISK PATH]
                └───► 3.2.2.2. Factory Data in Staging Mimics Production Data [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Leak Sensitive Data from Test Environment

Attack Vector: Attacker targets weakly secured test environments to extract sensitive data that was generated or used by FactoryBot. This data could include PII, credentials, or internal application secrets. Specific Paths:

  • 1.1.1. Expose Test Database Backups -> 1.1.1.1. Access Unsecured Backup Storage: Attacker finds publicly accessible or poorly secured storage (e.g., S3 bucket) containing test database backups.
  • 1.1.2. Log Sensitive Data in Test Logs -> 1.1.2.1. Access Unsecured Test Logs: Attacker gains access to test environment logs (e.g., server logs, application logs) which inadvertently contain sensitive data generated by factories.
  • 1.1.4. Expose Test Data via Error Messages/Debug Pages -> 1.1.4.1. Access Debug/Error Pages in Non-Test Environment: Attacker accesses debug or error pages in staging or even production (due to misconfiguration) that reveal factory-generated data in error messages.
  • 1.1.4. Expose Test Data via Error Messages/Debug Pages -> 1.1.4.2. Error Handling Reveals Factory-Generated Data: Attacker triggers errors in non-test environments, and the error handling logic inadvertently displays factory-generated data in the error response.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Generate Insecure Data in Factories

Attack Vector: Factories are designed to generate insecure data by default, or developers make mistakes in factory definitions leading to insecure data generation. This insecure data, if leaked or used in non-test contexts, becomes exploitable. Specific Paths:

  • 1.2.1. Create Weak/Predictable Passwords -> 1.2.1.1. Factories Use Static or Simple Password Generation: Factories are configured to use hardcoded or very simple passwords (e.g., "password", "123456").
  • 1.2.1. Create Weak/Predictable Passwords -> 1.2.1.2. Factories Use Predictable Password Patterns: Factories use predictable patterns for password generation (e.g., "user1password", "user2password").
  • 1.2.2. Generate Predictable Usernames/Identifiers -> 1.2.2.1. Factories Use Sequential or Simple Username Generation: Factories generate usernames sequentially (e.g., user1, user2, user3) or using simple patterns.
  • 1.2.2. Generate Predictable Usernames/Identifiers -> 1.2.2.2. Factories Use Publicly Known Patterns: Factories use usernames or patterns that are easily guessable or publicly known.
  • 1.2.3. Include Sensitive Data Directly in Factories -> 1.2.3.1. Hardcode Real Credentials in Factories (e.g., API keys): Factories directly embed real API keys, secrets, or other credentials in their definitions.
  • 1.2.3. Include Sensitive Data Directly in Factories -> 1.2.3.2. Embed PII in Factory Attributes Unnecessarily: Factories include Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in attributes when it's not strictly necessary for testing, increasing the risk of data breaches if test data is exposed.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Factories Create Data that Bypasses Security Checks

Attack Vector: Factories are intentionally or unintentionally designed to create data that circumvents application security mechanisms, leading to exploitable states. Specific Paths:

  • 2.1.2.1. Factories Set Attributes that Disable Security Features (e.g., admin flags): Factories directly set attributes like is_admin = true without proper authorization, creating privileged users.
  • 2.1.2.2. Factories Create Data in States that are Not Properly Validated: Factories create data in specific states that are not thoroughly validated by the application's security logic, leading to vulnerabilities in those states.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to FactoryBot usage)

Attack Vector: Vulnerabilities in dependencies used by FactoryBot or gems used within factory definitions are exploited. Specific Paths:

  • 2.2.1. Vulnerabilities in FactoryBot Dependencies -> 2.2.1.1. Outdated or Vulnerable Gems Used by FactoryBot: FactoryBot relies on outdated or vulnerable gems, which are then exploited by attackers.
  • 2.2.1. Vulnerabilities in FactoryBot Dependencies -> 2.2.1.2. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting FactoryBot Dependencies: A dependency of FactoryBot is compromised in a supply chain attack, injecting malicious code.
  • 2.2.2. Vulnerabilities in Gems Used in Factories -> 2.2.2.1. Factories Use Vulnerable Gems for Data Generation (e.g., Faker): Factories use vulnerable gems like Faker for data generation, and these vulnerabilities are exploited.
  • 2.2.2. Vulnerabilities in Gems Used in Factories -> 2.2.2.2. Factories Use Vulnerable Gems for Complex Logic: Factories use other gems for complex logic, and vulnerabilities in these gems are exploited.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Misuse of FactoryBot in Non-Test Environments

Attack Vector: FactoryBot, intended for testing, is mistakenly or intentionally used in production or staging environments, leading to unintended consequences and security risks. Specific Paths:

  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.1. Direct Factory Creation in Production Controllers/Services -> 3.1.1.1. Developer Mistake in Copying/Pasting Code: Developers accidentally copy code from tests into production controllers or services without removing factory calls.
  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.1. Direct Factory Creation in Production Controllers/Services -> 3.1.1.2. Misunderstanding of FactoryBot Scope: Developers misunderstand that FactoryBot is only for testing and incorrectly use it in production code.
  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.2. Factories Used in Seed Data or Migrations -> 3.1.2.1. Factories Used to Generate Initial Data in Production: Factories are incorrectly used to generate initial seed data for production databases.
  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.2. Factories Used in Seed Data or Migrations -> 3.1.2.2. Migrations Accidentally Include Factory Calls: Database migrations inadvertently include factory calls, leading to unexpected data creation in production.
  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.3. Factories Exposed via API Endpoints (Debug/Admin) -> 3.1.3.1. Debug Endpoints Allow Factory Creation: Debug endpoints, mistakenly left enabled in non-test environments, allow users to trigger factory creation.
  • 3.1. Accidental Use of Factories in Production Code -> 3.1.3. Factories Exposed via API Endpoints (Debug/Admin) -> 3.1.3.2. Admin Panels Unintentionally Use Factories: Admin panels unintentionally use factory methods for data creation, bypassing normal application logic and security controls.
  • 3.2. Factories Used in Staging/Pre-Production with Production Data -> 3.2.1. Factories Interact with Production-Like Staging Database -> 3.2.1.1. Factories Modify or Corrupt Staging Data: Factories are run in staging environments that use a copy of production data, and they unintentionally modify or corrupt this staging data.
  • 3.2. Factories Used in Staging/Pre-Production with Production Data -> 3.2.1. Factories Interact with Production-Like Staging Database -> 3.2.1.2. Factories Create Backdoors in Staging Environment: Factories are misused to create backdoor accounts or data in staging environments that resemble production.
  • 3.2. Factories Used in Staging/Pre-Production with Production Data -> 3.2.2. Staging Environment Exposed with Factory-Generated Data -> 3.2.2.1. Staging Environment Less Secure than Production: Staging environments are less secured than production, and if exposed, factory-generated data becomes accessible.
  • 3.2. Factories Used in Staging/Pre-Production with Production Data -> 3.2.2. Staging Environment Exposed with Factory-Generated Data -> 3.2.2.2. Factory Data in Staging Mimics Production Data: Factory data in staging is designed to be realistic and mimics production data. If staging is compromised, this data can be used to understand production data patterns and potentially target production systems more effectively.