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Threat Model Analysis for denoland/deno

Threat: Overly Permissive Permissions

Description: Attacker exploits a vulnerability in the application. Due to overly broad permissions granted to the Deno process (e.g., --allow-net, --allow-read), the attacker can leverage these permissions to perform unauthorized actions. For example, if --allow-net is too broad, the attacker can access internal networks or external services beyond what is necessary. If --allow-read is too broad, they can read sensitive files on the server.

Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access to internal resources, lateral movement within the network, service disruption.

Deno Component Affected: Permissions Model, Deno CLI flags (--allow-*)

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Apply the principle of least privilege when granting permissions.
  • Specify granular permissions (e.g., --allow-net=api.example.com, --allow-read=/app/data).
  • Regularly review and audit granted permissions.
  • Use tooling to analyze required permissions.

Threat: Permission Bypass

Description: Attacker discovers and exploits a vulnerability within Deno's permission checking logic itself. This allows them to bypass intended permission restrictions and gain unauthorized access to system resources or functionalities, even if permissions were intended to be restrictive.

Impact: Complete compromise of Deno's security model, unauthorized access to any resource Deno can access, potentially leading to full system compromise.

Deno Component Affected: Permissions Model, Deno Runtime, V8 Engine

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Keep Deno runtime updated to the latest stable version.
  • Monitor Deno security advisories and apply updates promptly.
  • Report suspected permission bypass vulnerabilities to the Deno security team.

Threat: Malicious Remote Modules

Description: Attacker compromises a remote module repository or CDN that the Deno application depends on. They inject malicious code into the module. When the application imports this compromised module, the malicious code is executed within the application's context. This is amplified by Deno's default module loading mechanism from URLs.

Impact: Arbitrary code execution, data theft, service disruption, supply chain compromise.

Deno Component Affected: Module System, Remote Module Loading, import statements

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Pin module versions in deno.json or import statements.
  • Use dependency lock files (deno.lock.json).
  • Prefer reputable module sources and CDNs.
  • Regularly audit dependencies and their sources.
  • Use dependency scanning tools.

Threat: Deno.run Command Injection

Description: Attacker injects malicious commands into input that is used to construct a command string for Deno.run. When Deno.run executes this command, the attacker's injected commands are executed on the server.

Impact: Arbitrary command execution, full system compromise, data theft, service disruption.

Deno Component Affected: Deno.run API

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Avoid using Deno.run if possible.
  • Strictly validate and sanitize all input used with Deno.run.
  • Use parameterized commands or safe command construction libraries.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to the Deno process user.

Threat: Deno.ffi Misuse and Native Library Vulnerabilities

Description: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in native libraries called via Deno.ffi or misuses Deno.ffi API in a way that leads to security issues. This could involve calling vulnerable native functions, passing incorrect data types, or causing memory corruption.

Impact: Vulnerabilities inherited from native libraries, crashes, memory corruption, security breaches.

Deno Component Affected: Deno.ffi API, Native Libraries

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Carefully vet and select native libraries.
  • Keep native libraries updated.
  • Thoroughly understand native library APIs and security implications.
  • Implement robust input validation for Deno.ffi calls.
  • Consider sandboxing native library interactions.

Threat: Sandbox Escape (Deno Runtime)

Description: Attacker discovers and exploits a vulnerability in the Deno runtime's sandbox itself, allowing them to escape the sandbox and gain access to the underlying system.

Impact: Complete compromise of the Deno runtime environment, potentially full system access.

Deno Component Affected: Deno Runtime, V8 Engine, Sandbox Isolation

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Keep Deno runtime updated.
  • Rely on Deno security team's efforts.
  • Consider OS-level security measures (containerization, virtualization) in sensitive environments.