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Attack Tree Analysis for actix/actix-web

Objective: [[Root: Achieve RCE on Actix-web Server]]

Attack Tree Visualization

[[Root: Achieve RCE on Actix-web Server]] | | [[Exploit Vulnerability in Dependency]] | | [[serde Deserialization]] | | ===>[[RCE via Deserialization]] | | [Other Crates] | | [[RCE]] | | [Exploit Vulnerability in Actix-web] | | [Unsafe Code] | | [[Code Injection]]

Attack Tree Path: [[Exploit Vulnerability in Dependency]]

Description: This represents the overarching threat of exploiting vulnerabilities within any library that the Actix-web application depends on. Dependencies are a major attack surface because they are often outside the direct control of the application developers.

  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [[serde Deserialization]] (High-Risk Path):
      • Description: serde is a widely used serialization/deserialization framework in Rust. Deserialization vulnerabilities occur when untrusted data is deserialized into complex data structures, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
      • Attack Scenario: An attacker sends a crafted, malicious serialized payload to an Actix-web endpoint that expects serialized data. The application uses serde to deserialize this payload. If a vulnerability exists in serde or the target data structure, the deserialization process can trigger unintended code execution, leading to RCE.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Deserialization vulnerabilities are common, and exploits are often publicly available).
      • Impact: Very High (RCE).
      • Effort: Medium (Exploits for known vulnerabilities might be readily available; finding new ones requires more effort).
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced.
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires monitoring for suspicious input and potentially analyzing memory dumps).
      • Mitigation:
        • Avoid deserializing untrusted data into complex types.
        • Use a safe deserialization format (e.g., JSON with strict schema validation, Protobuf).
        • Keep serde and related crates up-to-date.
        • Validate input before deserialization.
        • Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to filter known malicious payloads.
    • [Other Crates] -> [[RCE]]
      • Description: This represents the possibility of RCE through a vulnerability in any other dependency besides serde.
      • Attack Scenario: A vulnerability exists in a dependency (e.g., a library for image processing, database interaction, or any other functionality). The attacker crafts an input or triggers a condition that exploits this vulnerability, leading to RCE. The specific attack vector depends entirely on the vulnerable crate.
      • Likelihood: Medium (The more dependencies, the higher the chance of one having a vulnerability).
      • Impact: Very High (RCE).
      • Effort: Variable (Depends on the specific vulnerability).
      • Skill Level: Variable (Depends on the specific vulnerability).
      • Detection Difficulty: Variable (Depends on the vulnerability and how it manifests).
      • Mitigation:
        • Rigorous dependency management using tools like cargo audit and cargo outdated.
        • Regular security audits of the entire dependency tree.
        • Minimize the number of dependencies.
        • Keep all dependencies up-to-date.
        • Implement robust monitoring to detect unusual application behavior.

Attack Tree Path: [Exploit Vulnerability in Actix-web] -> [Unsafe Code] -> [[Code Injection]]

  • Description: This path represents exploiting memory safety vulnerabilities within unsafe blocks in the Actix-web framework itself (or custom middleware/handlers using unsafe).
    • Attack Scenario:
      • Actix-web (or a custom component) contains an unsafe block with a flaw (e.g., use-after-free, buffer overflow).
      • An attacker crafts malicious input that triggers this flaw.
      • The flaw leads to memory corruption.
      • The attacker leverages the memory corruption to inject and execute arbitrary code (RCE).
    • Likelihood: Low (if Actix-web is well-maintained and audited; Medium if using older versions or custom, unaudited unsafe code).
    • Impact: Very High (RCE).
    • Effort: High (Requires finding and exploiting a specific vulnerability in unsafe code, which often requires deep understanding of Rust's memory management).
    • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires sophisticated monitoring and analysis; might be detected by fuzzing or static analysis tools like cargo miri).
    • Mitigation:
      • Thoroughly audit all unsafe blocks.
      • Minimize the use of unsafe.
      • Keep Actix-web up-to-date.
      • Use fuzzing techniques (e.g., with cargo fuzz).
      • Employ static analysis tools.