mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for denoland/deno

Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege for Permissions

• Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege for Permissions
• Description:
  1. Analyze Deno Permission Needs: Examine your application's code and identify the minimum Deno permissions required for each module and functionality. Focus on Deno's permission flags like --allow-net, --allow-read, --allow-write, --allow-run, etc.
  2. Specify Granular Permissions: When running your Deno application, use command-line flags to explicitly grant only the necessary permissions. Utilize granular permissions where possible, such as --allow-net=specific-domain.com or --allow-read=/specific/path.
  3. Runtime Permission Checks (Optional but Recommended): Incorporate Deno.permissions.query() in your code to verify expected permissions are granted at runtime and handle cases where they are not, providing informative error messages or fallback behavior.
  4. Regular Permission Review: Periodically review and refine your application's permission requirements as it evolves. Remove any permissions that are no longer needed to maintain the principle of least privilege.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Unauthorized System Access via Deno APIs (High Severity): Attackers exploiting vulnerabilities could leverage granted Deno permissions to access system resources (network, file system, processes) beyond the application's intended scope.
  • Privilege Escalation within Deno Sandbox (High Severity): Overly permissive Deno permissions can enable attackers to escalate their privileges within the Deno sandbox, potentially bypassing intended security boundaries.
  • Supply Chain Attacks Exploiting Deno Permissions (Medium Severity): Compromised dependencies with broad permission requirements could exploit those permissions to perform malicious actions within the Deno environment.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized System Access via Deno APIs: Significantly Reduces risk. Limiting Deno permissions directly restricts the attack surface exposed through Deno's APIs.
  • Privilege Escalation within Deno Sandbox: Significantly Reduces risk. Restricting permissions confines the potential damage even if an attacker gains some level of control within the application.
  • Supply Chain Attacks Exploiting Deno Permissions: Moderately Reduces risk. While it doesn't prevent compromised dependencies, it limits the damage they can inflict by restricting their Deno permission access.
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Permissions are considered, but granular specification and runtime checks are inconsistent.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Systematic permission analysis for all modules.
  • Consistent use of granular permissions in deployment.
  • Runtime permission checks in critical sections.
  • Automated tools for permission analysis and enforcement.

Mitigation Strategy: Dependency Management and Supply Chain Security for Deno Remote Modules

• Mitigation Strategy: Dependency Management and Supply Chain Security for Deno Remote Modules
• Description:
  1. Pin Deno Dependency Versions: Always pin dependencies to specific versions in import URLs (e.g., https://deno.land/[email protected]/http/server.ts). Avoid using version ranges or latest tags in production Deno code.
  2. Deno Dependency Review and Auditing: Review the code of Deno dependencies, especially from less established sources, focusing on their functionality and potential security implications within the Deno environment.
  3. Checksum Verification for Deno Modules (Manual): Manually verify checksums (e.g., SHA-256) of downloaded Deno modules against trusted sources if available, to ensure integrity.
  4. Vendor Deno Dependencies: Download and store Deno dependencies within your project repository to reduce reliance on external servers and gain more control over the Deno dependency supply chain. Manage vendoring and updates specifically for Deno modules.
  5. Private Deno Module Registries: For sensitive applications, use private Deno module registries to host and control access to your Deno dependencies internally, enhancing security and control over the Deno module supply chain.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Deno Dependency Confusion/Substitution Attacks (High Severity): Attackers could substitute legitimate Deno modules with malicious ones if versioning is not strict or registries are compromised, specifically targeting Deno's URL-based import mechanism.
  • Malicious Code Injection via Deno Dependencies (High Severity): Compromised or malicious Deno dependencies can inject malicious code into your Deno application, exploiting Deno's runtime environment.
  • Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Deno Modules (Medium to High Severity): Vulnerabilities in Deno dependencies can be exploited through your application, even if your core Deno code is secure.
  • Outdated Deno Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): Using outdated Deno dependencies exposes your application to known vulnerabilities within the Deno ecosystem.
• Impact:
  • Deno Dependency Confusion/Substitution Attacks: Significantly Reduces risk. Deno version pinning and vendoring make substitution attacks much harder.
  • Malicious Code Injection via Deno Dependencies: Moderately to Significantly Reduces risk. Deno dependency review and vendoring help prevent malicious code injection. Checksum verification adds security.
  • Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Deno Modules: Moderately Reduces risk. Deno dependency auditing and monitoring help mitigate vulnerabilities. Regular updates are crucial.
  • Outdated Deno Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities: Significantly Reduces risk. Regularly updating Deno dependencies and monitoring advisories directly addresses this threat.
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Deno dependency pinning is common, but not consistently enforced. Review is informal. Vendoring and private registries are not used.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Formalized Deno dependency review process.
  • Automated Deno dependency vulnerability scanning (if tools available).
  • Deno dependency vendoring for critical applications.
  • Private Deno module registry exploration.
  • Automated Deno dependency update monitoring.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Usage of Deno Unsafe APIs

