attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for diesel-rs/diesel

Objective: [*** Attacker's Goal: Unauthorized Database Access ***]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [*** Attacker's Goal: Unauthorized Database Access ***]
                                                    |
                      -----------------------------------------------------------------
                      |                                                               |
      [1. SQL Injection via Diesel]                                   [2. Misuse of Diesel Features]
                      |                                                               |
      ---------------------------------                               ---------------------------------
                      |                                                               |
              [1.1 Raw SQL]                                                   [2.2 Connection]
              ====>>>|                                                           ====>>>|
              ---------                                                           ---------
              |                                                                   |       |
        [***1.1.1***]                                                      [***2.2.1***] [***2.2.2***]
          ====>>>

Attack Tree Path: [1.1.1 diesel::sql_query with Untrusted Input]

• Description: This is the most critical vulnerability. It occurs when user-provided data is directly incorporated into a raw SQL query string without proper sanitization or parameterization. Diesel's sql_query function (and similar functions that execute raw SQL) are the entry points for this attack.
  • Example:

    // VULNERABLE CODE!
    let user_input = req.params().get("username").unwrap(); // Untrusted input
    let query = format!("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{}'", user_input);
    let results = diesel::sql_query(query).load::<User>(&mut conn);

    An attacker could provide input like ' OR 1=1; -- to retrieve all users.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake if raw SQL is used with user input)
  • Impact: Very High (Full database compromise: data exfiltration, modification, deletion)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Detectable with static analysis, code review, and penetration testing. Can be obscured by complex code.)
  • Mitigation:
    • Primary: Never directly concatenate user input into raw SQL strings.
    • Secondary: Use parameterized queries (prepared statements) provided by the database driver, even with raw SQL. Diesel provides mechanisms for this. Example:

      // SAFER CODE (using parameterized query)
      let user_input = req.params().get("username").unwrap();
      let results = diesel::sql_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?")
          .bind::<diesel::sql_types::Text, _>(user_input)
          .load::<User>(&mut conn);

    • Tertiary: Implement strict input validation and sanitization before even attempting to use the data in a query.

Attack Tree Path: [2.2.1 Connection Pool Exhaustion (DoS)]

• Description: This attack aims to make the application unavailable by exhausting the database connection pool. If the application doesn't properly manage connections (e.g., leaks connections, doesn't release them back to the pool, or has a very low connection limit), an attacker can repeatedly open connections until the pool is full, preventing legitimate users from accessing the database.
  • Example: An attacker could repeatedly make requests to an endpoint that opens a database connection but doesn't release it properly.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common in applications that don't handle connections properly)
  • Impact: Medium (Denial of service, but no data compromise)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Monitoring connection pool usage will reveal the problem)
  • Mitigation:
    • Ensure that database connections are always released back to the pool, even in error cases. Use RAII (Resource Acquisition Is Initialization) patterns or finally blocks (if available in your framework) to guarantee release.
    • Configure the connection pool with a reasonable maximum size and timeout settings.
    • Implement monitoring and alerting for connection pool usage.

Attack Tree Path: [2.2.2 Connection String Leakage]

• Description: This is a catastrophic vulnerability. If the database connection string (which contains credentials like username, password, host, and database name) is exposed, an attacker can directly connect to the database, bypassing all application-level security and Diesel entirely.
  • Example:
    • Hardcoding the connection string in the source code.
    • Storing the connection string in an insecure configuration file (e.g., committed to a public repository).
    • Exposing the connection string in error messages or logs.
    • Vulnerable environment variable configuration.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends heavily on configuration management practices)
  • Impact: Very High (Full database compromise)
  • Effort: Very Low (If the connection string is exposed)
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Varies (Easy if exposed in logs or configuration files, hard if only in memory)
  • Mitigation:
    • Never hardcode connection strings in the source code.
    • Use environment variables to store connection strings.
    • Use a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud Secret Manager) to securely store and retrieve connection strings.
    • Ensure that configuration files containing sensitive information are not committed to version control.
    • Configure logging to avoid exposing sensitive information.
    • Regularly audit configuration and deployment processes to ensure that secrets are not accidentally exposed.