attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for denoland/deno

Objective: Attacker's Goal: To compromise a Deno application by exploiting high-risk vulnerabilities or critical weaknesses related to Deno's architecture and configuration.

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise Deno Application [CRITICAL NODE]
└── Exploit Deno Permissions Model [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── Runtime Vulnerability in Permission System [CRITICAL NODE]
    └── Initial Permission Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        └── Application Starts with Overly Broad Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            └── Developer Error in Permission Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]

└── Exploit Deno Dependency Management (URL-Based Imports) [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── Supply Chain Attack via Dependency Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │   └── Compromise Hosting of Dependency URL (e.g., GitHub account, personal server) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │   └── Inject Malicious Code into Legitimate Dependency at Source [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    ├── Malicious Dependency Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   └── Import Malicious Module from Untrusted Source [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │       └── Developer Imports from Unverified/Compromised URL [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │       └── Typosquatting/Similar Domain Name for Dependency URL [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └── Vulnerable Dependency [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        └── Use Dependency with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            └── Outdated Dependency with Publicly Disclosed Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH]

└── Exploit Deno Runtime or Standard Library Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── Deno Runtime Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]
    └── Standard Library Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]

└── Exploit Deno Configuration and Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── Insecure Flags/Options [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   └── Running Deno with `--allow-all` or other overly permissive flags in production [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │   └── Disabling Security Features via Command-Line Options [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └── Insecure Deployment Environment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        └── Weak Host OS Security [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └── Network Misconfigurations allowing unauthorized access to Deno process [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deno Permissions Model [CRITICAL NODE]

• Runtime Vulnerability in Permission System [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting a bug in Deno's core runtime code that handles permission checks. This could involve:
    • Memory corruption vulnerabilities (buffer overflows, use-after-free) in the Rust code responsible for permission enforcement.
    • Logic flaws in the permission granting or revoking mechanisms, allowing bypass of intended security boundaries.
  • Impact: Complete bypass of Deno's permission sandbox, allowing unrestricted access to system resources and capabilities.

• Initial Permission Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Application Starts with Overly Broad Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: The application is intentionally or unintentionally configured to run with excessive permissions from the start.
      • Developer Error in Permission Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Developers mistakenly grant unnecessary permissions (e.g., --allow-net, --allow-read, --allow-write, --allow-env, --allow-run, --allow-hrtime, --allow-ffi) during development or deployment.
      • Default Configuration is Insecure: Templates, examples, or initial project setups might inadvertently suggest or use insecure default permission configurations.
  • Impact: Reduces the effectiveness of Deno's permission-based security, expanding the attack surface and potential damage from other vulnerabilities (e.g., in dependencies or application logic).

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deno Dependency Management (URL-Based Imports) [CRITICAL NODE]

• Supply Chain Attack via Dependency Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Compromising the source of a Deno dependency hosted at a URL.
    • Compromise Hosting of Dependency URL (e.g., GitHub account, personal server) [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers gain control of the server or account hosting the dependency code.
    • Inject Malicious Code into Legitimate Dependency at Source [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers modify the legitimate dependency code at its source repository (e.g., by compromising developer accounts, exploiting repository vulnerabilities).
  • Impact: Injection of malicious code into the application through a trusted dependency, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE), data theft, or other malicious activities.

• Malicious Dependency Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Import Malicious Module from Untrusted Source [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Developers are tricked or misled into importing and using a deliberately malicious Deno module.
      • Developer Imports from Unverified/Compromised URL [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Developers import modules from untrusted or compromised URLs without proper verification.
      • Typosquatting/Similar Domain Name for Dependency URL [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers register domain names similar to legitimate dependency URLs to host malicious modules, hoping developers will make typos or be deceived.
  • Impact: Direct execution of malicious code within the application's context, potentially leading to RCE, data theft, or other malicious activities.

• Vulnerable Dependency [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Use Dependency with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: The application uses a Deno dependency that contains publicly known security vulnerabilities.
      • Outdated Dependency with Publicly Disclosed Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Developers fail to update dependencies, leaving known vulnerabilities unpatched.
  • Impact: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in dependencies to compromise the application, potentially leading to RCE, data theft, or other malicious activities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deno Runtime or Standard Library Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• Deno Runtime Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities directly within the Deno runtime itself. This could include:
    • Memory corruption bugs (buffer overflows, use-after-free) in the core Rust runtime code.
    • Logic flaws in the runtime's JavaScript/TypeScript execution engine or security sandboxing mechanisms.
  • Impact: Potentially critical, leading to sandbox escape, Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server, or denial of service.

• Standard Library Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities within Deno's standard library modules (e.g., std/http, std/fs, std/encoding). This could include:
    • Buffer overflows or injection vulnerabilities in standard library code.
    • Logic flaws in standard library APIs that can be misused to cause security issues.
  • Impact: Depends on the vulnerable module, but could range from denial of service to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or data manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deno Configuration and Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Insecure Flags/Options [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Running the Deno application with insecure command-line flags or options.
    • Running Deno with --allow-all or other overly permissive flags in production [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Developers mistakenly or intentionally use --allow-all or other flags that grant excessive permissions in production environments.
    • Disabling Security Features via Command-Line Options [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Developers use flags to disable important security features of Deno, such as permission checks or secure TLS settings.
  • Impact: Completely negates Deno's security model, allowing unrestricted access to system resources and capabilities, similar to running without any sandbox.

• Insecure Deployment Environment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Weak Host OS Security [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: The underlying operating system hosting the Deno application is not properly secured. This includes:
      • Unpatched OS vulnerabilities.
      • Weak access controls and user permissions.
      • Missing security configurations (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection).

  • Impact: Compromise of the host OS can lead to compromise of the Deno application and potentially other applications or systems on the same host.

  • Network Misconfigurations allowing unauthorized access to Deno process [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Network configurations allow unauthorized access to the Deno application or its internal services. This includes:
      • Exposing Deno application ports directly to the public internet without proper firewalls or access controls.
      • Misconfigured network segmentation allowing lateral movement within the network.

  • Impact: Unauthorized access to the Deno application, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruption, or further attacks on internal systems.