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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for bevyengine/bevy

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Robust Asset Validation

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Bevy Asset Extension Whitelisting: Configure Bevy's asset loading systems to only load assets with explicitly allowed file extensions. This can be done by customizing asset loaders or implementing checks within asset processing systems.
    • Step 2: Magic Number Verification in Bevy Asset Loaders: Within custom Bevy asset loaders, implement magic number verification to confirm the true file type of loaded assets, regardless of file extension. Use Rust crates like infer within Bevy systems for this purpose.
    • Step 3: Size Limits in Bevy Asset Systems: Implement Bevy systems that enforce size limits on loaded assets. This can be done by checking file sizes before or during asset loading within Bevy systems and preventing loading of excessively large assets.
    • Step 4: Text Asset Sanitization for Bevy Shaders/Configs: When loading text-based assets like shaders or configuration files using Bevy's asset system, implement sanitization logic within custom Bevy asset loaders or systems to escape or reject potentially malicious content before Bevy processes them.
    • Step 5: Checksum/Signature Verification for Bevy Assets: Integrate checksum or signature verification into Bevy's asset loading pipeline. Generate checksums during asset preparation and verify them within Bevy systems during asset loading to ensure integrity.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Malicious File Injection via Bevy Assets - Severity: High (Potential for code execution, data exfiltration, denial of service through Bevy's asset loading)
    • File Extension Spoofing in Bevy Assets - Severity: Medium (Circumventing basic file type checks in Bevy, leading to malicious file injection)
    • Denial of Service (DoS) via Large Bevy Assets - Severity: Medium (Resource exhaustion by loading excessively large files through Bevy's asset system)
    • Injection Vulnerabilities in Bevy Text Assets - Severity: Medium (Potential for code injection or configuration manipulation if text assets loaded by Bevy are not properly sanitized)
    • Asset Tampering within Bevy Application - Severity: Medium (Unauthorized modification of assets used by Bevy, potentially leading to unexpected behavior or malicious content)

  • Impact:

    • Malicious File Injection via Bevy Assets: High Risk Reduction
    • File Extension Spoofing in Bevy Assets: High Risk Reduction
    • Denial of Service (DoS) via Large Bevy Assets: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Injection Vulnerabilities in Bevy Text Assets: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Asset Tampering within Bevy Application: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented: Partial - Bevy's default asset loading provides basic extension handling. More advanced validation like magic number checks, size limits, sanitization, and checksums are likely not implemented by default and require custom Bevy systems.

  • Missing Implementation: Magic number verification for critical assets loaded by Bevy, explicit size limit enforcement within Bevy asset systems, text asset sanitization for shaders and configuration files loaded by Bevy, and checksum/signature verification for Bevy asset integrity.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Asset Sources (Bevy Context)

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Bevy Asset Bundles for Secure Distribution: Utilize Bevy's asset bundling features to package application assets into secure bundles for distribution. This helps control the source and integrity of assets used by Bevy.
    • Step 2: Restrict WebGL Bevy Asset Origins with CSP: For Bevy WebGL applications, configure a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) header that explicitly whitelists allowed origins for Bevy to load assets from, using directives relevant to asset types (images, fonts, etc.).
    • Step 3: Avoid Dynamic Bevy Asset Paths from User Input: Within Bevy systems and asset loading logic, strictly avoid constructing asset paths directly from user-provided input. Use asset handles or predefined asset paths managed within Bevy's asset management system.
    • Step 4: Secure Server-Side Bevy Asset Storage (If Applicable): If Bevy applications load assets from a server, ensure the server infrastructure is secure, uses HTTPS, and has access controls to protect assets served to Bevy applications.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Path Traversal Vulnerabilities in Bevy Asset Loading - Severity: High (Access to arbitrary files on the server or client system through Bevy's asset loading mechanisms)
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Malicious Bevy Assets (WebGL) - Severity: High (Execution of malicious scripts injected through compromised assets loaded by Bevy in a web context)
    • Unauthorized Bevy Asset Access/Modification - Severity: Medium (Data breaches, asset tampering, intellectual property theft related to assets used by Bevy)
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Bevy Asset Loading (If insecure HTTP) - Severity: Medium (Asset replacement or modification during transit when Bevy loads assets over insecure connections)

  • Impact:

    • Path Traversal Vulnerabilities in Bevy Asset Loading: High Risk Reduction
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Malicious Bevy Assets (WebGL): High Risk Reduction
    • Unauthorized Bevy Asset Access/Modification: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Bevy Asset Loading: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented: Partial - Bevy supports asset bundling. CSP for WebGL and dynamic path prevention require explicit configuration in Bevy applications. Server-side security depends on external infrastructure.

  • Missing Implementation: Strict CSP configuration for Bevy WebGL applications, explicit checks within Bevy systems to prevent dynamic asset paths from user input, and potentially enhanced server-side asset storage security for Bevy asset delivery.