• Mitigation Strategy: Secure Usage of Deno Unsafe APIs
• Description:
  1. Minimize Deno Unsafe API Usage: Evaluate if using Deno's "unsafe" APIs (Deno.run, Deno.writeFile, Deno.net, Deno.ffi) is truly necessary. Explore safer alternatives within Deno's standard library or architecture.
  2. Restrict Deno Permissions for Unsafe APIs: When unsafe APIs are needed, grant the most restrictive Deno permissions possible. For example, limit --allow-run to specific commands or --allow-net to specific network ranges.
  3. Input Validation and Output Sanitization for Deno Unsafe APIs: When using unsafe APIs that interact with external systems or data within Deno (e.g., Deno.run with user input), rigorously validate inputs and sanitize outputs to prevent injection vulnerabilities specific to Deno's context.
  4. Code Review for Deno Unsafe API Usage: Conduct thorough code reviews focusing on Deno code sections using unsafe APIs. Ensure secure usage and proper security measures within the Deno environment.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Command Injection via Deno.run (High Severity): Improper use of Deno.run in Deno with unsanitized input can lead to command injection, executing arbitrary commands within the Deno runtime and potentially the system.
  • Path Traversal/File System Manipulation via Deno File APIs (High Severity): Insecure use of Deno's file system APIs (Deno.writeFile, Deno.readFile) with unsanitized paths can lead to path traversal vulnerabilities within the Deno environment.
  • Network Exploitation via Deno.net (Medium to High Severity): Misuse of Deno.net or Deno.connect in Deno with insufficient validation can expose internal network services or allow network attacks originating from the Deno application.
  • Arbitrary Code Execution via Deno.ffi (High Severity): Incorrect or insecure use of Deno.ffi in Deno can lead to arbitrary code execution if external libraries are compromised or used improperly within the Deno runtime.
• Impact:
  • Command Injection via Deno.run: Significantly Reduces risk. Input validation and sanitization are crucial for preventing command injection in Deno. Minimizing Deno.run usage further reduces risk.
  • Path Traversal/File System Manipulation via Deno File APIs: Significantly Reduces risk. Input validation and sanitization of file paths are essential in Deno. Least privilege Deno file permissions also limit impact.
  • Network Exploitation via Deno.net: Moderately to Significantly Reduces risk. Input validation and Deno permission restrictions on network access are key.
  • Arbitrary Code Execution via Deno.ffi: Moderately Reduces risk. Careful code review and minimizing Deno.ffi usage are important. Securely managing external libraries in Deno is critical.
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Awareness of Deno unsafe APIs exists. Input validation is sometimes applied, but inconsistently. Code reviews may cover unsafe API usage, but not systematically.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Formal guidelines for secure Deno unsafe API usage.
  • Automated code analysis for insecure Deno unsafe API usage.
  • Code review checklist items for Deno unsafe APIs.
  • Consistent input validation and output sanitization for Deno unsafe API interactions.
  • Exploration of sandboxing/isolation for high-risk Deno unsafe API operations.

