Threat: Malicious Prop Injection
Description: An attacker injects crafted data into a component's props, bypassing intended validation logic within the component. This leverages Dioxus's component model and prop passing mechanism. The attacker aims to alter the component's internal state, triggering unexpected behavior specific to how Dioxus handles state and rendering.
Impact:
* Information Disclosure: Reveal sensitive data rendered by the component based on manipulated Dioxus state.
* Denial of Service: Cause the Dioxus component to enter an infinite loop or crash due to invalid state.
* Logic Bypass: Circumvent application logic controlled by the Dioxus component's state, exploiting Dioxus's reactivity system.
* Client-side manipulation: Change the behavior of client-side application, by manipulating Dioxus internal state.
Affected Dioxus Component: Any Dioxus component receiving props (#[component] macro, Scope object, props passed to components). The component's render function and state update logic within the Dioxus framework are the targets.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Strict Input Validation at Component Boundary: Implement robust validation before props are accepted by the Dioxus component. Use Rust's type system and custom validation functions, specifically checking for data structures and values expected by the Dioxus component.
* Immutability: Enforce immutability of props and state within the Dioxus component using Rust's ownership and borrowing. This prevents Dioxus from processing unexpected state changes.
* Dioxus-Specific State Management: Utilize Dioxus's state management tools (e.g., dioxus-hooks, use_ref) to centralize and control state updates, making it harder to inject malicious state.
* Defensive Rendering: Within the Dioxus render function, handle unexpected prop values gracefully, preventing crashes or unexpected behavior within the Dioxus rendering pipeline.
Threat: Re-render Flood (Targeting Dioxus's Diffing)
Description: An attacker sends crafted input that triggers an excessive number of re-renders, specifically targeting Dioxus's Virtual DOM diffing algorithm. The attacker aims to exploit inefficiencies or edge cases in the diffing process to cause performance degradation or a denial of service. This is distinct from general DoS; it targets Dioxus's core rendering mechanism.
Impact:
* Denial of Service: The Dioxus application becomes unresponsive due to excessive Virtual DOM operations.
* Resource Exhaustion: Server resources (in SSR/LiveView) or client browser resources are consumed by Dioxus's rendering engine.
Affected Dioxus Component: Dioxus's Virtual DOM implementation, specifically the diffing algorithm and the render function of components. Components with complex conditional rendering or large lists are more susceptible. use_effect and event handlers that trigger state changes are also key.
Risk Severity: High (especially for SSR/Liveview)
Mitigation Strategies:
* Dioxus-Specific Profiling: Use Dioxus's profiling tools to identify components and rendering paths that are particularly expensive or frequently updated.
* Optimize Diffing: Carefully structure components to minimize the amount of work required by Dioxus's diffing algorithm. Avoid unnecessary changes to the Virtual DOM. Use keys effectively for lists.
* Debouncing/Throttling (Dioxus Context): Use debouncing or throttling within Dioxus event handlers and use_effect to limit the frequency of state updates that trigger re-renders.
* Memoization (use_memo): Leverage Dioxus's use_memo hook to avoid recomputing expensive values that haven't changed, reducing the cost of re-renders within the Dioxus framework.
Threat: 3.1.3. Component Hijacking (LiveView/SSR): State Override via Compromised Dioxus LiveView Connection
Threat: State Override via Compromised Dioxus LiveView Connection
Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Dioxus LiveView WebSocket connection and sends malicious messages to the server, specifically targeting Dioxus's server-side component state management. The attacker overwrites the state of existing Dioxus components or injects new, malicious components, exploiting how Dioxus handles state synchronization.
Impact:
* Complete Application Control: The attacker controls the Dioxus UI and application logic through manipulated Dioxus state.
* Data Exfiltration: Steal sensitive data displayed by Dioxus components.
* Data Manipulation: Modify data managed by Dioxus on the server.
* Denial of Service: Crash the Dioxus application or disrupt its functionality.
Affected Dioxus Component: The dioxus-liveview crate, specifically the WebSocket communication handling and the server-side Dioxus component management logic. Server-side functions that handle client messages related to Dioxus state are critical.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Secure WebSocket (WSS): Always use WSS for Dioxus LiveView connections.
* Strong Authentication (Dioxus Context): Implement robust authentication specifically for Dioxus LiveView connections, verifying user identity before allowing interaction with Dioxus components.
* Message Validation (Dioxus-Specific): Validate all incoming messages from the client on the server-side, treating them as untrusted. Validate against the expected Dioxus message format and data types before updating Dioxus component state.
* Authorization (Dioxus Component Level): Implement authorization checks to ensure clients can only modify Dioxus components they are authorized to access, based on the Dioxus component ID or other identifiers.
* Input Sanitization (Dioxus State): Sanitize any data received from the client before using it to update Dioxus component state on the server.
Threat: 3.3.2. Untrusted Client Input to Server Functions: Server-Side Injection via Dioxus Server Functions
Threat: Server-Side Injection via Dioxus Server Functions
Description: An attacker sends crafted data to a Dioxus server function (#[server]), exploiting a vulnerability in how the function handles input. This is critical because Dioxus server functions provide a direct bridge between client-side actions and server-side logic. The vulnerability could lead to code injection or other server-side attacks because of the direct connection Dioxus provides.
Impact:
* Data Corruption: Modify or delete data.
* Code Execution: Execute arbitrary code on the server.
* Denial of Service: Crash the server.
* Data Exfiltration: Steal sensitive data.
Affected Dioxus Component: Server functions defined using the #[server] macro in Dioxus fullstack applications. The parameters of these functions, and how they interact with the rest of the Dioxus application, are the primary attack surface.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Strict Input Validation (Dioxus Server Function Context): Implement rigorous input validation on all data received from the client within Dioxus server functions. Validate data types, lengths, and formats before any processing.
* Parameterized Queries (within Dioxus Server Functions): If interacting with a database from a Dioxus server function, always use parameterized queries or an ORM to prevent SQL injection.
* Command Sanitization (Dioxus Server Function Context): If executing system commands within a Dioxus server function, meticulously sanitize and validate any user-provided input. Avoid direct string concatenation.
* Least Privilege (for Dioxus Server Process): Run the Dioxus server process with the least necessary privileges to limit the impact of a successful attack.
* Output Encoding (from Dioxus Server Functions): If the Dioxus server function returns data that includes user input, ensure proper output encoding to prevent XSS when that data is rendered by Dioxus components.