Objective: Gain unauthorized access to system information or manipulate system processes by exploiting vulnerabilities in the procs library.
Gain unauthorized access to system information or manipulate system processes
├── 1. Information Disclosure [HR]
│ ├── 1.1 Exploit `procs` functions to read sensitive process information [CN]
│ │ ├── 1.1.1 Bypass intended filtering/restrictions (if any) in `procs`
│ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1 Craft malicious input to `procs` functions (e.g., `pid`, `keyword`) to access processes outside the intended scope. [HR] [CN]
│ │ ├── 1.1.2 Read sensitive environment variables of other processes (if `procs` exposes this). [HR] [CN]
│ │ ├── 1.1.3 Read command-line arguments of other processes, potentially revealing credentials or configuration secrets. [HR]
├── 2. Process Manipulation
│ ├── 2.1 Inject malicious code into a target process
│ │ ├── 2.1.1 Exploit a buffer overflow or other memory corruption vulnerability in `procs` itself (if present) to gain control of the application using `procs`. [CN]
├── 3. Privilege Escalation (Indirect, via `procs` exploitation)
├── 3.1 Exploit a vulnerability in `procs` to gain control of the application using it. [CN]
│ ├── 3.1.1 As in 2.1.1, find a memory corruption vulnerability in `procs` itself. [CN]
Attack Tree Path: 1. Information Disclosure [HR]
- Description: This is the primary attack vector, focusing on unauthorized access to system and process information. The
procslibrary's core function is to provide this information, making it a natural target.- Sub-Vectors:
Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit procs functions to read sensitive process information [CN]
* **Description:** The attacker attempts to directly misuse the functions provided by `procs` to obtain information they shouldn't have access to. This is the gateway to most information disclosure attacks.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Bypass intended filtering/restrictions (if any) in procs
* **Description:** The attacker tries to circumvent any security measures built into `procs` to limit access to information.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1 Craft malicious input to procs functions (e.g., pid, keyword) to access processes outside the intended scope. [HR] [CN]
* **Description:** This is the most direct and likely attack. The attacker provides carefully crafted input to `procs` functions, aiming to trick the library into revealing information about processes or files it shouldn't. This could involve:
* **Path Traversal:** If `procs` uses user-provided input to construct paths to `/proc` entries, the attacker might try to inject ".." sequences or absolute paths to access files outside the intended directory. Example: If a function takes a PID as input, the attacker might provide "../../etc/passwd" to try to read the password file.
* **PID Manipulation:** If `procs` allows specifying PIDs, the attacker might try to provide PIDs of system processes or other users' processes to access their information.
* **Keyword Injection:** If `procs` uses keywords to search for processes, the attacker might try to inject special characters or patterns to broaden the search or access unintended processes.
* **Likelihood:** High (if input validation is weak)
* **Impact:** High
* **Effort:** Low to Medium
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Read sensitive environment variables of other processes (if procs exposes this). [HR] [CN]
* **Description:** The attacker leverages `procs` to read the environment variables of other processes. Environment variables often contain sensitive data like API keys, database credentials, and other secrets.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (depends on `procs` functionality and access controls)
* **Impact:** High
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Novice to Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3 Read command-line arguments of other processes, potentially revealing credentials or configuration secrets. [HR]
* **Description:** Similar to environment variables, command-line arguments can sometimes contain sensitive information, although this is generally considered bad practice.
* **Likelihood:** Medium
* **Impact:** Medium to High
* **Effort:** Low
* **Skill Level:** Novice to Intermediate
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard
Attack Tree Path: 2. Process Manipulation
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Inject malicious code into a target process
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 Exploit a buffer overflow or other memory corruption vulnerability in procs itself (if present) to gain control of the application using procs. [CN]
* **Description:** The attacker exploits a memory safety vulnerability (like a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free) in the `procs` library itself. This allows them to overwrite memory and potentially execute arbitrary code within the context of the application using `procs`. This is a *critical* vulnerability because it gives the attacker control over the application, which can then be used for further attacks.
* **Likelihood:** Low (but depends on code quality and language used)
* **Impact:** Very High
* **Effort:** High
* **Skill Level:** Advanced to Expert
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard
Attack Tree Path: 3. Privilege Escalation (Indirect, via procs exploitation)
* **Sub-Vectors:**
Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Exploit a vulnerability in procs to gain control of the application using it. [CN]
* **Description:** This is the same as 2.1.1. The attacker gains control of the application. The difference here is the *context*: if the application using `procs` is running with elevated privileges (e.g., as root or a system service), then the attacker gains those privileges.
* **Sub-Vectors:**
(Same as 2.1.1)