Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
60 lines (51 loc) · 6.83 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

60 lines (51 loc) · 6.83 KB

Threat Model Analysis for bevyengine/bevy

Threat: Threat 1: Exploitation of a Deserialization Vulnerability in bevy_reflect

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious serialized data payload (e.g., a scene file, a saved game, or data received over the network if bevy_reflect is used for serialization there) that, when deserialized by Bevy's reflection system (bevy_reflect), triggers unintended code execution. This often involves exploiting type confusion or unsafe code within the deserialization process.
    • Impact:
      • Critical: Arbitrary code execution on the client (if client-side) or server (if server-side). Complete control over the application.
      • Data breach: Potential for sensitive data theft.
      • Denial of service: Application crash.
    • Bevy Component Affected: bevy_reflect crate, specifically the deserialization functionality. This could also involve custom Reflect implementations in user code or third-party crates if those are used with Bevy's systems.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid using bevy_reflect for untrusted data: Prioritize using a more secure serialization format (e.g., a binary format with a well-defined schema and robust parser) for data from untrusted sources.
      • Validate deserialized data: Thoroughly validate the deserialized data after deserialization, even if using bevy_reflect, to ensure it meets expected constraints. Check for unexpected types, out-of-bounds values, etc.
      • Use a "safe" subset of bevy_reflect (if available): Look for future Bevy versions that might offer a restricted, security-hardened subset of bevy_reflect for deserialization.
      • Regularly update Bevy: Stay current with Bevy releases to get any security fixes related to bevy_reflect.
      • Fuzz testing: Employ fuzzing to test bevy_reflect deserialization with various inputs to find potential vulnerabilities.

Threat: Threat 2: Resource Exhaustion via Malicious Asset Loading

  • Description: An attacker provides a specially crafted asset file (e.g., a model with an extremely high polygon count, a texture with an enormous resolution, or an audio file with an excessively long duration) designed to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, GPU) when loaded by Bevy, leading to a denial of service.
    • Impact:
      • High: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes. Other applications on the system might be affected.
      • Denial of service.
    • Bevy Component Affected: Asset loading pipeline (bevy_asset), including specific asset loaders (e.g., gltf loader, image loaders that are part of the Bevy ecosystem).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Impose limits on asset size and complexity: Set maximum limits on polygon counts, texture resolutions, audio durations, etc. Reject assets exceeding these limits.
      • Validate asset metadata before loading: Check asset metadata (if available) to determine size and complexity before loading the full data.
      • Use asynchronous asset loading: Load assets in the background to avoid blocking the main thread. Implement timeouts to prevent indefinite loading.
      • Resource monitoring: Monitor resource usage during asset loading and take action (abort, log) if excessive consumption is detected.
      • Progressive loading: For large assets, consider progressive loading (e.g., lower-resolution versions first) to improve user experience and mitigate malicious asset impact.

Threat: Threat 3: Denial of Service via Excessive Entity Spawning

  • Description: An attacker triggers the creation of a very large number of entities, exceeding the application's capacity and causing a denial of service. This could be through a vulnerability in game logic or by exploiting a network protocol if that protocol is handled within Bevy's ECS.
    • Impact:
      • High: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to excessive memory or CPU usage.
    • Bevy Component Affected: ECS (bevy_ecs), specifically entity creation and management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Limit the number of entities: Set a limit on the total number of entities.
      • Limit entity spawning rate: Restrict the rate at which new entities can be created.
      • Resource monitoring: Monitor entity count and take action (log, stop accepting new entities) if the limit is approached/exceeded.
      • Network input validation (if applicable): If entity creation is triggered by network input and that input is handled within Bevy's systems, validate the input to prevent malicious entity spawning.

Threat: Threat 4: Vulnerability in a Third-Party Bevy Plugin (High-Impact)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a critical third-party Bevy plugin (e.g., a physics engine integration tightly coupled with Bevy's ECS, a networking library wrapper directly interacting with Bevy's systems). The vulnerability could be in the plugin's Rust code or a native library it uses. This is only high/critical if the plugin has deep integration with Bevy's core systems.
    • Impact:
      • High to Critical: Depends on the plugin and vulnerability. Could range from significant logic errors to arbitrary code execution if the plugin has sufficient privileges within the Bevy context.
    • Bevy Component Affected: The specific third-party plugin and potentially the Bevy components it interacts with (e.g., bevy_ecs, bevy_asset).
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the plugin's role)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully vet plugins: Before using a third-party plugin, thoroughly research its reputation, review its source code (if available), and check for known vulnerabilities. Prioritize plugins with a strong security focus.
      • Use well-maintained plugins: Choose plugins that are actively maintained and have a history of addressing security issues promptly.
      • Regularly update plugins: Keep plugins up-to-date to get security fixes.
      • Isolate plugins (if feasible): Consider running plugins in separate threads or processes to limit the impact of a compromised plugin. This is advanced but provides stronger isolation.
      • Report vulnerabilities: If you find a vulnerability, report it to the plugin maintainer.