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Attack Tree Analysis for bytecodealliance/wasmtime

Objective: Compromise Application using Wasmtime Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application using Wasmtime Vulnerabilities ├───(OR)─ Exploit Wasm Module Vulnerabilities │ ├───(AND)─ Malicious Wasm Module Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Direct Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Application Allows Upload/Loading of Arbitrary Wasm │ │ └───(OR)─ Man-in-the-Middle Attack [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Intercept and Replace Wasm Module During Delivery │ └───(AND)─ Wasm Module Designed for Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Memory Exhaustion │ │ │ └─── Wasm Module Allocates Excessive Memory │ │ ├─── CPU Exhaustion │ │ │ └─── Wasm Module Executes CPU-Intensive Code │ │ └─── I/O Exhaustion │ │ └─── Wasm Module Performs Excessive I/O Operations (if permitted) │ └───(OR)─ Logic Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └─── Wasm Module Exploits Application Logic via Host Functions ├───(OR)─ Exploit Wasmtime Runtime Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───(AND)─ Memory Safety Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Trigger Buffer Overflow in Wasmtime's C/Rust Code │ │ ├───(OR)─ Use-After-Free [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Trigger Use-After-Free in Wasmtime's Memory Management │ │ └───(OR)─ Validation Bypass [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Craft Wasm Module that Bypasses Wasmtime's Validation │ ├───(AND)─ Logic Vulnerabilities in Wasmtime [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Compilation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Trigger Vulnerabilities during Wasm-to-Native Compilation │ │ ├───(OR)─ Execution Engine Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Exploit Bugs in Wasmtime's Execution Engine │ │ └───(OR)─ Sandboxing Escape [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Find and Exploit Weaknesses in Wasmtime's Sandboxing Mechanisms ├───(OR)─ Exploit Host Function Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───(AND)─ Vulnerable Host Function Implementation [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Memory Safety Issues in Host Function Code [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Exploit Buffer Overflows, Use-After-Free, etc. in Host Functions │ │ ├───(OR)─ Logic Bugs in Host Function Code [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Exploit Flaws in Host Function Logic to Achieve Malicious Goals │ │ └───(OR)─ Insecure Host Function Design [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Host Functions Provide Excessive Privileges or Unsafe Operations │ └───(AND)─ Host Function Abuse via Wasm Module [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Parameter Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Wasm Module Sends Malicious Parameters to Host Functions │ └───(OR)─ Sequence of Calls Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── Wasm Module Calls Host Functions in Malicious Sequences ├───(OR)─ Exploit Wasmtime API Misuse/Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(AND)─ API Misuse by Application Developer [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Incorrect Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Application Configures Wasmtime Insecurely (e.g., disabled sandboxing) │ │ ├───(OR)─ Improper Resource Management [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Application Fails to Limit Wasm Module Resources Effectively │ │ └───(OR)─ Unsafe API Usage Patterns [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Application Uses Wasmtime API in a Way that Introduces Vulnerabilities └───(OR)─ Exploit Resource Exhaustion on Host System via Wasmtime [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───(AND)─ Denial of Service via Wasm Module [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Memory Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Wasm Module Indirectly Causes Host System Memory Exhaustion │ ├───(OR)─ CPU Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Wasm Module Indirectly Causes Host System CPU Exhaustion │ └───(OR)─ Disk/Network Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── Wasm Module Indirectly Causes Host System Disk/Network Exhaustion (if permitted) └───(AND)─ Wasmtime Configuration Weakness [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── Application Fails to Configure Resource Limits in Wasmtime

Attack Vectors:

  • Direct Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • If the application allows users or external sources to upload or provide Wasm modules without proper validation, attackers can directly inject malicious modules.
    • This is a critical node because it's a direct entry point for malicious code into the application's Wasmtime environment.
  • Man-in-the-Middle Attack [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • If Wasm modules are fetched over insecure networks (e.g., HTTP without integrity checks), attackers can intercept the download and replace legitimate modules with malicious ones.
    • This path is high-risk when module delivery is not secured.

