attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for clap-rs/clap

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to command-line argument parsing using clap-rs, focusing on high-risk attack vectors.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via clap-rs [HIGH RISK PATH]
├─── Input Injection/Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├─── Command Injection via Argument [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Application uses clap to parse arguments
│   │   ├─── Application unsafely passes argument to shell command [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Attacker crafts malicious argument to execute shell commands [HIGH RISK PATH - END]
│   ├─── Path Traversal via Argument [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Application uses clap to parse file path arguments
│   │   ├─── Application does not properly sanitize/validate file paths [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Attacker provides path traversal sequences in arguments [HIGH RISK PATH - END]
│   ├─── Argument Injection into Application Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Application logic relies on argument values without sufficient validation [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Attacker provides unexpected or malicious argument values to alter application behavior [HIGH RISK PATH - END]
└─── Misconfiguration/Misuse of clap-rs API [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├─── Developers misunderstand or misuse clap-rs API features [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├─── Misuse leads to insecure argument handling or parsing logic [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └─── Attacker exploits the consequences of this misuse [HIGH RISK PATH - END]

Attack Tree Path: Input Injection/Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector Category: This is the overarching category representing the highest risk. It focuses on manipulating input provided through command-line arguments to inject malicious payloads or alter application behavior in unintended ways.

• Criticality: High. Input injection vulnerabilities are consistently ranked among the most critical web application security risks, and this extends to command-line applications as well.

• Mitigation Priority: Highest. Defensive measures against input injection should be the top priority.

  • 1.1. Command Injection via Argument [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploits the unsafe use of command-line arguments within shell commands.
    • Critical Node: Application unsafely passes argument to shell command: This is the crucial step where the application becomes vulnerable. If arguments are passed to shell commands without proper sanitization or parameterization, command injection becomes possible.
    • High-Risk Path End: Attacker crafts malicious argument to execute shell commands: The attacker's goal is to inject shell commands within the argument, which, when executed by the application, compromises the system.
    • Detailed Attack Steps:
      • Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments.
      • Application takes a parsed argument and incorporates it into a shell command string.
      • Application executes this shell command using functions like std::process::Command (potentially incorrectly).
      • Attacker crafts a malicious argument containing shell metacharacters and commands (e.g., ;, |, &&, ||, $(), `).
      • When the application executes the constructed shell command, the attacker's injected commands are also executed, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.
    • Impact: Critical. Full system compromise, data breach, denial of service, and more.
    • Mitigation:
      • Avoid using shell commands with user-provided input whenever possible.
      • If shell commands are necessary, use parameterized commands or escape arguments rigorously. Rust's std::process::Command allows passing arguments as separate parameters, which is the preferred method.
      • Input validation and sanitization: While helpful, sanitization is complex and error-prone for shell commands. Parameterization is the most robust defense.

  • 1.2. Path Traversal via Argument [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploits the application's handling of file paths provided as command-line arguments without proper validation.
    • Critical Node: Application does not properly sanitize/validate file paths: The vulnerability arises when the application trusts user-provided file paths without checking for malicious sequences like ../ or absolute paths that could lead outside the intended directory.
    • High-Risk Path End: Attacker provides path traversal sequences in arguments: The attacker's goal is to use path traversal sequences in arguments to access files or directories outside the application's intended scope, potentially gaining access to sensitive information.
    • Detailed Attack Steps:
      • Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments, including arguments intended to be file paths.
      • Application uses these file paths to access files on the file system without sufficient validation.
      • Attacker provides arguments containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../sensitive_file, /etc/passwd).
      • The application, without proper validation, attempts to access the files specified by the attacker's manipulated paths, potentially granting unauthorized access.
    • Impact: Medium to High. Information disclosure, access to sensitive files, potential for further exploitation depending on the files accessed.
    • Mitigation:
      • Validate and sanitize file paths:
        • Use canonicalization to resolve symbolic links and remove redundant path components.
        • Restrict allowed paths to a specific directory (chroot-like approach).
        • Use safe path manipulation functions provided by the operating system or libraries.
      • Principle of least privilege: Ensure the application only has the necessary file system permissions.

