attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for dalance/procs

Objective: To compromise application using 'procs' by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

• [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerabilities in 'procs' Crate
  • [OR] [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities in 'procs'
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Malicious Filtering/Sorting Input
      • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Supply crafted filter/sort arguments to application using 'procs'
  • [OR] Command Injection via Process Arguments (Application Side)
    • [AND] [CRITICAL NODE] Application using 'procs' passes unsanitized user input as arguments to 'procs' functions (indirectly).
  • [OR] Buffer Overflow/Memory Safety Issues
    • [AND] [CRITICAL NODE] 'procs' has vulnerabilities in memory management when handling process data or input.
  • [OR] [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Logic/Algorithm Flaws in 'procs'
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion
      • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Trigger 'procs' to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory) when processing process data.
  • [OR] [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependencies of 'procs'
    • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 'procs' depends on crates with known vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerabilities in 'procs' Crate

• Attack Vector: This is the overarching goal of exploiting any weakness within the procs crate itself. It encompasses all the sub-paths below.
• Breakdown: Attackers aim to find and leverage bugs, design flaws, or implementation errors directly within the procs crate's code. Success here directly compromises applications using procs.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities in 'procs'

• Attack Vector: Focuses on vulnerabilities arising from how procs handles external input, specifically related to filtering and sorting process data.
• Breakdown:
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Malicious Filtering/Sorting Input:
    • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Supply crafted filter/sort arguments to application using 'procs':
      • Attack Vector: An attacker provides specially crafted input strings intended to be used as filters or sorting criteria by the application when calling procs functions.
      • Vulnerability: If procs's input parsing logic for filters or sorts is flawed (e.g., lacks proper validation, susceptible to injection-style attacks, or causes unexpected behavior with specific characters or patterns), an attacker can exploit this.
      • Potential Impact:
        • Denial of Service (DoS): Crafted input could cause procs to enter an infinite loop, consume excessive resources, or crash, leading to DoS of the application.
        • Information Leakage: Input manipulation might bypass intended filtering or sorting, leading to the exposure of process information that should have been restricted.
        • Unexpected Behavior: Unintended logic execution within procs due to flawed input handling could lead to unpredictable application behavior.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Command Injection via Process Arguments (Application Side)

• [CRITICAL NODE] Application using 'procs' passes unsanitized user input as arguments to 'procs' functions (indirectly).
  • Attack Vector: This is primarily an application-level vulnerability, but directly related to how the application uses procs. The attacker targets the application's code, not procs directly.
  • Vulnerability: If the application takes user-supplied input and uses it to construct filters, arguments, or commands that are then indirectly passed to or processed by procs (or used in conjunction with procs output in a way that leads to command execution), without proper sanitization, command injection becomes possible.
  • Breakdown: Even though procs itself is unlikely to directly execute commands based on input, if the application using procs constructs shell commands or system calls based on user input and then uses procs in a way that interacts with these commands (e.g., filtering process lists based on command names derived from user input), a command injection vulnerability can arise in the application's logic.
  • Potential Impact:
    • System Compromise: Successful command injection can allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system with the privileges of the application, potentially leading to full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Buffer Overflow/Memory Safety Issues

• [CRITICAL NODE] 'procs' has vulnerabilities in memory management when handling process data or input.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting memory safety vulnerabilities within the procs crate.
  • Vulnerability: Despite Rust's memory safety features, vulnerabilities can still occur in unsafe blocks within procs or in its dependencies if they have memory safety issues.
  • Breakdown: Attackers would look for weaknesses in how procs manages memory when processing process information or handling input. This could involve buffer overflows, use-after-free errors, or other memory corruption issues.
  • Potential Impact:
    • Arbitrary Code Execution (RCE): Memory corruption vulnerabilities can often be leveraged to achieve arbitrary code execution, allowing the attacker to run malicious code on the system.
    • System Compromise: RCE typically leads to full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Logic/Algorithm Flaws in 'procs'

• Attack Vector: Targeting flaws in the logic or algorithms used within procs, specifically focusing on resource exhaustion.
• Breakdown:
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion:
    • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Trigger 'procs' to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory) when processing process data.:
      • Attack Vector: An attacker crafts input or system conditions that trigger inefficient algorithms or logic within procs, causing it to consume excessive CPU, memory, or other resources.
      • Vulnerability: If procs uses inefficient algorithms for listing, filtering, sorting, or processing process data, especially under specific conditions (e.g., a system with a very large number of processes, processes with specific characteristics), an attacker can exploit this.
      • Potential Impact:
        • Denial of Service (DoS): Resource exhaustion can lead to the application becoming unresponsive or crashing, causing a denial of service.

Attack Tree Path: 6. [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependencies of 'procs'

• Attack Vector: Indirectly attacking procs by exploiting vulnerabilities in its dependencies.
• Breakdown:
  • [AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 'procs' depends on crates with known vulnerabilities.:
    • Attack Vector: Attackers target known security vulnerabilities in the crates that procs depends on.
    • Vulnerability: If any of procs's dependencies have known vulnerabilities (e.g., reported in security advisories, listed in vulnerability databases), and procs uses the vulnerable versions of these dependencies, applications using procs become indirectly vulnerable.
    • Potential Impact:
      • Varies: The impact depends entirely on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. It could range from DoS to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and system compromise, depending on the nature of the dependency vulnerability.