Mitigation Strategy: Thorough Plugin Auditing (Bevy Plugins)

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Bevy Plugin Source Verification: When using Bevy plugins, prioritize plugins from trusted sources within the Bevy community or known developers. Verify the origin and maintainer of Bevy plugins before integration.
    • Step 2: Code Review of Bevy Plugins: Conduct code reviews specifically for Bevy plugins before integrating them. Focus on understanding how the plugin interacts with Bevy systems, resources, and entities. Look for suspicious system registrations, resource access patterns, or potential vulnerabilities within the Bevy plugin code.
    • Step 3: Functionality and Permission Scrutiny of Bevy Plugins: Carefully examine the functionality provided by Bevy plugins and the Bevy systems and resources they access. Ensure the plugin's purpose and Bevy system interactions are justified and minimize unnecessary access.
    • Step 4: Dependency Analysis of Bevy Plugin Crates: Analyze the dependencies (crates) of Bevy plugins. Use cargo audit to check for vulnerabilities in the plugin's crate dependencies, ensuring the security of the Bevy plugin's supply chain.
    • Step 5: Testing Bevy Plugins in Isolated Bevy Environment: Before deploying with a new Bevy plugin, test it thoroughly within a separate Bevy project or staging environment to observe its behavior within the Bevy ecosystem and identify any unexpected security or stability issues within the Bevy application.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Malicious Bevy Plugin Integration - Severity: High (Code execution, data breaches, system compromise through malicious code within Bevy plugins)
    • Vulnerable Bevy Plugin Dependencies - Severity: Medium (Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in crates used by Bevy plugins)
    • Unintended Behavior from Bevy Plugins - Severity: Medium (Bevy plugins causing unexpected security issues due to bugs or design flaws within the Bevy application context)
    • Backdoor or Spyware Bevy Plugins - Severity: High (Bevy plugins designed to secretly collect data or provide unauthorized access within the Bevy application)

  • Impact:

    • Malicious Bevy Plugin Integration: High Risk Reduction
    • Vulnerable Bevy Plugin Dependencies: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Unintended Behavior from Bevy Plugins: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Backdoor or Spyware Bevy Plugins: High Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented: Low - Bevy plugin integration might occur without formal security audits. Dependency checks might be done for build purposes but not specifically for Bevy plugin security.

  • Missing Implementation: Formal Bevy plugin auditing process, including code review focused on Bevy interactions, functionality scrutiny within the Bevy context, dependency analysis of plugin crates, and testing in isolated Bevy environments.

Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege for Bevy Plugins

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Modular Bevy Application Design: Design Bevy applications with modularity in mind, separating core Bevy systems and resources from plugin-provided features. This limits the scope of access required by Bevy plugins.
    • Step 2: Minimize Bevy System/Resource Access for Plugins: Restrict the Bevy systems and resources that plugins can directly access. Avoid granting Bevy plugins broad access to sensitive game state, core Bevy logic, or system resources unless strictly necessary for their intended Bevy-related functionality.
    • Step 3: Data Sandboxing (Conceptual) within Bevy Systems: While Bevy doesn't enforce sandboxing, conceptually limit data sharing between Bevy plugins and core Bevy systems. Use well-defined Bevy events, resources, or component queries for communication, rather than allowing plugins direct, unrestricted access to Bevy's ECS.
    • Step 4: Permission-Based Bevy Plugin System (Future Enhancement): Consider contributing to or designing a future Bevy plugin system that incorporates explicit permission requests and grants. This would enable finer-grained control over the capabilities of Bevy plugins within the Bevy engine.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Privilege Escalation via Bevy Plugins - Severity: High (Malicious Bevy plugins gaining more access within the Bevy application than intended, leading to system compromise within the Bevy context)
    • Lateral Movement via Bevy Plugins - Severity: Medium (Compromised Bevy plugins being used to attack other parts of the Bevy application or system through Bevy's ECS)
    • Data Breaches via Over-Permissive Bevy Plugins - Severity: Medium (Bevy plugins gaining access to and exfiltrating sensitive game data or application state due to overly broad permissions within the Bevy environment)

  • Impact:

    • Privilege Escalation via Bevy Plugins: High Risk Reduction
    • Lateral Movement via Bevy Plugins: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Data Breaches via Over-Permissive Bevy Plugins: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented: Low - Bevy's plugin system is flexible but doesn't inherently enforce least privilege. Bevy application architecture might be somewhat modular, but explicit permission controls for Bevy plugins are missing.

  • Missing Implementation: Architectural refactoring of Bevy applications to enforce modularity and minimize Bevy plugin access, conceptual data sandboxing within Bevy systems, and potentially future contributions to Bevy for a permission-based plugin system.