  • 1.3. Argument Injection into Application Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploits weaknesses in application logic that relies on argument values without sufficient validation, leading to unintended behavior or security bypasses.
    • Critical Node: Application logic relies on argument values without sufficient validation: The core issue is the lack of robust validation of argument values after they are parsed by clap-rs. The application logic assumes the arguments are in the expected format and range without verifying.
    • High-Risk Path End: Attacker provides unexpected or malicious argument values to alter application behavior: The attacker's goal is to provide argument values that are outside the expected range or format, causing the application to behave in an unintended or insecure manner.
    • Detailed Attack Steps:
      • Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments.
      • Application logic directly uses the parsed argument values without proper validation of their content or range.
      • Attacker provides unexpected or malicious argument values (e.g., negative numbers where positive are expected, excessively long strings, special characters, values exceeding limits).
      • The application logic, due to lack of validation, processes these malicious values, leading to errors, unexpected behavior, logic bypasses, or even resource exhaustion.
    • Impact: Medium. Logic errors, data corruption, security bypasses, denial of service (resource exhaustion).
    • Mitigation:
      • Thoroughly validate all argument values after parsing with clap-rs. Check data types, ranges, formats, lengths, and any other relevant constraints.
      • Implement input sanitization and normalization as needed for specific argument types.
      • Use type-safe programming practices and leverage Rust's strong typing to enforce constraints where possible.

Attack Tree Path: Command Injection via Argument [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploits the unsafe use of command-line arguments within shell commands. * Critical Node: Application unsafely passes argument to shell command: This is the crucial step where the application becomes vulnerable. If arguments are passed to shell commands without proper sanitization or parameterization, command injection becomes possible. * High-Risk Path End: Attacker crafts malicious argument to execute shell commands: The attacker's goal is to inject shell commands within the argument, which, when executed by the application, compromises the system. * Detailed Attack Steps: * Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments. * Application takes a parsed argument and incorporates it into a shell command string. * Application executes this shell command using functions like std::process::Command (potentially incorrectly). * Attacker crafts a malicious argument containing shell metacharacters and commands (e.g., ;, |, &&, ||, $(), `). * When the application executes the constructed shell command, the attacker's injected commands are also executed, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server. * Impact: Critical. Full system compromise, data breach, denial of service, and more. * Mitigation: * Avoid using shell commands with user-provided input whenever possible. * If shell commands are necessary, use parameterized commands or escape arguments rigorously. Rust's std::process::Command allows passing arguments as separate parameters, which is the preferred method. * Input validation and sanitization: While helpful, sanitization is complex and error-prone for shell commands. Parameterization is the most robust defense.

Attack Tree Path: Path Traversal via Argument [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploits the application's handling of file paths provided as command-line arguments without proper validation. * Critical Node: Application does not properly sanitize/validate file paths: The vulnerability arises when the application trusts user-provided file paths without checking for malicious sequences like ../ or absolute paths that could lead outside the intended directory. * High-Risk Path End: Attacker provides path traversal sequences in arguments: The attacker's goal is to use path traversal sequences in arguments to access files or directories outside the application's intended scope, potentially gaining access to sensitive information. * Detailed Attack Steps: * Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments, including arguments intended to be file paths. * Application uses these file paths to access files on the file system without sufficient validation. * Attacker provides arguments containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../sensitive_file, /etc/passwd). * The application, without proper validation, attempts to access the files specified by the attacker's manipulated paths, potentially granting unauthorized access. * Impact: Medium to High. Information disclosure, access to sensitive files, potential for further exploitation depending on the files accessed. * Mitigation: * Validate and sanitize file paths: * Use canonicalization to resolve symbolic links and remove redundant path components. * Restrict allowed paths to a specific directory (chroot-like approach). * Use safe path manipulation functions provided by the operating system or libraries. * Principle of least privilege: Ensure the application only has the necessary file system permissions.