Attack Vectors:

  • Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Malicious Wasm modules can be designed to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, I/O) within the Wasmtime sandbox, leading to Denial of Service (DoS) for the application or even the host system.
    • This is high-risk because it's relatively easy to implement in Wasm and can disrupt application availability.
  • Logic Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Malicious Wasm modules can exploit the application's logic by interacting with host functions in unintended or malicious ways.
    • This is a critical node because it allows attackers to manipulate application behavior and potentially bypass security controls through the defined host function interface.

Attack Vectors:

  • Memory Safety Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Buffer Overflow [CRITICAL NODE]: Exploiting buffer overflows in Wasmtime's C or Rust code by providing crafted Wasm modules or inputs.
    • Use-After-Free [CRITICAL NODE]: Triggering use-after-free vulnerabilities in Wasmtime's memory management.
    • These are critical nodes because memory safety vulnerabilities in Wasmtime can lead to arbitrary code execution, sandbox escape, and full host compromise.
  • Validation Bypass [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Crafting Wasm modules that bypass Wasmtime's validation checks, allowing the execution of invalid or malicious Wasm code.
    • This is a critical node because bypassing validation undermines a core security mechanism of Wasmtime.
  • Logic Vulnerabilities in Wasmtime [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Compilation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]: Triggering vulnerabilities during the Wasm-to-native compilation process.
    • Execution Engine Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]: Exploiting bugs in Wasmtime's execution engine.
    • Sandboxing Escape [CRITICAL NODE]: Finding and exploiting weaknesses in Wasmtime's sandboxing mechanisms to break out of the Wasm sandbox.
    • These are critical nodes because vulnerabilities in Wasmtime's core logic can lead to sandbox escape and host system compromise, bypassing the intended security boundaries.

Attack Vectors:

  • Vulnerable Host Function Implementation [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Memory Safety Issues in Host Function Code [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Host functions implemented with memory safety vulnerabilities (buffer overflows, use-after-free, etc.) can be exploited by malicious Wasm modules.
    • Logic Bugs in Host Function Code [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Flaws in the logic of host functions can be exploited to achieve malicious goals.
    • Insecure Host Function Design [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]: Host functions designed with excessive privileges or unsafe operations can be easily abused.
    • These are critical nodes because host functions are the primary interface between Wasm modules and the host application, and vulnerabilities here directly expose the host application.
  • Host Function Abuse via Wasm Module [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Parameter Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]: Malicious Wasm modules can send crafted or malicious parameters to host functions to trigger vulnerabilities or unexpected behavior.
    • Sequence of Calls Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH]: Wasm modules can call host functions in specific sequences or combinations that were not anticipated, leading to vulnerabilities or logic flaws being exposed.
    • These paths are high-risk because even well-implemented host functions can be abused through parameter manipulation or unexpected call sequences if not carefully designed and validated.

Attack Vectors:

  • API Misuse by Application Developer [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Incorrect Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH]: Insecure configuration of Wasmtime, such as disabling sandboxing or relaxing security restrictions.
    • Improper Resource Management [HIGH RISK PATH]: Failure to properly configure resource limits for Wasm modules.
    • Unsafe API Usage Patterns [HIGH RISK PATH]: Using Wasmtime API functions in a way that introduces vulnerabilities due to improper error handling or data management.
    • These paths are high-risk because developer errors in API usage are common and can directly weaken the security of the Wasmtime integration.

Attack Vectors:

  • Denial of Service via Wasm Module [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Memory Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH]: Wasm modules indirectly causing host system memory exhaustion.
    • CPU Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH]: Wasm modules indirectly causing host system CPU exhaustion.
    • Disk/Network Exhaustion (Host) [HIGH RISK PATH]: Wasm modules indirectly causing host system disk/network exhaustion (if permitted by host functions).
    • These paths are high-risk because even within the Wasmtime sandbox, malicious modules can still cause resource exhaustion on the host system, leading to DoS.
  • Wasmtime Configuration Weakness [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Failure to configure resource limits in Wasmtime, making the application more susceptible to resource exhaustion attacks.
    • This path is high-risk because it's a common configuration oversight that directly increases the risk of DoS.