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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for dalance/procs

Mitigation Strategy: Restrict Access to /proc (Containerization)

Description:

  1. Dockerize the Application: Package the application and its dependencies into a Docker container.
  2. Configure Bind Mount (Read-Only): When running the container, use a bind mount to mount the host's /proc filesystem into the container, but make it read-only. This prevents the application (and any potential attacker exploiting it) from modifying anything within /proc. Example (Docker command): docker run -v /proc:/proc:ro ...
  3. Restrict /proc View (Optional, Advanced): If possible, further restrict the container's view of /proc. Instead of mounting the entire /proc, mount only specific subdirectories that the application needs. This requires a deep understanding of the application's requirements. You might use techniques like unshare or nsenter (if available and appropriate) to create a more isolated process namespace, limiting the container's view to only its own processes.
  4. Test Thoroughly: After implementing the containerization and /proc restrictions, thoroughly test the application to ensure it still functions correctly. This is crucial, as overly restrictive mounts can break functionality.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • Information Disclosure (High Severity): Dramatically reduces the risk. The application can only see a limited, read-only view of process information. If the view is further restricted (step 3), this risk is almost eliminated.
  • Denial of Service (Medium Severity): Limits the ability of an attacker to use procs information to target host processes for DoS attacks.
  • Privilege Escalation (High Severity): Makes privilege escalation extremely difficult, as the attacker's view of the system is highly restricted.
  • Data Tampering (Medium Severity): Prevents any direct modification of the host's /proc filesystem, which could be used for data tampering.

Impact:

  • Information Disclosure: Very High impact - approaches elimination of the risk if the /proc view is tightly controlled.
  • Denial of Service: Medium impact - significantly reduces the attacker's options.
  • Privilege Escalation: Very High impact - makes privilege escalation extremely challenging.
  • Data Tampering: High impact - prevents direct tampering via /proc.

Currently Implemented:

  • The application is containerized.

Missing Implementation:

  • The /proc filesystem is currently mounted read-write within the container. This is a major security gap. It must be changed to a read-only mount in the Dockerfile or docker-compose configuration. Further restriction of the /proc view (step 3) should be investigated and implemented if feasible.

Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization (Process ID/Name)

Description:

  1. Identify Input Points: Identify all points in the application where user input (directly or indirectly) can influence which processes are queried using the procs library. This could be through API endpoints, configuration files, command-line arguments, or any other mechanism.
  2. Implement Strict Validation: For any input that represents a process ID or name, implement strict validation:
    • Process IDs: Validate that the input is a positive integer within a reasonable range (avoiding excessively large numbers that might cause resource issues).
    • Process Names:
      • Whitelist (Preferred): If the application only needs to query a known, limited set of processes, create a whitelist of allowed process names. Reject any input that doesn't match the whitelist.
      • Regular Expression (If Whitelist Not Feasible): If a whitelist is not possible, use a carefully crafted regular expression to restrict the allowed characters to a safe set (e.g., alphanumeric characters, underscores, and perhaps hyphens). Crucially, prevent path traversal characters (like .., /, and potentially others depending on the OS). The regex should be as restrictive as possible while still allowing legitimate use cases.
  3. Sanitize (If Necessary, with Caution): If you cannot fully validate the input (e.g., you need to allow some special characters that are difficult to validate), sanitize the input. This involves removing or escaping any potentially dangerous characters. However, sanitization is generally less secure than strict validation, so it should be used as a last resort.
  4. Test Thoroughly: Test the input validation and sanitization with a wide range of inputs, including known malicious patterns (e.g., path traversal attempts), boundary conditions (very large/small numbers), and unexpected characters.

List of Threats Mitigated:

  • Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious process IDs or names to access information about arbitrary processes (those they shouldn't have access to).
  • Denial of Service (Low Severity): Reduces the risk of an attacker using crafted input to trigger unexpected behavior or resource exhaustion within the procs library or the application itself.
  • Data Tampering (Low Severity): Prevents attackers from injecting malicious process IDs or names to access information about arbitrary processes and use it for data tampering.

Impact:

  • Information Disclosure: Medium impact - prevents access to arbitrary processes via input manipulation.
  • Denial of Service: Low impact - mitigates some potential DoS vectors, but not the primary ones related to procs.
  • Data Tampering: Low impact - mitigates some potential data tampering vectors.

Currently Implemented:

  • No input validation or sanitization is currently implemented for process IDs or names obtained from user input.

Missing Implementation:

  • This is a critical missing security control. Input validation and sanitization must be implemented for all relevant input points where user-supplied data can influence which processes are queried. This needs to be added to the API endpoint handlers, configuration file parsing, and any other code that processes user-supplied process identifiers. Prioritize using a whitelist if at all possible.