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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for dani-garcia/vaultwarden

Threat: Admin Interface Compromise via Brute-Force

  • Description: An attacker attempts to guess the administrator password by repeatedly submitting login attempts, using automated tools and dictionary attacks against the Vaultwarden admin interface.
    • Impact: Complete control over the Vaultwarden instance, including access to all user data, configuration settings, and the ability to disable security features.
    • Affected Component: rocket web framework authentication handling, specifically the /admin/login route and associated authentication logic.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Enforce strong password policies (length, complexity) for the admin account. Implement robust account lockout mechanisms after a small number of failed login attempts. Implement rate limiting on the /admin/login route. Consider adding CAPTCHA or other bot detection mechanisms.
      • User: Use a very strong, unique, and randomly generated password for the admin account. Enable and require two-factor authentication (2FA) for the admin account. Restrict access to the /admin interface to trusted IP addresses using firewall rules or a reverse proxy configuration.

Threat: Data Exfiltration via Unprotected Backup (If Vaultwarden handles backup logic)

  • Description: If Vaultwarden's code includes backup functionality, an attacker gains access to an unencrypted or weakly encrypted backup file of the Vaultwarden database generated by Vaultwarden's internal mechanisms. This assumes the backup process is part of Vaultwarden's code, not just external scripts.
    • Impact: Complete exposure of all user data, including passwords, secure notes, and other sensitive information.
    • Affected Component: Backup functionality within Vaultwarden's codebase (if present), including database interaction and file handling.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: If backup functionality is built-in, ensure strong encryption is used by default, with secure key management. Provide options for users to configure backup locations and encryption keys securely.
      • User: If using Vaultwarden's built-in backup (if it exists), ensure strong encryption is enabled and the key is stored securely and separately from the backup data.

Threat: Denial of Service via Attachment Upload

  • Description: An attacker uploads a very large file or a large number of files as attachments through Vaultwarden's interface, consuming server resources (disk space, CPU, memory) and potentially causing the Vaultwarden instance to become unresponsive.
    • Impact: Denial of service, preventing legitimate users from accessing their data.
    • Affected Component: Attachment handling logic, specifically the file upload and storage mechanisms within the rocket framework and potentially the database interaction for storing attachment metadata.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Implement strict limits on the size and number of attachments per user and per organization. Validate file types to prevent the upload of potentially malicious files (e.g., executables). Consider using a separate storage service for attachments to isolate them from the main Vaultwarden application. Implement rate limiting on attachment uploads.
      • User: Monitor server resource usage (disk space, CPU, memory) and configure alerts for unusual activity.

Threat: Session Hijacking via Weak Session Management

  • Description: An attacker intercepts or steals a user's Vaultwarden session token, allowing them to impersonate the user and access their Vaultwarden data. This targets weaknesses within Vaultwarden's session handling.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to a user's Vaultwarden data.
    • Affected Component: Session management within the rocket framework, including token generation, storage (likely in cookies), and validation.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Use cryptographically secure random number generators for session tokens. Ensure session tokens are transmitted only over HTTPS. Set the Secure and HttpOnly flags on session cookies. Implement session expiration and inactivity timeouts. Consider using a robust session management library.
      • User: Always use HTTPS to access Vaultwarden. Be cautious of public Wi-Fi networks. Log out of Vaultwarden when finished using it.

Threat: Websocket Hijacking/Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker intercepts or manipulates the websocket connection between the client and the Vaultwarden server. This could allow the attacker to eavesdrop on sensitive data transmitted via websockets or inject malicious commands.
    • Impact: Data leakage, unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the user, potential for session hijacking.
    • Affected Component: Websocket handling within the rocket framework and the associated client-side JavaScript code.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Ensure websockets are only used over secure connections (WSS). Implement proper authentication and authorization for websocket connections. Validate all data received over the websocket connection. Consider using a robust websocket library with built-in security features.
      • User: Always use HTTPS to access Vaultwarden. Be cautious of public Wi-Fi networks.

Threat: Dependency Vulnerability Exploitation (High/Critical Vulnerabilities)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known high or critical severity vulnerability in a third-party library or dependency used directly by Vaultwarden's code.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could include remote code execution, data breaches, or denial of service. Focus is on high/critical vulnerabilities that could lead to significant compromise.
    • Affected Component: Any component that relies on the vulnerable dependency. This could be within the rocket framework, database drivers, or other libraries used by Vaultwarden.
    • Risk Severity: High/Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Regularly update all dependencies to the latest versions. Use a dependency management tool (e.g., cargo) to track and manage dependencies. Prioritize updates that address high or critical severity vulnerabilities. Monitor security advisories for known vulnerabilities in dependencies. Consider using a vulnerability scanning tool to identify vulnerable dependencies. Employ a robust Software Composition Analysis (SCA) process.
      • User: Keep Vaultwarden updated to the latest version, as updates often include security patches for dependencies.