attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for bevyengine/bevy

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server or client running a Bevy application, or to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) specific to Bevy's functionality.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------+
                                      |  Compromise Bevy Application (RCE/DoS) |  CRITICAL NODE
                                      +-------------------------------------+
                                                  /                       \
                                                 /                         \
         +--------------------------------+                                  +--------------------------------+
         |  Exploit Resource Loading/   |                                  | Exploit Bevy's Rendering    |
         |  Asset Management Vulnerabilities|                                  |  Pipeline/Shader Vulnerabilities|
         +--------------------------------+                                  +--------------------------------+
               /                                                                        \
              /                                                                          \
+-------------+                                                                 +---------+
| Load Malicious|                                                                 |   R3    |
| Asset (e.g., |                                                                 |         |
|  GLTF, PNG) |                                                                 |         |
+-------------+                                                                 +---------+
  HIGH RISK                                                                         HIGH RISK
  CRITICAL                                                                          (DoS)

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Bevy Application (RCE/DoS) - CRITICAL NODE

This is the attacker's ultimate goal. All paths below lead to this.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Resource Loading/Asset Management Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: Load Malicious Asset (e.g., GLTF, PNG) - HIGH RISK, CRITICAL

Description: The attacker crafts a specially designed asset file (like a GLTF model or PNG image) that exploits a vulnerability in Bevy's asset parsing or handling code, or in one of the underlying libraries Bevy uses for asset loading (e.g., gltf, image crates). This could involve buffer overflows, format string bugs, or other memory corruption issues. The reliance on external crates for asset loading increases the attack surface. * Likelihood: Medium to High. Asset loading is a common attack vector, and vulnerabilities in parsing libraries are frequently discovered. * Impact: High. Successful exploitation could lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). * Effort: Medium. Requires finding or crafting an exploit payload. * Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires knowledge of memory corruption, exploit development, and the asset format. * Detection Difficulty: Medium. Sophisticated exploits can evade detection, but input validation and fuzzing help. * Actionable Insights: * Input Validation: Implement strict validation of all loaded assets before Bevy processes them. Check file headers, sizes, and internal structures. Don't rely on file extensions. * Fuzzing: Fuzz Bevy's asset loading functions with malformed inputs. This should be part of Bevy's CI/CD. * Dependency Auditing: Regularly audit dependencies (e.g., gltf, image crates) for vulnerabilities using tools like cargo audit. Update promptly. * Sandboxing (if possible): Isolate the asset loading process (e.g., separate process with reduced privileges).

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Bevy's Rendering Pipeline/Shader Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (R3) - HIGH RISK (DoS)

Description: The attacker submits complex scenes, shaders, or other rendering-related inputs that consume excessive GPU or CPU resources, leading to a denial of service. This could involve a large number of draw calls, overly complex shaders, or huge textures. * Likelihood: Medium to High. Relatively easy to attempt. * Impact: Medium. Causes the application to become unresponsive or crash. * Effort: Low. Can be achieved with minimal effort. * Skill Level: Low. Minimal technical expertise required. * Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium. Resource exhaustion is often noticeable through performance monitoring. * Actionable Insights: * Resource Limits: Implement limits on scene complexity, draw calls, texture sizes, and buffer sizes. * Timeout Mechanisms: Implement timeouts to prevent shaders from running indefinitely. * Monitoring: Monitor GPU and CPU resource usage and detect anomalies.