Objective: Exfiltrate Data or Achieve Arbitrary Code Execution via Application's Use of Ripgrep (rg)
+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Exfiltrate Data or Achieve Arbitrary Code Execution |
| via Application's Use of Ripgrep (rg) |
+-----------------------------------------------------+
/ |
/ |
+--------------------------------+ +---------------------+
| 1. Input Validation Bypass | | 2. Command Injection |
+--------------------------------+ +---------------------+
/ | |
/ | |
+----------+-----+ +------+-----+ +---+---+-----+
| 1.a. Craft | | 1.b. Use | |2.a. Inject|
| Regex to | | Special | | rg Flags |
| Match | |Characters| | to Run |
| Unintended | | in Path | | Arbitrary|
| Files | |[HIGH-RISK]| | Commands |
| [HIGH-RISK] | | | | [CRITICAL]|
+----------+-----+ +------+-----+ +---+---+-----+
|
|
+-----------+-----+
| 2.b. Bypass |
| Filtering |
| of Flags |
| [CRITICAL] |
+-----------+-----+
Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 1: Input Validation Bypass -> Craft Regex to Match Unintended Files
-
Overall Description: The attacker exploits insufficient validation of user-supplied regular expressions to make ripgrep match files outside the intended scope, leading to data exfiltration.
-
Steps:
- The application accepts a regular expression as input from the user.
- The application fails to adequately sanitize or restrict the user-provided regex.
- The attacker crafts a malicious regex that matches files outside the intended search directory or files containing sensitive information. Examples:
../../etc/passwd
(if path traversal is not handled elsewhere).*\.conf
(to match all configuration files).*\.key
(to match private key files)
- The application uses the attacker's regex with ripgrep.
- Ripgrep matches the unintended files.
- The application displays or processes the contents of the matched files, exposing sensitive data to the attacker.
-
Likelihood: Medium
-
Impact: High
-
Effort: Low
-
Skill Level: Intermediate
-
Detection Difficulty: Medium
-
Overall Description: The attacker exploits insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths to access files outside the intended directory, leading to data exfiltration (classic path traversal).
-
Steps:
- The application accepts a file path or part of a file path as input from the user.
- The application fails to adequately sanitize or restrict the user-provided path.
- The attacker injects special characters like
..
(parent directory),*
(wildcard), or shell metacharacters into the path. Examples:../../etc/passwd
/var/www/../../../etc/shadow
*.php
(if wildcards are not properly handled)
- The application constructs the file path to be used with ripgrep, incorporating the attacker's malicious input.
- Ripgrep accesses files outside the intended directory.
- The application displays or processes the contents of the accessed files, exposing sensitive data to the attacker.
-
Likelihood: Medium
-
Impact: High
-
Effort: Very Low
-
Skill Level: Intermediate
-
Detection Difficulty: Easy
-
Overall Description: The attacker injects arbitrary ripgrep flags, particularly
--pre
, to execute arbitrary commands on the server, leading to complete system compromise. -
Steps:
- The application constructs the ripgrep command string using user-provided input.
- The application fails to properly escape or sanitize the user input, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary flags.
- The attacker injects a malicious flag, such as
--pre 'bash -c "malicious_command"'
. Other dangerous flags could also be used. - The application executes the ripgrep command with the injected flag.
- The injected command is executed with the privileges of the user running ripgrep (often the web server user).
- The attacker gains arbitrary code execution on the server.
-
Likelihood: Low
-
Impact: Very High
-
Effort: Low
-
Skill Level: Advanced
-
Detection Difficulty: Hard
Attack Tree Path: Critical Node 2: Command Injection -> Bypass Filtering of Flags
-
Overall Description: The attacker bypasses the application's attempts to filter out dangerous ripgrep flags, enabling them to proceed with command injection (Critical Node 1).
-
Steps:
- The application attempts to filter out dangerous ripgrep flags from user input.
- The attacker identifies a weakness in the filtering logic. This could involve:
- Using alternative flag names (e.g., short vs. long flags:
-e
vs.--regexp
). - Using encoding techniques (e.g., URL encoding).
- Exploiting flaws in the regular expression used for filtering.
- Finding edge cases or boundary conditions that the filter doesn't handle.
- Using alternative flag names (e.g., short vs. long flags:
- The attacker crafts their input to bypass the filter.
- The application fails to block the malicious flag.
- The attacker can now inject arbitrary flags (proceeding to Critical Node 1).
-
Likelihood: Low
-
Impact: Very High
-
Effort: Medium
-
Skill Level: Advanced
-
Detection Difficulty: Hard