Mitigation Strategy: Regular Bevy and Crate Updates & Dependency Scanning

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Establish Bevy and Crate Update Schedule: Create a regular schedule for updating Bevy itself and all project dependencies (crates used by Bevy applications). Prioritize staying up-to-date with Bevy releases and crate updates for security patches.
    • Step 2: Monitor Bevy and Rust Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories specifically for Bevy, Rust, and crates commonly used in Bevy projects. Stay informed about reported vulnerabilities affecting Bevy and its ecosystem.
    • Step 3: Automated Dependency Scanning for Bevy Projects: Integrate dependency scanning tools like cargo audit into the development pipeline for Bevy projects. Run scans regularly to detect known vulnerabilities in Bevy's dependencies and project crates.
    • Step 4: Dependency Pinning (with Regular Bevy/Crate Updates): Pin dependency versions in Bevy project Cargo.toml files to ensure consistent builds. However, regularly review and update pinned Bevy and crate versions to incorporate security patches and stay current with Bevy releases.
    • Step 5: Vulnerability Remediation Process for Bevy Projects: Establish a clear process for responding to vulnerability reports affecting Bevy or its dependencies. This includes assessing the impact on Bevy applications, prioritizing remediation, updating Bevy and crates, testing Bevy applications, and deploying patched versions.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Bevy/Crates - Severity: High (Attackers exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in outdated Bevy versions or crates used in Bevy applications)
    • Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Bevy Projects - Severity: Medium (Compromised dependencies introduced through malicious updates or package repositories affecting Bevy projects)
    • Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Bevy/Ecosystem (Reduced Risk) - Severity: High (While updates don't prevent zero-days, staying up-to-date with Bevy and crates reduces the window of exposure and facilitates faster patching when vulnerabilities are discovered in the Bevy ecosystem)

  • Impact:

    • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Bevy/Crates: High Risk Reduction
    • Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Bevy Projects: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Bevy/Ecosystem (Reduced Risk): Low Risk Reduction (Indirectly improves response time for Bevy-related vulnerabilities)

  • Currently Implemented: Partial - Bevy and crate updates might be performed for feature updates or bug fixes, but a regular security-focused update schedule and automated vulnerability scanning for Bevy projects are likely missing.

  • Missing Implementation: Establishment of a regular security update schedule for Bevy and crates, integration of automated dependency scanning into CI/CD for Bevy projects, and a formal vulnerability remediation process specifically for Bevy application vulnerabilities.

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Content Security Policy (CSP) for Bevy WebGL

  • Description:

    • Step 1: Define a Strict CSP for Bevy WebGL: Configure a Content Security Policy (CSP) header for the web server serving Bevy WebGL applications. This CSP should be specifically tailored to the needs of a Bevy WebGL application, being as restrictive as possible while allowing Bevy to function correctly in the browser.
    • Step 2: Whitelist Allowed Origins for Bevy WebGL Resources: Use CSP directives to explicitly whitelist only necessary origins for resources loaded by Bevy WebGL applications, such as scripts, images, styles, and network connections. Directives like default-src 'none', script-src 'self', img-src 'self', style-src 'self', connect-src 'self' are crucial for Bevy WebGL. Avoid 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval', or wildcard origins in Bevy WebGL CSP.
    • Step 3: CSP Reporting for Bevy WebGL: Enable CSP reporting by configuring report-uri or report-to directives in the CSP header for Bevy WebGL applications. This allows monitoring and identifying CSP violations specific to Bevy WebGL deployments, aiding in policy refinement.
    • Step 4: Testing and Refinement of Bevy WebGL CSP: Thoroughly test Bevy WebGL applications with the CSP enabled to ensure proper functionality. Review CSP violation reports generated by Bevy WebGL deployments and adjust the policy as needed to balance security and the specific needs of Bevy WebGL.
    • Step 5: Enforce CSP in Production for Bevy WebGL: Ensure the strict CSP is enforced in the production environment for all Bevy WebGL deployments to protect users from web-based attacks targeting Bevy WebGL applications.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Bevy WebGL - Severity: High (Preventing execution of malicious scripts injected into the Bevy WebGL application page)
    • Clickjacking on Bevy WebGL Applications - Severity: Medium (Mitigating attempts to trick users interacting with Bevy WebGL applications into clicking on hidden or malicious elements)
    • Data Injection Attacks Targeting Bevy WebGL - Severity: Medium (Reducing the risk of injecting malicious data through web attack vectors into Bevy WebGL applications)
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Bevy WebGL (Reduced Risk) - Severity: Medium (CSP can help mitigate some aspects of MITM attacks by controlling resource loading in Bevy WebGL contexts)

  • Impact:

    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Bevy WebGL: High Risk Reduction
    • Clickjacking on Bevy WebGL Applications: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Data Injection Attacks Targeting Bevy WebGL: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on Bevy WebGL (Reduced Risk): Low Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented: Low - CSP is likely not configured or is too permissive for Bevy WebGL applications by default.

  • Missing Implementation: Implementation of a strict, Bevy WebGL-specific CSP header, whitelisting only necessary origins for Bevy WebGL resources, enabling CSP reporting for Bevy WebGL deployments, and thorough testing and refinement of the CSP policy for Bevy WebGL applications in production.