Mitigation Strategy: Mitigation for --allow-all Misuse in Deno

• Mitigation Strategy: Prohibit --allow-all in Production Deno Deployments
• Description:
  1. Enforce Policy Against --allow-all: Establish a strict policy prohibiting --allow-all in production Deno deployments.
  2. CI/CD Checks for --allow-all: Implement automated checks in your CI/CD pipeline to detect and prevent deployments using --allow-all in the Deno command. Fail deployments if detected.
  3. Development Environment Guidance for Deno Permissions: If --allow-all is used in development for convenience, clearly document it's only for development and never for production Deno deployments.
  4. Developer Education on Deno Permissions: Educate developers about the severe security risks of --allow-all in Deno and emphasize granular Deno permissions. Provide training on Deno's permission system.
  5. Code Review of Deno Deployment Scripts: Review deployment scripts and Deno command invocations in code reviews to prevent accidental or intentional --allow-all in production Deno configurations.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Complete System Compromise due to Disabled Deno Sandbox (Critical Severity): Using --allow-all disables Deno's security sandbox, making the application extremely vulnerable within the Deno runtime environment.
  • Data Breaches due to Disabled Deno Sandbox (Critical Severity): With --allow-all, attackers can easily access and exfiltrate sensitive data if they compromise the Deno application, bypassing Deno's security features.
  • Denial of Service due to Disabled Deno Sandbox (High Severity): Attackers can leverage --allow-all to perform DoS attacks by consuming system resources or disrupting services within the Deno runtime environment.
• Impact:
  • Complete System Compromise due to Disabled Deno Sandbox: Significantly Reduces risk. Prohibiting --allow-all and CI/CD checks effectively eliminate this critical Deno-specific vulnerability.
  • Data Breaches due to Disabled Deno Sandbox: Significantly Reduces risk. Removing --allow-all restores Deno's sandbox, making data breaches much harder through permission-related exploits in Deno.
  • Denial of Service due to Disabled Deno Sandbox: Significantly Reduces risk. Restoring Deno's sandbox and controlling permissions limits DoS attacks via permission-related exploits in Deno.
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Informal avoidance of --allow-all in production. No automated checks or formalized policy. Developer education is ongoing but needs strengthening.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Formal policy against --allow-all in production Deno.
  • Automated CI/CD checks for --allow-all in Deno deployments.
  • Formal Deno permission training for developers.
  • Regular audits of Deno deployment configurations for --allow-all.

Mitigation Strategy: Regular Deno Runtime Updates and Security Monitoring

• Mitigation Strategy: Regular Deno Runtime Updates and Security Monitoring
• Description:
  1. Establish Deno Runtime Update Schedule: Create a schedule for regularly updating the Deno runtime to the latest stable version. Prioritize updates for security patches in the Deno runtime.
  2. Monitor Deno Security Advisories and Releases: Actively monitor Deno's official release notes, security advisories, and community channels for announcements of new Deno versions and security vulnerabilities specific to the Deno runtime.
  3. Subscribe to Deno Security Mailing Lists/Channels: Subscribe to Deno security mailing lists or relevant community channels to receive timely notifications about Deno runtime security vulnerabilities and recommended actions.
  4. Test Deno Updates in Staging: Before deploying Deno runtime updates to production, thoroughly test them in a staging environment to ensure compatibility and identify any issues specific to your Deno application.
  5. Automate Deno Runtime Updates (If feasible): Explore automating the Deno runtime update process in your deployment pipeline to ensure timely updates and reduce manual effort for Deno runtime management.
  6. Deno Vulnerability Scanning (Future Enhancement): As vulnerability scanning tools for Deno applications and dependencies become mature, integrate them to proactively identify and address known vulnerabilities in your Deno application and its dependencies.
• List of Threats Mitigated:
  • Exploitation of Known Deno Runtime Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated Deno runtimes may contain known security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit to compromise the Deno application and the underlying system, specifically targeting weaknesses in the Deno runtime itself.
  • Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Deno Runtime (Medium to High Severity): While updates primarily address known vulnerabilities, staying up-to-date reduces the window for attackers to exploit newly discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the Deno runtime before patches are available.
• Impact:
  • Exploitation of Known Deno Runtime Vulnerabilities: Significantly Reduces risk. Regular Deno runtime updates directly patch known vulnerabilities in Deno, eliminating or significantly reducing exploitation risk.
  • Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Deno Runtime: Minimally to Moderately Reduces risk. While updates don't prevent zero-day exploits, a proactive Deno update strategy ensures patches are applied quickly once available, minimizing the exposure window for Deno runtime vulnerabilities.
• Currently Implemented: Partially Implemented. Deno runtime updates are performed, but not on a strict schedule. Monitoring of release notes is informal. No automated update process or vulnerability scanning for Deno is in place.
• Missing Implementation:
  • Formal schedule and process for Deno runtime updates.
  • Automated monitoring of Deno security advisories and release notes.
  • Automated Deno runtime update process in CI/CD.
  • Integration of vulnerability scanning tools for Deno applications (when mature).
  • Formal communication plan for Deno security updates to relevant teams.