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Attack Tree Analysis for dioxuslabs/dioxus

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code (Client/Server) in Dioxus App [CN]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Execute Arbitrary Code (Client/Server) in Dioxus App | [CN]
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                  ^
                                                  |
          +-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
          |                                     |
+---------------------+             +---------------------+
|  Exploit Event      | [HR]        |  Exploit Rendering  | [HR]
|  Handling Bugs     |             |  Vulnerabilities   |
+---------------------+             +---------------------+
          ^                                     ^
          |                                     |
+---------+---------+             +---------+---------+
| Inject  | Bypass  | [HR]        | XSS via |  Improper | [HR]
| Malicious| Sanit. |             | Unsafe  |  Input   |
| Event   |         |             | HTML    |  Valid.  |
| [CN]    |         |             | [CN]    |          |
+---------+---------+             +---------+---------+
          ^
          |
+---------+---------+
|  Craft  |  Find   |
|  JS     |  Weak   |
|  Payload|  Point  |
+---------+---------+
          ^
          |
+---------+
| Find    |
| Event   |
| Handler |
+---------+

+---------+---------+
|  Supply |  Memory  |
|  Chain  |  Corrupt.|
|  Attack |  in      |
|  [CN]   |  WASM/   |
|         |  Rust    |
+---------+---------+

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Exploit Event Handling Bugs -> Bypass Sanitization

  • Overall Description: This attack path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities in how the Dioxus application handles events, particularly user-generated events. The attacker aims to bypass input sanitization mechanisms to inject malicious code.

  • Steps:

    • Find Event Handler:

      • The attacker identifies a specific event handler within the Dioxus application that processes user input. This could be a handler for button clicks, form submissions, keyboard input, or custom events.
      • The attacker analyzes the code to understand how the event handler processes the input data.

    • Find Weak Point:

      • The attacker searches for vulnerabilities in the event handler's input validation or sanitization logic. This could involve:
        • Missing or incomplete input validation.
        • Incorrectly configured sanitization libraries.
        • Use of custom sanitization routines with flaws.
        • Bypassing sanitization through encoding or other techniques.

    • Craft JS Payload:

      • The attacker creates a malicious JavaScript payload designed to achieve their objective (e.g., steal cookies, redirect the user, exfiltrate data, modify the DOM).
      • The payload is often crafted to exploit specific vulnerabilities in the target application or browser.

    • Inject Malicious Event [CN]:

      • The attacker triggers the vulnerable event handler, providing the crafted malicious payload as input. This could involve:
        • Clicking a specially crafted button.
        • Submitting a form with malicious data.
        • Generating a custom event with a malicious payload.

    • Bypass Sanitization [HR]:

      • The attacker's malicious payload successfully bypasses the application's input sanitization, allowing the injected JavaScript code to be executed in the context of the application.

  • Critical Node: Inject Malicious Event: This is the crucial step where the attacker successfully delivers the malicious payload to the vulnerable event handler.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Exploit Rendering Vulnerabilities -> XSS via Unsafe HTML / Improper Input Validation

  • Overall Description: This attack path targets vulnerabilities in how the Dioxus application renders content, specifically focusing on Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities. The attacker aims to inject malicious scripts into the rendered output.

  • Steps:

    • Improper Input Validation [HR]:

      • The attacker identifies areas where user-supplied data is used in the rendering process without proper validation.
      • This could involve:
        • Directly embedding user input into HTML attributes.
        • Using user input to construct HTML elements dynamically.
        • Failing to validate data before passing it to Dioxus components.

    • XSS via Unsafe HTML [CN]:

      • The attacker crafts a malicious input that contains HTML tags, often including <script> tags or event handlers (e.g., onload, onerror) that execute JavaScript code.
      • The attacker provides this input to the application through a vulnerable input field or parameter.
      • The application renders the malicious HTML without proper sanitization, causing the injected JavaScript code to be executed in the user's browser.

  • Critical Node: XSS via Unsafe HTML: This is the critical point where the attacker's injected script is executed in the user's browser, leading to a successful XSS attack.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Supply Chain Attack on Dependencies

  • Overall Description: This attack vector targets the dependencies of the Dioxus application, rather than the application code itself. The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in third-party libraries or packages used by the Dioxus application.

  • Attack Vector:

    • The attacker identifies a vulnerable dependency used by the Dioxus application. This could be a Rust crate, a JavaScript library (for web targets), or even a dependency of a dependency.
    • The vulnerability could be a known vulnerability (e.g., listed in a vulnerability database) or a zero-day vulnerability (unknown to the public).
    • The attacker exploits the vulnerability in the dependency to gain control of the Dioxus application. This could involve:
      • Injecting malicious code into the dependency.
      • Modifying the dependency's behavior to achieve the attacker's goals.
      • Using the dependency as a stepping stone to attack other parts of the system.

  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it can lead to complete system compromise, and it's often difficult to prevent because it relies on the security of external components.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Memory Corruption in WASM/Rust

  • Overall Description: This attack vector targets potential memory safety issues within the Rust code compiled to WebAssembly (WASM) that Dioxus uses. While Rust is designed for memory safety, unsafe code blocks or vulnerabilities in external libraries can introduce risks.

  • Attack Vector:

    • The attacker identifies or creates a situation where memory corruption can occur. This is significantly more difficult in Rust than in languages like C/C++, but it's not impossible, especially when:

      • unsafe Rust code is used incorrectly. unsafe blocks bypass Rust's borrow checker and allow for manual memory management, pointer manipulation, and other operations that can lead to memory safety violations if not handled with extreme care.
      • Interfacing with C/C++ code (FFI - Foreign Function Interface) introduces vulnerabilities from those less-safe languages.
      • Rare bugs in the Rust compiler or standard library itself are present (extremely unlikely, but theoretically possible).
      • Vulnerabilities exist in the WASM runtime.

    • Types of memory corruption that could occur (though again, Rust makes these very difficult):

      • Buffer Overflows/Underflows: Writing data beyond the allocated bounds of a buffer, potentially overwriting adjacent memory.
      • Use-After-Free: Accessing memory that has already been deallocated, leading to unpredictable behavior or crashes.
      • Double Free: Attempting to free the same memory region twice, which can corrupt the memory allocator's internal data structures.
      • Dangling Pointers: Using a pointer that points to invalid memory (e.g., memory that has been freed or never been allocated).
      • Integer Overflows/Underflows: (Less directly memory corruption, but can lead to it) Arithmetic operations that result in values outside the representable range of the integer type, potentially leading to unexpected behavior or buffer overflows.

    • The attacker exploits the memory corruption to achieve one or more of the following:

      • Arbitrary Code Execution: Overwriting code pointers or function tables to redirect execution to attacker-controlled code.
      • Data Corruption: Modifying critical data structures to alter the application's behavior or state.
      • Denial of Service: Causing the application to crash or become unresponsive.
      • Information Disclosure: Reading sensitive data from memory.

  • Criticality: This is a critical node because successful exploitation of a memory corruption vulnerability can give the attacker complete control over the application, potentially bypassing all other security measures. The difficulty of achieving this in a Rust/WASM environment is high, but the impact is also very high.