Attack Tree Path: Argument Injection into Application Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploits weaknesses in application logic that relies on argument values without sufficient validation, leading to unintended behavior or security bypasses. * Critical Node: Application logic relies on argument values without sufficient validation: The core issue is the lack of robust validation of argument values after they are parsed by clap-rs. The application logic assumes the arguments are in the expected format and range without verifying. * High-Risk Path End: Attacker provides unexpected or malicious argument values to alter application behavior: The attacker's goal is to provide argument values that are outside the expected range or format, causing the application to behave in an unintended or insecure manner. * Detailed Attack Steps: * Application uses clap-rs to parse command-line arguments. * Application logic directly uses the parsed argument values without proper validation of their content or range. * Attacker provides unexpected or malicious argument values (e.g., negative numbers where positive are expected, excessively long strings, special characters, values exceeding limits). * The application logic, due to lack of validation, processes these malicious values, leading to errors, unexpected behavior, logic bypasses, or even resource exhaustion. * Impact: Medium. Logic errors, data corruption, security bypasses, denial of service (resource exhaustion). * Mitigation: * Thoroughly validate all argument values after parsing with clap-rs. Check data types, ranges, formats, lengths, and any other relevant constraints. * Implement input sanitization and normalization as needed for specific argument types. * Use type-safe programming practices and leverage Rust's strong typing to enforce constraints where possible.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfiguration/Misuse of clap-rs API [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector Category: This high-risk path stems from developers misunderstanding or incorrectly using the clap-rs API, leading to insecure argument handling logic within the application.

• Criticality: Medium to High. While not directly exploiting a vulnerability in clap-rs itself, misuse can create significant vulnerabilities in the application.

• Mitigation Priority: High. Developer training, code reviews, and static analysis are crucial to prevent API misuse.

  • Critical Node: Developers misunderstand or misuse clap-rs API features [HIGH RISK PATH]: This is the root cause of this high-risk path. Lack of understanding or incorrect implementation of clap-rs features can lead to vulnerabilities.
  • Critical Node: Misuse leads to insecure argument handling or parsing logic [HIGH RISK PATH]: The consequence of API misuse is the creation of insecure argument handling logic. This could involve incorrect validation, logic bypasses, or other flaws.
  • High-Risk Path End: Attacker exploits the consequences of this misuse: Attackers can then exploit the vulnerabilities created by the API misuse, such as incorrect validation or logic bypasses, to compromise the application.
  • Detailed Attack Steps:
    • Developers misunderstand or incorrectly implement clap-rs API features during application development. Examples include:
      • Incorrectly defining argument requirements or constraints.
      • Misusing argument groups or mutually exclusive arguments.
      • Failing to handle default values securely.
      • Incorrectly implementing custom validation logic (if any).
    • This misuse results in insecure argument handling logic within the application. For example, validation might be bypassed, or certain argument combinations might lead to unexpected behavior.
    • Attacker analyzes the application's command-line interface and identifies vulnerabilities arising from the API misuse.
    • Attacker crafts specific command-line arguments that exploit these vulnerabilities to achieve their goals (e.g., bypass security checks, trigger errors, alter application behavior).
  • Impact: Medium. Can lead to various vulnerabilities depending on the nature of the misuse, including input validation bypass, logic errors, and potentially information disclosure or denial of service.
  • Mitigation:
    • Thorough developer training on clap-rs API and secure CLI design principles.
    • Comprehensive code reviews focusing on clap-rs usage and argument handling logic.
    • Static analysis tools to detect potential misuses of the clap-rs API and insecure argument handling patterns.
    • Extensive testing of command-line argument parsing with various valid and invalid inputs, including edge cases and boundary conditions.
    • Follow best practices for secure coding and CLI design.