Attack Surface: Bypassing Permissions System
Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Deno's permission checking mechanism to gain unauthorized access to system resources.
Deno Contribution: Deno's core security model is built around its permission system. Flaws directly undermine this security.
Example: A vulnerability in Deno's file system permission check allows a script with --allow-read=/tmp to read files outside of /tmp.
Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, system compromise, privilege escalation.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Deno updated to the latest version for security patches.
- Thoroughly test permission boundaries during development.
- Report suspected permission bypass vulnerabilities to the Deno security team.
Attack Surface: Permission Escalation
Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities within Deno itself to escalate initially granted permissions to a higher level of access.
Deno Contribution: Vulnerabilities in Deno's runtime can allow attackers to bypass intended permission restrictions.
Example: A bug in Deno's runtime allows a script with --allow-read to escalate to full --allow-all permissions.
Impact: Complete circumvention of Deno's security model, leading to full system access.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Deno updated to the latest version.
- Implement robust input validation to prevent exploitation of potential Deno vulnerabilities.
- Run Deno applications in sandboxed environments to limit escalation impact.
Attack Surface: Malicious Code in Remote Modules
Description: Importing and executing code from compromised or malicious URLs.
Deno Contribution: Deno directly fetches and executes code from URLs, trusting the source.
Example: A developer imports a module from a compromised server, unknowingly executing malicious code.
Impact: Remote code execution, data theft, backdoors, denial of service.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly vet and trust sources of imported modules.
- Regularly audit dependencies and their sources.
- Consider code review and static analysis of imported modules.
Attack Surface: Insecure Transports (HTTP for Modules)
Description: Fetching modules over unencrypted HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.
Deno Contribution: Deno allows HTTP module fetching, though HTTPS is recommended.
Example: MITM attack injects malicious code when a Deno app fetches a module over HTTP.
Impact: Compromising the application by injecting malicious code during dependency resolution.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Always use HTTPS for module imports.
- Enforce HTTPS-only module fetching policies.
- Use secure network environments to minimize MITM risks.
Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in Built-in Modules
Description: Bugs or security flaws within Deno's core built-in modules.
Deno Contribution: Deno's built-in modules are core functionality; vulnerabilities directly impact applications.
Example: Buffer overflow in Deno.fs.readFile allows code execution via crafted file path.
Impact: Denial of service, information disclosure, remote code execution within Deno runtime.
Risk Severity: High to Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Deno updated to the latest version.
- Report suspected vulnerabilities in built-in modules.
- Implement input validation when using built-in modules.
Attack Surface: Unsafe Native Code Execution (FFI)
Description: Using Deno's FFI to interact with untrusted or vulnerable native libraries.
Deno Contribution: Deno's FFI bypasses the security sandbox if misused with untrusted native code.
Example: Deno app uses FFI to call a native library with a buffer overflow, enabling arbitrary code execution.
Impact: Full system compromise, bypassing Deno's security sandbox.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Avoid FFI unless absolutely necessary.
- Thoroughly vet native libraries used with FFI.
- Apply strict input validation before passing data to native functions.
- Run FFI-using apps in highly isolated environments.
Attack Surface: FFI API Misuse
Description: Incorrectly using the FFI API, leading to memory corruption or unexpected behavior.
Deno Contribution: FFI API complexity increases risk of developer errors leading to vulnerabilities.
Example: Incorrect data type specification in FFI call leads to memory corruption and exploitable crash.
Impact: Denial of service, information disclosure, potentially exploitable memory corruption.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly understand FFI API and native library requirements.
- Use static analysis and testing to detect FFI usage errors.
- Implement robust error handling and boundary checks when using FFI.
Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in V8 Engine
Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the underlying V8 JavaScript engine.
Deno Contribution: Deno relies on V8, inheriting its security vulnerabilities.
Example: Zero-day in V8 allows code execution via malicious JavaScript in Deno.
Impact: Remote code execution, sandbox escapes, critical security issues.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Deno updated to include patched V8 versions.
- Implement robust input validation to minimize V8 vulnerability attack surface.
- Run Deno apps with sandboxing or containerization.
Attack Surface: Deno Runtime Bugs
Description: Bugs and security flaws within the Deno runtime itself (written in Rust).
Deno Contribution: Vulnerabilities in Deno's core runtime directly impact all applications.
Example: Memory safety vulnerability in Deno runtime allows sandbox escape and host system control.
Impact: Sandbox escapes, privilege escalation, denial of service for all Deno apps.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Deno updated to the latest version.
- Report suspected runtime vulnerabilities to the Deno security team.
- Run Deno apps in isolated environments to limit runtime vulnerability impact.
Attack Surface: Supply Chain Attacks on Deno Executable
Description: Compromising the Deno executable during build or distribution.
Deno Contribution: Compromised Deno runtime puts all applications at risk.
Example: Attacker injects malicious code into official Deno executable distribution.
Impact: Widespread compromise of Deno applications via malicious runtime.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Download Deno from official, trusted sources.
- Verify executable integrity using checksums/signatures.
- Implement secure software supply chain practices.